‘Choice Between Malaria and Cholera’ or ‘Democratic Façade’: The 2006 Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Abstract

This article presents an analytical case study of the electoral transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2006. The transition to electoral democracy was significant, yet also characterised by fragility, ambiguity and uncertainties. The article's primary focus is the intricacies of the presidential and parliamentary elections and how these electoral building blocks were constituted. It simultaneously draws attention to the transitional flaws that render the electoral benchmark insecurely grounded. The fault lines include doubts about the main candidates—‘the choice between malaria and cholera', uncertainties as to the political elite's commitment to the practices of electoral democracy—fears that the new order could turn out to be a ‘democratic façade’, the continuous threat of reversion to war in the east and outbreak of civil unrest in the west, dependence on international funding and security support, and the effect of weak state institutions. The two strongest forces propelling the possible consolidation (effective and repeat functioning) of elections in the DRC are popular war-weariness and international pressure on the political elite to make the electoral settlement work. This case study explores these countervailing trends.

Notes

Professor, Graduate School of Public and Development Management, University of the Witwatersrand, 2 St David's Place, Parktown, Johannesburg, South Africa. E-mail address: [email protected]

1. Also see the ICG (2005, 2006) warning that elections can only be part of the transition to democracy; that they are not an end in themselves. ‘Transition’ is generally understood to be a political process that brings about a change in the political regime. Morlino (1987, p. 53) notes that it is ‘the ambiguous and intermediate period’ when a preceding regime has abandoned certain of its non-democratic characteristics, ‘without having acquired all of the characteristics of the new regime that eventually will be established’.

2. In this regard, see O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986, pp. 51–61).

3. The author of this article has been on several research trips to the DRC, the most recent of which was field research at the time of the runoff presidential election in the DRC, October–November 2006. Field observations inform many of the points of analysis in this article.

4. This phrase was first noted in conversations with Congolese voters in Kinshasa. The sentiment was subsequently confirmed in the observation of spoilt ballots that would state ‘no choice’ (town of Kananga), or have the words ‘foreigner’ or ‘bandit and thief’ (town of Bunia) written next to the names of the second-round presidential candidates.

5. Boshoff and Wolters (2005) note the holding of elections as a ‘key element’ in the move from post-conflict transition to a democratic state.

6. The ICG (2007, p. 2) notes that this lull could possibly have been a function of preoccupation with campaigning. The ICG report also points to the fact that only 45 of the previous 500 members of the national assembly had won re-election.

7. Regarding the phenomenon of the weak institutionalisation of the DRC state, see Kabemba (2006a). Human Rights Watch (2005) elaborates on some of the institutional fault-lines in the year preceding the 2006 elections.

8. Whereas such domination by the winning party or alliance is commonplace internationally, it could be problematic in a country that is not only deeply divided between its east and west, but also just recently emerged from an inclusive multiparty transitional government period of three years.

9. See Kabemba (2006b, pp. 152–153) for a further elaboration of prevailing conditions in the DRC.

10. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) provides an insightful overview of this period.

11. Hempstone (1962) offers insights into that particular electoral period.

12. Moore (2006) analyses the events of this tumultuous period. Also see Young and Turner (1985).

13. Named after the South African resort where the delegates were hosted. It provided for a transitional constitution, and an inclusive power-sharing transitional government of two years.

14. The electoral system and arrangements around direct and indirect suffrage are specified in the Electoral Law (No. 06/006 of 3 March 2006).

15. In the case of the indirect elections, the electorate was constituted by the provincial deputies, city councillors, municipal councillors or sectors of chefferies councillors.

16. The pending new provincial boundaries were known at the time of these 2006 provincial elections.

17. The duration of voting operations was 11 hours on one day of voting. CEI operational staff (mostly part-timers trained for electoral functions) was notably more accomplished in the second round. Only a small number of voting stations did not open. Even in instances where stations opened late, voting materialised.

18. Resolution DIC/CPJ/09 of 18 April 2002 created the CEI. It was governed by a combination of relevant articles (154-160) in the 2003 Transitional Constitution, and the Organic Law 04/009 of 5 June 2004. The constitutional provisions were followed through in articles 5 and 211 of the Constitution of 18 February 2006. These articles provided for both institutions and processes that are required for the conduct of elections, including voter registration, voting operation and vote counting (EISA, 2006a, p. 5).

19. The amount was over and above the US$1.3 billion for MONUC's military operations (Boshoff, 2005). The US government funds constituted 27% of MONUC's annual budget, which gave the US a vital background role.

20. All major party. It is estimated that donors contributed a total of US$459 m to help organise the July 2006 elections. Acronyms and full party names are listed in Table 4.