In Search of a Public Sphere: Mainstreaming Religious Networks into the African Renaissance Agenda1

Draft paper originally presented at the 2006 Social Science Conference, Johannesburg, South Africa, 27–29 September 2006.

Abstract

The debate about the role of religion in public life has intensified in the last decade against the backdrop of ascendant religiosity that has challenged the secularisation and modernisation theses. Hitherto discarded or marginally treated as purely tenacious and atavistic in social science research, religion has become an important motif in the scholarly analyses of contemporary issues that shape interpersonal, social, national, and international relations. In the post-modern era, the motivation for most social science research on religion has stemmed from the reality of ascendant religiosity, which refers to the increasing recourse to faith or spirituality by a growing number of persons. Within this milieu, religious networks have emerged as important actors in civil society and as powerful forces for social mobilisation, albeit for both constructive and destructive ends. Given the enormous influence that religious networks wield over a great number of citizens in Africa, state actors have tended in recent times to co-opt faith-based organisations into policy implementation processes (such as HIV/AIDS advocacy) with a view to ensure that such activities effectively resonate amongst the people. Moreover, governments often mobilise the religious constituency in the implementation of different national development and transformation agendas. At the continental level, the logic of extricating Africa from its multifaceted problematique has been conceptualised as African Renaissance, a concept that has been robustly analysed in contemporary African scholarship. This paper amplifies the discourse on African Renaissance by examining critically the raison d'etre, possibilities, and plausible pitfalls of the integration of religious networks into the African Renaissance agenda.

Notes

Draft paper originally presented at the 2006 Social Science Conference, Johannesburg, South Africa, 27–29 September 2006.

It should be noted that the data for Tables 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 have been sourced from the World Christian Encyclopedia, which presents what is arguably the most comprehensive information on religious affiliation on country-by-country basis. However, we hasten to add that a Christian bias is not unlikely in this encyclopaedic presentation. (Note also that numbers do have political and strategic implications.) We have cross referenced these statistics with data obtained from the Central Intelligence Agency's World Factbook, and several scholarly materials in order to mitigate bias and to ensure reliability.

It is instructive to note that the literature on the constructive engagement of religious groups in such areas as promoting positive social change, poverty alleviation, conflict resolution, and development draws ideological insights from liberation theology which found expression in the prophetic tradition of Catholic Church leaders who not only decried the poverty, misery, suffering and injustice (in twentieth century Latin America) but also committed themselves to social action to extricate society from these problems.

A case in point is the recently concluded national census in Nigeria where the Federal Government expunged the section on religious affiliation from the census data form. In the opinion of the government, religion (more often than not) has been a sore point or a divisive factor in Nigerian politics; its inclusion in the national census and the result thereof could have implications for the prevailing schism between Muslim-dominated North and predominantly Christian South.

For details on Sufism in Senegal and its influence in the country's politics, see Behrman (1970); Creevey (1985); and Villalón (1995).

A case in point pertains to the current efforts by the South African Council of Churches (SACC) in addressing the crisis in Zimbabwe as well as its deleterious humanitarian consequences.

However, it is important to stress that a few religious institutions and leaders did endorse, support and legitimise colonialism and/or apartheid thus reflecting in some substantive and practical sense the social ambivalence of religion.

Authors' interview with TMW, civil society official Bas-Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 8 February 2006.

This point should be moderated by a caveat though i.e. that religion and faith-based institutions as well as their leaders have been implicated in (organised) violence and in a number of conflicts in Africa and elsewhere. Take, for instance, the culpability of the Rwandan churches in the infamous 1994 genocide, the several episodes of ethno-religious crises in Nigeria, and the apparent ‘handiness’ of religion as a leitmotif for terrorism.

Examples from Nigeria include but not limited to the Catholic Church, the Methodist and Anglican churches, the Redeemed Christian Church of God and the Islamic organisation, the Nasrul-Lahi-il-Fathi Society of Nigeria (NASFAT).

According to estimates, the figure is higher in West Africa as the survey referred to earlier reveals that 99 per cent of West Africans belong to one religion or the other.

See Ndegwa (1994) and Sabar-Friedman (1997) for details on state–civil society relations in Kenya. Also see Rothchild and Chazan (1998) and Ndegwa (1996) for details on state–civil society relations in Africa.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ufo Okeke Uzodike

∗Associate Professor of International Relations, School of Politics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. Email: [email protected]

Ayo Whetho

∗∗PhD candidate, School of Politics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa.