Stopping a Conflagration: The Response of Kenyan Civil Society to the Post-2007 Election Violence

Abstract

Kenya experienced unprecedented political violence following the flawed and disputed presidential election result in December 2007. Over 1,100 people were killed and another 600,000 displaced. The violence spread rapidly and threatened Kenya as a nation-state. Following international mediation by the African Union's Panel of Eminent African Personalities under the chairmanship of Kofi Annan, the former United Nations Secretary General, the two main protagonists agreed to end violence and to share political power. Although much has been written about the Kenya post-election violence, little has been said about the role the country's indigenous civil society groups played in the mediation process, and to end the violence. This article discusses the role they played in ending the crisis by responding to two questions: ‘How did civil society put out the fire?’ and ‘What lessons can other African civil society organizations learn from the experience?’

Notes

The debate on whether there was fraud or not is yet to be settled. See David Throup on how vote count progressed during the tallying (Throup, 2008). Kanyinga et al. (2010) have also attempted an analysis of presidential, parliamentary and civic election and conclude that the presidential vote comprised some anomalous votes. The Independent Review Commission (IREC) on the 2007 elections (referred to as Kriegler Commission, so named after Judge Johann Kriegler, who chaired it) investigated and concluded that the results were so polluted that it was not possible to know the winner. See the Independent Review Commission (IREC) on the 2007 elections, Nairobi: Government Printers, 2008.

The Kikuyu, Embu and Meru constitute what is usually referred to as GEMA or Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association. This group, whose members live around Mt. Kenya, is widely believed to have been politically and economically advantaged during the first post-colonial regime of President Kenyatta, a Kikuyu. Under President Kibaki, the group again began to dominate the political and economic spheres by staffing senior and powerful public sector positions with people from the region. This exacerbated feelings of marginalization among other groups.

The Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) popularly referred to as the Waki Commission (named after Justice Philip Waki, who chaired it) documented this pattern of violence in all the regions. See Republic of Kenya (2008b). Muthoni Wanyeki has also filled gaps in gender-based violence; she has given an analysis of how gender-based violence took place (see Wanyeki, 2009).

The cloud of secrecy and demand for high levels of confidentiality required of the mediation process made it difficult to collect solid data on what transpired. Nonetheless, Elizabeth Lindenmayer and Josie Lianna Kaye (2009) provide some insight on some of the events around the mediation process. Makumi Mwagiru (2008) provides an analytical overview. All the same, there is no ‘insider’ accounting of events that transpired during the period.

There is consensus that civil society comprises institutions and other organized interests between the state and the family. But there are still a number of issues on which there is limited agreement within these discussions. One of these is the question of autonomy of civil society, with some, such as Shivji (2008) observing that donors and the state induce development of their own civil society organizations (NGOs) to serve their interests (Shivji, 2008). Firoze Manji and Carl O'Coill make a similar argument on the proliferation of NGOs in Africa during the deepening of neo-liberalism. To them, African NGOs did not have an independent agenda (Manji and O'Conill, 2002).

Lester Salamon, et al (2004) presents a comprehensive overview of the global development, size and structure of civil society. On the whole, the 1990s started experiencing what Salamon et al. (1999) call ‘global associational revolution’ with the emergence of civil society in all sectors of the economy. They emerged to fill important gaps in service delivery as well as to facilitate democratization work, especially in Eastern Europe and Africa. (see Salamon et al., 1999).

Mahmood Mamdani (1996) spells out these challenges in ‘Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. See also Peter Gibbon, 2001.

It is interesting that the discussions on civil society in Africa do not give attention to the significance of social capital in terms of building collective efforts for democratization. Viewed in Putnam's sense of norms of reciprocity and civic engagement (Coleman, 1990: 307; Putnam, 1993: 167), social capital is taken as given but is not necessarily argued to be responsible for the form in which civil society organises in the civic arena. This appears as the main shortcoming of the literature on civil society and democratization struggles in Africa. The role of the foundation of the collective and communal spirit of togetherness is rarely discussed except with reference to the decolonization literature.

Alan Fowler is of the view that there is no single sector without NGOs’ involvement (Fowler, 2000).

The policy was developed to facilitate the work of development NGOs rather than the whole of civil society. Many advocacy and human rights groups are not considered in the major policy pronouncements. See Republic of Kenya, Sessional Paper No.1, 2006 on Non-Governmental Organisations.

Some of the earlier works on the role of Civil Society in Kenya during this period include Stephen Ndegwa. The Two Faces of Civil Society: NGOs and Politics in Africa. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1996. Others include Willy Mutunga. Constitution-Making from the Middle: Civil Society and Transitional Politics in Kenya, 1992-1997. MWENGO. Nairobi: SAREAT/MWENGO, 1999; Godwin R. Murunga and Shadrack W. Nasong'o. Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy. London: Zed Books in Association with CODESRIA, 2007; Makau Mutua, 2008. Human Rights NGOs in East Africa: Political and Normative Tensions. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Willy Mutunga has detailed the role of CSOs in constitutional reforms and shown how CSOs led other groups to constitute a reform movement from the mid 1990s. From these efforts, several leaders emerged to take up leadership of opposition political parties (Mutunga, 1999).

Makau Mutua provides a detailed analysis of the role played by human rights organisation and the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) in particular in forming the coalition (Mutua, 2008).

Thomas P. Wolf. ‘Poll Poison’? Politicians and polling in the 2007 Kenya Election. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol 27 No. 3 July 2009: 279-304.

PNU campaigned on an economic growth platform while ODM campaigned on a platform of political reforms. The government had resuscitated the economy from about a 2% to a 7% growth rate. If re-elected, the party argued, growth would soon trickle down to reduce poverty levels. On the other hand, ODM argued that PNU practised the ‘politics of exclusion’ and had marginalized several communities from the centre of power. The party campaigned on a political reforms platform. In addition, the party argued for generational and political change. The party argued that the PNU leadership was in the hands of a group of old men short of ideas and innovations; they were keen to ensure dominance at any cost. These issues divided the country. The divisions also took ethnic dimensions.

Muthoni Wanyeki has identified the various forms of violence that unfolded during the crisis. Muthoni Wanyeki, ‘Kenyan Civil Society and the 2007/2008 Political Crisis: Towards and Following the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR)’. Nairobi: African Research Resource Foundation (ARRF), Nairobi, 2010.

For academic analysis of the Mungiki, see: Mutuma Ruteere, Dilemmas of Crime, Human Rights and the Politics of Mungiki Violence in Kenya. Kenya Human Rights Institute (2008); David M Anderson, ‘Vigilantes, Violence and the Politics of Public Order in Kenya’, African Affairs (2002) 101, 531: Peter Mwangi Kagwanja, ‘Facing Mount Kenya or Facing Mecca? The Mungiki, Ethnic Violence and the Politics of the Moi Succession in Kenya, 1987-2002’, African Affairs (2003) 102, 25; Godwin Murunga, ‘Mungiki and Re-Traditionalisation of Society. CODESRIA Bulletin No 3&4, 2006.

The Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), for instance, publicly argued that there could be no peace without addressing the problem of the disputed poll and, secondly, without addressing historical injustices that had continued to cause conflicts between various groups. In one of several statements issued during the crisis, the Council noted that the injustices may hold the key to the genesis of the inter-ethnic animosities that remained unattended since independence in 1963. See Jibril Adan and Evalyne Ogutu (2008). Supkem: ‘Base the Talks on Truth and Justice,’ The Standard, 25 January, Pg. 19; Ngumbao Kithi (2008), ‘Kadhi Calls for Dialogue,’ The Standard, 30 January 2008 p.5.

The deepening of divisions between the Muslims and Christians began during the campaigns for the referendum on the 2005 draft Constitution of Kenya and centred on the perceived prominence of the Kadhi courts. Some Christian leaders did not want the Constitution to provide for the Kadhi courts while Muslims wanted more recognition of the courts. The divisions intensified and prevented the inter-religious groups from taking a common position on whether to support or reject the draft constitution. The divisions were evident at both the Bomas of Kenya National Constitutional Conference, as well as during the campaigns on the draft.

Majimbo is Kiswahili for federalism. ODM supported a devolved form of government comprising regional governments. PNU critiqued this as a threat to the unity of the nation.

The Cardinal of the Catholic Church is Embu and from the same Mt. Kenya region with the President as is the General Secretary of the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK). The main ethnic communities in the region are the Kikuyu and related Meru and Embu groups. It would have taken an enormous amount of courage by these two to ‘break ranks’ and attack the government or the senior leadership of their own region. The church also adopted a position similar to that of senior PNU leaders with regard to post-election violence. For instance, the head of the Catholic Church argued that the violence in Rift Valley was planned and fanned by politicians who targeted certain communities (referring to the Kikuyu, who were displaced). See Evalyne Ogutu and Brian Odero (2008).

The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) did acknowledge that the church was divided along ethnic lines during the crisis; it could not even take a common position on how elections would be managed because different leaders identified with what was favourable to their ethnic communities. See Patrick Nzioka (2008).

This is not to suggest that the church has completely reinvented itself. The church is yet to regain the authority it enjoyed over politics throughout the post-colonial period until 2002.

Details of the origins of Concerned Citizens for Peace are well elaborated in George Wachira with Thomas Arendshorst and Simon M. Charles. Citizens in Action: Making Peace in the Post-Election Crisis in Kenya – 2008. Nairobi: Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa (NPI-Africa).

Wachira, et al: 9.

The Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) organized round-table discussions to analyse the evolving situation. Some KPTJ members would be involved in these discussions and analyses. Through this approach, there was always a coalescence of views between some segments of the private sector, notably KAM, and KPTJ.

Muthoni Wanyeki (ibid) has identified about five interrelated contributions of CSOs to ending the crisis, including their role in the mediation process. The role of KPTJ is again comprehensively discussed in Oloo, et al (ibid). This section borrows from these papers.

Whether to go to courts or not invited debate from academics, too. There were also clear divisions among them. The most visible support for the courts came through Peter Mwangi Kagwanja's policy brief for Africa Peace Institute. See Peter Mwangi Kagwanja, Breaking Kenya's Impasse: Chaos or Courts. Africa Peace Institute Policy Brief No. 1 2008. Godwin Murunga's rejoinder was clear: Kagwanja's perspective was not neutral. There was no merit in going to courts, which was PNU's argument. See Godwin Murunga. The Kenyan General Elections: Troubling Propaganda or Intellectual Garb. Dakar: CODESRIA Bulletin No 1&2 2009.

CVIPEV report, op-cit.

Oloo Onyango, et al. Op-cit; Muthoni Wanyeki, Op-cit.

Wachira, et al: Op-cit.

Those involved in the drive for peace would give flowers to the police who sealed ‘open spaces’ to prevent ODM from holding rallies. They were also persistently knocking on the doors of the Internal Security officials to have a dialogue on police brutality.

For more see Wachira, et al. Op-cit.

The public support for dialogue and mediation should be qualified. There were divisions similar to those within the civil society. Some preferred dialogue if that would assist in resolving allegations of fraud while others preferred dialogue if this would end violence.

For more see Onyango Oloo, et al. Op-cit.

They included Uganda, Mauritania, Somalia and, initially, the US. The US government withdrew its recognition almost immediately after allegations of fraud intensified. Uganda, too, clarified that it had only commended the Kenyan voters.

For more see Onyango Oloo, et al. Op-cit.

KPTJ analysed the crisis and developed a set of recommendations shared with international donors and Western governments. The analysis, ‘The Political Crisis in Kenya: Defining the Way Forward’ was presented to the Panel on 2 February 2008. KPTJ had already publicly stated that power sharing was critical and that peace could only be secured if the government addressed the question of justice and truth about both the elections and the violence that was taking place. The February statement formalized this position. From then on, the media and Western governments began underlining the importance of power sharing, addressing the humanitarian crisis and promoting healing and reconciliation.

The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation. Annotated Agenda found at www.dialoguekenya.org/agreements.aspx (accessed 20 October 2010).

This was spelt out in Agenda Item 3: How to resolve the political crisis. Details of power sharing were then sketched out in the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government. These can be found at www.dialoguekenya.org/agreements.aspx (accessed October 2010).

Details on all Agenda 4 items in Annotated Agenda found at the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation www.dialoguekenya.org/agreements.aspx (accessed 20 October 2010).

For a comprehensive analysis on how the coalition government has performed in implementing these four Agenda Items under the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, see reports by South Consulting, a firm that has been tracking progress of implementation since 2008. These reports are available at http://south.co.ke/NationalAccord.aspx

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Karuti Kanyinga

Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Development Studies (IDS), University of Nairobi, Kenya. Email: [email protected]; CC [email protected]. The author wishes to thank Anders Sjogren, Kwamchetsi Makokha, Prisca Kamungi, Muthoni Wanyeki and David Everatt for comments that assisted in revising the paper. The usual caveats apply: views and errors in this paper are the author's.