The International Politics of Survival: The Case of Mugabe's Staying Power

Abstract

Despite Zimbabwe's economic and political system having been in freefall since 2000, by the elections of 2008, and even now in 2011, the country's president, Robert Mugabe, still managed (and manages) to rally support from portions of the population. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change garnered much international and domestic support, but it took until February 2009 to get Mugabe to share power. Puzzling too for Western observers was the reluctance of African states, especially South Africa, to push Mugabe to abide by democratic norms until late in the game, threatening new initiatives by the African Union and in southern Africa. This article explores the strategies that Mugabe used until a few years ago to play foreign and domestic actors and contexts off each other in order to maintain total control. The need for an approach that bridges the domestic-foreign policy theoretical divide is illustrated by how such an approach can deepen our understanding of the Zimbabwe case.

Notes

The new government was bound to maintain many of the agreed structures for seven years (including a guarantee of 20 of 100 seats in Parliament for whites).

By 2002, Mandela had handed over power in a second South African democratic election (1999); Zambia's President Chiluba, in office for 10 years, allowed elections to proceed without him as a candidate (2001); and the long-ruling leaders of Namibia, Malawi, and Mozambique all stated that they would respect their respective constitutions and not run for re-election (International Crisis Group (ICG), 11 January 2002, p. 2).

In late 2001, Congress passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Recovery Act, which imposed ‘smart’ (targeted) sanctions that promoted the seizure of assets and made travel to the United States illegal for Mugabe and other significant government leaders (Bond and Manyanya, 2003, p. 47).

Meredith, 2002, pp. 163–64. He also announced pay increases to public employees during the campaign (see Stiff, 2000, p. 305).

These included the Public Order and Security Act of 2000, a reduction in the number of polling places in urban areas where the MDC did well, and the use of violence against MDC supporters (Makumbe, 2002, p. 88).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Andrea Grove

Associate Professor of Political Science, California State University, Channel Islands