Theories of Distributive Justice and Post-Apartheid South Africa

Abstract

South Africa is a highly distributively unequal country, and its inequality continues to be largely along racial lines. Such circumstances call for assessment from the perspective of contemporary theories of distributive justice. Three such theories—Rawlsian justice, utilitarianism, and luck egalitarianism—are described and applied. Rawls' difference principle recommends that the worst off be made as well as they can be, a standard which South Africa clearly falls short of. Utilitarianism recommends the maximization of overall societal well-being, a goal which South Africa again fails to achieve given its severe inequality and the fact of the diminishing marginal value of money—that a given amount of money tends to produce more utility for a poor person than it does for a rich person. The final theory, luck egalitarianism, aims to make distributions sensitive to individual exercises of responsibility. This view also objects to South Africa's inequality, this time on the basis that the poor are overwhelmingly worse off through no fault or choice of their own. These major theories of distributive justice therefore all propose large-scale redistribution to the benefit of the (predominantly black) poor. Perhaps more surprisingly, all three views also provide support for socio-economic affirmative action, as opposed to South Africa's race-based Black Economic Empowerment.

Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of this article were presented at events at the University of Johannesburg in March 2012 and the Constitutional Court of South Africa in October 2013. I thank the audiences on those occasions for their comments. I am especially grateful to David Bilchitz, Daryl Glaser, and Peter Vale for helpful discussion, and Thad Metz for his detailed and insightful written comments.

Notes

1. Those in relative poverty live in households that fall below a poverty threshold that takes into account both income and household size; for instance, in 2009, the poverty threshold was R1259 for a one-person household and R4544 for an eight-person household.

2. An alternative, avowedly African approach to distribution is presented in Metz (2009, 2011, 551–554), (2012), 76–79.

3. Glaser (2007, 2010) mention Rawls in an egalitarian critique of racial affirmative action in South Africa.

4. Thad Metz raised this concern.

5. It may seem puzzling to discuss improving the condition of the worst off and eliminating involuntary disadvantage as alternative strategies, rather than alternative descriptions of the same strategy. But while the poor certainly tend to be involuntarily disadvantaged, the two strategies are distinct in principle and sometimes in practice. For instance, if I have R1000 which I can assign either to A, who is prudent and quite poor, or B who is destitute having burnt down his business through his own free will, I would give my money to B if I am concerned with improving the condition of the worst off, but to A if I am concerned with eliminating involuntary disadvantage.

6. I do not attempt here to combine the theories into a single pluralistic theory. Arneson's ‘responsibility-catering prioritarianism’ is a theory of this sort (Arneson 1999). I have suggested a similar view elsewhere (Knight 2008, 2009).

7. This case does, of course, also raise the issue of the distribution of income. I address this later in the section.

8. It might be countered that socio-economic affirmative action is impracticable. It would, however, be a relatively simple matter for government to require that any history of private education and medical aid is taken into account when assessing applicants, as well as parental wealth. These would serve as better proxies for advantaged upbringing than would race.

9. I thank a referee for urging me to consider this line of argument further.

10. I owe this suggestion to Thad Metz.