Post-liberation Democratic Authoritarianism: The Case of Namibia

Abstract

Namibia is praised as one of the most laudable democratic societies in Sub-Saharan Africa. But it also displays strong tendencies of autocratic political rule and intolerance with regard to views dissenting from the official ‘patriotic history’ under the former liberation movement, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO of Namibia), since Independence transformed into SWAPO Party. This article summarises and seeks to explain the underlying social currents for this situation. By doing so, it also illustrates that a formally intact democratic system does neither produce a fully democratic political culture—nor democrats, for that matter. A truly democratic breakthrough for a pluralist society based on mutual respect despite different political opinions seems, under the given circumstances of the Namibian society, an unlikely development in the near future, notwithstanding the good marks the political system receives in international rankings for African democracies.

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this article had been presented as a paper to the conference on ‘Democratization and Electoral Authoritarianism’ at the University of Lüneburg, 7/8 November 2013. I wish to thank the conference organisers Sebastian Elischer and Matthijs Bogaards for providing me this opportunity. I am also grateful to the two anonymous reviewers, whose observations and comments motivated me to further improve the text.

Notes

1. Slogan on the website of the Zimbabwe Solidarity Peace Trust established in South Africa by Zimbabwean scholars and activists (http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/).

2. This focus is also characteristic for Melber (2013; 2014) and the chapter in Doorenspleet and Nijzink (2014). Previous efforts include in particular Melber (2003c, 2004, and 2009b).

3. Recent exceptions are Hartmann (2009), the Namibia chapter in Elischer (2013, 100–139) and my own chapters in the edited volumes by Doorenspleet and Nijzink (2013c, 2014). Though guided by a different research interest, Elischer's many empirical references are suited to underline the general argument in this article.

4. It features only in two tables in the chapter by Lindberg and Jones (2010), classified as ‘democratic dominant’.

5. These were the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) in Angola and Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO) in Mozambique (both 1975), Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in Zimbabwe (1980), SWAPO in Namibia (1990) and the ANC in South Africa (1994).

6. The SWAPO was founded in 1960, later re-named into SWAPO of Namibia and after Independence in 1990 transformed into SWAPO party. It has retained to a large extent its movement character and despite being firmly rooted in the country's northern region formerly called Ovamboland, representing more than half of the population (and hence securing a decisive segment of the electorate) appeals to Namibians from different regions and cultures as well as social classes.

7. This implies that a relevant set of external variables impacting the constitutive character of Namibian democracy remain ignored. Following the argument of Levitsky and Way (2002, 2010a, 2010b), the particular historical epoch of appeasement as a result of the geopolitical environment after the collapse of the Soviet bloc resulted in a focus on good governance (cf. Abrahamsen 2000) over and above traditional security goals under the bipolarity of the Cold War period. Some of the external factors shaping constitutional ingredients in the transition to Namibian Independence are presented elsewhere (see Melber 2004; Melber and Saunders 2007). It should also be admitted, that class-specific factors influencing policy are also outside the scope of this article. This does not mean that the relevance and impact of social formations and class interests are denied.

8. http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/namibia/.

9. The figures are compiled from various reliable sources, including the official data released by the Directorate of Elections. See for the full party names (Table 4).

10. The director of elections for the Election Commission of Namibia (ECN) came under severe criticism after registering the RDP without alerting in advance SWAPO and State House that this will happen. In March 2008, he was finally replaced (Maletsky 2008). The members of the ECN are now almost all recruited on the basis of their political trustworthiness. Namibia's permanent representative to the United Nations, earlier unceremoniously dismissed as deputy foreign minister for being accused of supporting the foreign minister Hidipo Hamutenya in his ambitions to become the successor to president Nujoma, came under heavy criticism by party hardliners after the election results in the diplomatic mission in New York in November 2009 were in favour of the new opposition party RDP (with 25 votes against 24 votes for SWAPO). Being ultimately recalled by president Pohamba in late 2010 was widely perceived as political punishment (Gurirab 2010).

11. There were repeated cases of ministries using the facilities for party-political motivated activities, and State House provides the President also for party-political activities with all privileges. The equation that the party is the government and the government is the state is openly put into practice.

12. UDP activists remain nevertheless active in the Caprivi region, which was renamed into Zambezi in 2013. In April 2012, they planned a demonstration. While following all stipulated procedures in registering with the authorities, permission was categorically denied (Masawi and Konjore 2012). With reference to Diamond (1996, 23), Bogaards (2007, 187) reminds us that ‘bans on particularistic parties violate one of the nine features of liberal democracy’.

13. http://www.ecn.na/Pages/home.aspx.

14. See Chapter of The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia on ‘Regional and Local Government', which delegates authority to these newly established bodies.

15. It has become a habit for SWAPO leaders to donate funds to schools, which in turn are given their names or make them the official patron of the particular school benefitting. In September 2012, the leader of the RDP, Hidipo Hamutenya, was awarded the status as patron by a school in his northern home region after he had made some noteworthy donations. As a response, the school was blocked and children were prevented from attending. This even provoked a concerned intervention by one of the leading activists among the SWAPO party's Youth League, who asked if ‘the country (is) being led through emotions (rule of man) or by legitimate leadership and institutions (the rule of law)’ (Amupanda 2012).

16.

The Cabinet shall consist of the President, the Prime Minister and such other Ministers as the President may appoint from the members of the National Assembly, including members nominated under Article 46 (1) (b) hereof, for the purpose of administering and executing the functions of the Government. The President may also appoint a Deputy Prime Minister to perform such functions as may be assigned to him or her by the President or the Prime Minister. (http://www.gov.na/cabinet;jsessionid=351d6161d9c7efc84f5a485d858b. Accessed November 10, 2013)

17. Imagine such a fundraising dinner hosted by President Obama for the Democrats in the White House … .