Personhood and (Rectification) Justice in African Thought

ABSTRACT

This article invokes the idea of personhood (which it takes to be at the heart of Afro-communitarian morality) to give an account of corrective/rectification justice. The idea of rectification justice by Robert Nozick is used heuristically to reveal the moral-theoretical resources availed by the idea of personhood to think about historical injustices and what would constitute a meaningful remedy for them. This notion of personhood has three facets: (1) a theory of moral status/dignity, (2) an account of historical conditions and (3) the achievement of moral excellence by the agent (personhood). This article argues that a just society is a function of (1) and (2), and it further argues that the aim of rectification justice is to correct these two facets of a society, which are necessary for (3) to be possible. The aim of correcting history just is to make personhood a possibility for all humanity, particularly of those who were victims of past injustices.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 I am using Nozick's entitlement conception of justice because I am ultimately interested in addressing historical injustices. Surely, there are many ways to address historical injustices, I rely on the idea of ‘rectification justice’ for heuristical purposes to give us some sense of thinking about how to address historical injustices. As such, I am not committed to this idea for its own sake or even the entire political edifice within which Nozick imagines it. I think it is one useful way, heuristically, to think about past injustices in light of an influential African ethical concept of personhood.

2 Jason Van Niekerk’s (2013) doctoral thesis does a good job of defending this position in African ethics.

3 I am aware that Thad Metz (2011, 2013) does touch on addressing historical injustices and he insists that past injustices ought to be a feature of a robust moral theory. It is important, however, to note that in these articles Metz is not directly discussing the question of addressing historical injustices per se, but is ultimately showcasing that his theory does a better job than that of Wiredu, because it has the corpus to include past considerations in its moral purview. My aim just is to reveal the moral resources inherent in this idea of personhood to address historical injustices. Further, Metz takes a rights-based approach to address historical injustices. Elsewhere, I have argued that rights are incompatible with much of African moral-political thinking, particularly the moral logic inherent in the idea of personhood (Molefe 2017a). Elsewhere, I also argued that the theory that Metz relies on to address historical injustices is implausible, and, as such, if I am correct, it should not be taken seriously (Molefe 2017b).

4 Stephen Darwall’s (1977) article ‘Two Kinds of Respect’ anticipates the distinction between these patient-centred and agent-centred notions of personhood. For a brilliant distinction between these two concepts of personhood, see Behrens (2013) article ‘Two Normative Conceptions of Personhood’.

5 A cautious reader will note, however, that the entire article tethers the patient-centred and the agent-centred notions of personhood in its approach to questions of justice.

6 See Gyekye’s (1992) analysis of Afro-communitarianism.

7 I adopted this example from Metz (2013).

8 Think of act-utilitarianism, for example: the right action is defined as one that maximizes certain outcomes in the future (MacNaughton and Rawling, 2006). If I make a promise or even take a loan, when the time to fulfil my promise or to pay may dues, the most important consideration is not the mere fact that I promised (backward-looking moral logic) but rather what course of action(s) will maximise the good (forward-looking moral logic).

9 I will not here burden myself with the question of whether this necessarily implies that children are less moral than adults or they are merely untested or they are amoral. I would favour a position that considers them relative to their experience. But, I need not have answers to this question since it does affect my conclusions.

10 It is crucial that the social–political arrangements that are put in place ensure their amorality.

11 The reason for this is that the aim is a just society, and not correcting history for the sake of correcting history. Also, the reason is that the oppressor and the oppressed are both human; and, as such, both require conditions conducive for human beings to self-realize. The goal is putting in place an order conducive for all humanity to flourish.

12 I am committed to egalitarianism.