Trust and Justice – Establishing the Link

ABSTRACT

This article discusses the complementarity between the concepts of ‘justice’ and ‘trust’, and points out the ‘logical’ link between the two concepts, but observes that while the notions of justice implies trust, trust does not imply justice. The argument is that in the ideal situation where there is both trust and justice in a modern democratic state where cooperation is voluntary, there is a constant supply of justice that enhances the quality of governance. The substance of justice as fairness, is discussed with reference to Rawls concern with redistributive issues and this is illustrated by the long-standing land redistribution challenges in South Africa and other settler post-colonial states. This link with justice is established through order which originates from the trust that is generated through cooperation. The significance of justice for social order depends on the values it is associated with, and conversely, the significance of trust for social order depends on the degree of the presence of justice. Linking the two concepts: trust and justice, can thus enrich the analytical assessment of social order.

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Notes

1 This has been demonstrated by a wide range of literature including Putnam (1993) and Coleman (1988).

2 Logical investigation has contributed immensely to the understanding of logic and this is evident throughout philosophical enquiry. Engel Pascal’s (1981) definition of logic applies here: the theory of inferences that are valid in virtue of their form. This applies to deductive logic and the theory of inductive inferences does not belong to formal logic in the usual sense. See The Norm of Truth, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic, Toronto: Toronto University Press.

3 Kaplan (1961, 73–75) posed a question that he readily answered; ‘What are we to understand by the logical structure as distinct from the grammatical alone?’ The former relies on the use of Analytic statements whose truth can be certified by consulting the rules of the language in use and synthetic statements which cannot be refuted or established without some reference (direct or indirect) to factual experience.

4 See Stephens and Anderson’s (1997) response to Roberts’s definition of cooperation. Whilst they advocate the use of an economic definition (for its easy applicability and manipulability), they debate the merits of both approaches, the behavioral and the economic definition. 

5 Political ideology and cooperation reveal one of the other dimensions. See Daniel Balliet et al. (2016).

6 Mistzal (1996) positions trust as one of the important sources of cooperation generated by trustworthy behavior.

7 Froestad (2002) finds this to be a challenge and yet cooperation that sustains human relationships is more or less equally balanced between generalized reciprocity and ‘particularized reciprocity’. The latter would pertain to relations between familiar parties whilst the former refers to unconsciously coordinated cooperation amongst strangers. Another type, balanced reciprocity, refers to simultaneous exchanges of items of equivalent value.

8 See The Catholic Encyclopedia, 1908 Contrat Social.

9 Mistzal divides social order into three categories that are determined by the function of trust: stable order which accounts for the predictability, reliability and legibility of the social reality; cohesive order that can be viewed as normative integration and collaborative order that refers to social cooperation (see Mistzal 1996). On the other hand, utilitarian theory views social order as a coincidence of egoistic interests and for Spencer it is a result of contractual obligations and for Durkheim it is the submission to a collective conscience which is the supreme authority.

10 See Hume’s Ethical Writings 1965 edited by Alastair MacIntyre, Oxford University, page 79.

11 A complication that may arises from Rawls’ view is that he does not distinguish between just and fair, the two are used interchangeably. The ambiguity is removed by using the words right and fair respectively.

12 There are different types of justice and this paper only refers to two: procedural justice which refers to decision making on the basis of rules that are known in advance impartiality in administering the rules. And redistributive justice which refers to the distribution of resources fairly so that everyone is adequately rewarded only on the basis of what they have done, an equal reward for equal tasks.

13 We must read with caution that Rawls does not advocate absolute equality with regard to the distribution of wealth but that he proposes access to equal opportunities. An example of an unjust system with regard to distribution is the caste system that denies advantages to some.

14 Some critics discredit the notion of justice as fairness for lacking the means to redress how the talented can affect their demands on society.

15 Lane and Bachmann (1998), amongst others call this the control mechanism. The implication is that it takes the dominant role in structuring relations.

16 Emphasis added.

17 Emphasis added.

18 This is reductionist in so far as it overlooks the role of other factors such as ethnicity and religion in enhancing solidarity.

19 A number of surveys have demonstrated the relationship between perceptions of equality and trustworthiness of institutions. Among these are the Afrobarometer surveys 1999–2001 and 2002–2003 and the Eurobarometer surveys. For the latter, see Norris (2000).

20 The former communist states attempted material fairness and yet trust remained low as strategies for effecting the new social order were devoid of justice.

21 The Weberian sense in which authority is power marked by the consent of the citizens applies here.

22 See Mercy vs Justice: A clash of Virtues on http:/wwwatheism.about.com/llibrary/FAQ/phil/blphil/_mercyjustice.htm

23 Note that many conflicts are rooted in disputes that occurred generations before. And an empirical example is that support in the Zimbabwe president increased by 25% points from 1999 (20%) to 45% in 2004 after the violent land redistribution exercise.

24 A’s payoff is 1,1 and B’s is the second quantity. If both choose to cooperate then both gain 1 unit. If one defects and the other cooperates, defector gains 2 units and the other loses 2 units. If they both choose to cooperate, then they maximize and both gain 2.