South Africa’s dwindling developmental local government: a dying dream?

ABSTRACT

This article brings politics and Democratic Developmental State (DDS) theory back into the debates surrounding the operationalisation of Developmental Local Government (DLG) in South Africa. It interrogates the extent to domestic political factors and actors have impacted the ability of the DLG to fulfil its constitutional and developmental mandate. It does so by adopting a theoretical case study methodology in assessing the functioning of South Africa’s DLG against three ‘micro-foundations’ of the DDS model: Developmental-Oriented Leadership, Effective Local ‘Pilot Agency’ and Meritocratic Bureaucracy, and Developmental Performance. It finds that the political imperatives and motives of the ANC at play at the onset of democracy in 1994 coupled with the local politicking ever since has crippled the ability of local government to fulfil its constitutional and developmental mandate. This article proposes the adoption of the Developmental Civil Society (DCS) model as a tool to circumvent South African local power politics and boost developmental capacity at the local level in order to fully realise a DDS. It goes beyond the objective of DLG through the self-empowerment of citizens, not only as policy formulators and passive recipients of development, but as active producers of inclusive socioeconomic development.

Introduction

Since the dawn of South Africa’s democracy in 1994, democratic development (expressed through the promise of inclusive socioeconomic development through participatory democracy) has been one of the greatest expectations of many South Africans. Democratic developmentalism, a key ideology of the ruling African National Congress (ANC), has served as one of key cornerstones in the country’s democratic transition: At the national level, it has been encapsulated under the banner of the Democratic Developmental State (DDS). At the local level, it assumed the form of Developmental Local Government (DLG) (Khambule 2020, 155). The concept and theoretical framework of DLG heralds from South Africa and is considered to be a recent development in post-development theory (Schoburgh 2016, 20). South Africa’s DLG is intended to serve as the building blocks of its DDS. Referred to by Eris D. Schoburgh (2016) as the ‘micro-institutional developmental state’, South Africa’s DLG was envisioned by the White Paper on Local Government as the localised iteration and replica of the Developmental State (DS) model (Khambule 2020, 167). In its role, DLG is mandated to work alongside its constituents in the formulation of local developmental policies which responds swiftly to the context-specific needs of their communities. For Schoburgh (2016, 20), then, ‘The ultimate logic of DLG is the creation of an atmosphere in which local solutions to local development challenges can be generated’.

Yet, sadly, after 28 years of democratic rule, democratic development has failed to inform the ‘modus operandi’ of both national and local government. While South Africa’s pursuit of building a capable DDS is yet to yield any concrete results, its DLG remains in crisis unable to realise its duties and obligations (Nagar 2021a; Tshishonga 2021). In particular, local government has failed in addressing the systemic and persistent issues of, ‘administrative incapacity, inefficient delivery, under spending and corruption, inadequate consultation, poor responsiveness and lack of accountability’ (Tshishonga 2021, 28).

Local government’s developmental deficiencies, have persisted in the wake of numerous state interventions such as, ‘Project Consolidate (2004–2006), Siyenza Manje Programme (2006–2009), Local Government Turnaround Strategy (2009), Operation Clean Audit Programme (2009–2014) and, currently, Back to Basics’ (Tshishonga 2021, 28). More recently in 2018, Cyril Ramaphosa launched the Thuma Mina! (Send Me!) campaign which sought to improve service delivery by emphasising individual citizen involvement in service delivery (Maluleke 2018). However, increasing voter apathy coupled with the intensification of service delivery protests suggests that South Africans have not bought into Ramaphosa’s vision of a ‘New Dawn’ nor the borrowing of the late Hugh Masekela’s principle of Thuma Mina. More worryingly, it sheds light into the current state of South Africa’s democracy where citizens express little interest in the electoral process as a transformative tool for democratic development.

This is most evident recent 2021 local government which was marked by a shockingly low percentage of voter turnout: Less than half (43 percent) of South Africans who registered to vote came to the polls on 27 October 2021 (Mkhize et al. 2021). This indicates a 15 percent drop in voter turnout since the previous elections in 2016 and also represents ‘the lowest turnout for democratic elections in South Africa’ (Mkhize et al. 2021; Runciman and Bekker 2021). Besides administrative and personal factors, other key factors which have contributed to the abstention from the 2021 local government elections include, ‘complaints about service delivery and corruption, uninterest or disillusionment, and a lack of political alignment’ (Runciman and Bekker 2021).

In light of this, this article brings politics and DDS theory back into the debates surrounding the operationalisation of DLG in South Africa. It seeks to interrogate the extent to domestic political factors and actors have impacted the ability of the DLG to fulfil its constitutional and developmental mandate. It situates its theoretical analysis within the context of South Africa’s local government which is riddled by intense political party competition, poor governance and corruption, and institutional weaknesses. It will flesh out the domestic political imperatives and factors that have contributed, not only to the creation of South Africa’s DLG, but also to its (dys)functionality.

In addressing these objectives, this article poses the following three research questions: Firstly, ‘What role did national political factors and actors play in the establishment of South Africa’s DLG?’ Secondly, ‘To what extent does South African local politics facilitate the function of DLG?’ Thirdly, ‘How can South Africa circumvent local power politics to truly achieve bottom-up democratic development?’

This article vehemently argues that the political imperatives and motives of the ANC in 1994 coupled with the local politicking ever since has crippled the ability of local government to fulfil its constitutional and developmental mandate. Given its current weakened state, local government hardly provides a conducive environment for democratic development. The inability of local government to uphold and deliver on its constitutional mandate and various legislative frameworks has resulted most evidently in poor service delivery. Broadly speaking, developmentalism (and in particular, the issue of service delivery) has, therefore, been used as a political tool at both the national and local level as part of their respective political campaigns: Here, the blame for poor service delivery outputs is passed between the national and local spheres of government and among the competing political parties. The growing politicisation of service delivery has increasingly occupied the focus of government and captivated the attention of the electorate so much so that emphasis is detracted from the business of delivering quality public goods and services to the citizenry.

In circumventing the ‘politics of the day’, South Africa must burrow deeper and plant the developmental seed within a fertile proactive civil society if it is to truly achieve democratic development. For this reason, this article calls for the construction of, not a ‘micro’, but rather a ‘nano’ institutional developmental state from below with the introduction of the Developmental Civil Society (DCS). The DCS goes beyond the objective of DLG through the self-empowerment of citizens, not only as policy formulators and passive recipients of development, but as active producers of inclusive socioeconomic development.

The remainder of the article is divided into five sections: The first section provides a literature review which interrogates the political imperatives at play during the establishment of South Africa’s DLG. The second section outlines the research design and methodology employed within the article. The third section fleshes out the domestic political variables inherent in its theoretical analysis of South Africa’s DLG according to three ‘micro-foundations’ of the DDS model: Developmental-Oriented Leadership, Effective Local ‘Pilot Agency’ and Meritocratic Bureaucracy, and Developmental Performance. The conclusory section offers a brief final word on the need for South Africa to cultivate a proactive DCS in its long-standing quest for democratic development.

Political imperatives surrounding the establishment of South Africa’s Developmental Local Government (DLG): a review of the literature

During South Africa’s apartheid (1948–1994) and in line with the main tenets of racial segregation outlined in the Group Areas Act, each racial group was delegated its own local authority. Jaap De Visser (2009, 8) describes this scenario as one in which the white minority population reaped the benefits of ‘well-resourced and viable commercial centres with strong revenue bases’ while the majority black and population were forced to occupy the barren underdeveloped outskirts. He further contends that local government was underpinned by an ‘urban economic logic that systematically favoured white urban areas at the cost of black urban and peri-urban areas’ (De Visser 2009, 8). It follows, then, that there existed no single local government, with the sufficient capacity, that catered to the needs of the South African population as a whole. Thus, prior to 1994, local government came to be considered as, ‘a racially configured, illegitimate arm of government’ which exclusively attended to the socioeconomic interests and needs of the white minority (De Visser 2009, 7).

The advent of democracy in 1994 witnessed a complete overhaul and restructuring of local government in order for it to serve and reflect, not only the white minority, but the entirety of the South African population. Various legislative frameworks informed and supported the establishment of South Africa’s local government, which included: ‘the Constitution (1996), the White Paper on Local Government (1998), the Municipal Structures Act (1998), the Municipal Demarcation Board Act (1998), the Municipal Systems Act (2000), and the Municipal Financial Management Act (2003)’ (Tshishonga 2021, 29). The place, role and function of local government was to be greatly enhanced and elevated in South Africa’s democratic dispensation: In line with South Africa’s DDS ambitions, local government was expected to be people-driven and assume a developmental function (Department of Provincial and Local Government [DPLG] 1998).

Not only was local government solely tasked with provision of service delivery, but it was expected to engender public participation within the development process by empowering citizens as key actors in the formulation of local developmental policy. The DLG came to be defined by the following four characteristics (De Visser 2009, 9–10):

• Maximising economic growth and social development: local government is instructed to exercise its powers and functions in a way that has a maximum impact on economic growth and social development of communities.

• Integrating and coordinating: local government integrates and coordinates developmental activities of other state and non-state agents in the municipal area.

• Democratic development and public participation: local government becomes the vehicle through which citizens work to achieve their vision of the kind of place in which they wish to live.

• Leading and learning: municipalities must build social capital, stimulate the finding of local solutions for increased sustainability, and stimulate local political leadership.

In terms of its position, local government was no longer regarded as the lowest tier of government, but rather as a distinct, interrelated and independent sphere of government bearing an equal importance and weight in relation to the national and provincial spheres (Republic of South Africa 1996). This change occurred within the context of South Africa’s state system which embeds federalism within a unitary state system thereby catering for provincial and local elections (Govender and Ramodula 2020). This arrangement facilitated the decentralisation of powers and functions to local government in a bid to have it as the sphere ‘closest to the people’ (Oosthuizen and Thornhill 2017, 433). For the first time, citizens and local institutions were given the opportunity to participate in and shape developmental policy through democratic, ‘bottom-up’, approaches to development: The rationale for this proximity is simple; local politicians and citizens were better equipped to articulate and arrive at policy solutions which best fit their locale. In addition, the provision made for local government elections (every 5 years), brought democracy to the grassroots level by allowing citizens to elect local politicians who best represented and grasped their context-specific needs and political values.

Yet, during the same time in which the country was establishing its local government, South Africa’s the ruling party faced mounting pressure to racially transform its bureaucracy to complement its racially transformed government and society. Unlike other African countries who formed part of the British colonial empire (such as Botswana and Mauritius), South Africa’s period of apartheid, which directly proceeded colonial rule, prevented the training of an indigenous bureaucracy by British expatriates during the terminal phase of colonial rule and as it transitioned into democratic rule (Nagar 2015, 2019). At the onset of its democracy in 1994, the ruling ANC decided against retaining the existing civil service (at least for a set period of time), comprising of white appointed officials and using them to train a cohort of black South African civil servants. In so doing, much of the valuable knowledge, skills and institutional memory were not transferred over to South Africa’s newly established local government. This hindered the possibility of transferring ‘technical (and technocratic) standards of efficiency and effectiveness’ which is essential to building a competent and largely-incorrupt bureaucracy (Wallis 1989, 52; Nagar 2015). Even more problematic, the ANC’s political imperative to racially transform a previously white government structure meant that it undermined a cardinal rule of the DS: The presence of a meritocratic bureaucracy; i.e. that bureaucrats be recruited and compensated strictly according to merit. In this manner, the ruling party forsook standards of meritocracy in favour of race as a key determining factor in the recruitment of bureaucrats. As will be shown below, this decision has been detrimental to the functioning of the South Africa’s administrative machinery and DLG.

At a first glance, then, one can observe that local government was bestowed with an ambitious and sweeping mandate while simultaneously being stripped of any technical capacity to deliver. This is compounded by the fact that, prior to 1994, there existed no single local governmental architecture to cater to the needs of the entire population. Making matters worse, at the time, the majority of the population (being those of colour) lived in abject poverty and relative deprivation as a result of apartheid’s laws which vehemently denied them equal access to public goods and services and of opportunities (Hirschowitz and Orkin 1997). In 1994, a mere 59 percent of households had access to running water, 48 percent to sanitation and 30 percent to electricity (De Visser 2009, 11).

While the ANC’s need to racially reconfigure government can be easily accepted as a pressing political imperative – with unforeseen and unintended consequences – its reasoning for federalism and decentralisation is arguably pre-empted by more sinister political motives and considerations. According to Albert Van Zyl (2003), the ruling party’s motives for (fiscal) federalism and decentralisation was a political decision which had little to do with maximising administrative efficiency in the areas of service delivery and public financial management. Rather, this was a political strategic decision informed by the ANC’s electoral objectives: Federalism and decentralisation assisted the ANC in securing and maintaining control over national government while allowing opposition parties the opportunity to contest for provincial and local spheres of government.

Moreover, it is quite possible that the ANC foresaw that the provision of basic goods and services would not be as speedily rolled out as anticipated by South Africans at the advent of democracy. By assigning the monumental task of service delivery on to a newly formed local government – under the guise of decentralisation – the ruling party (and more so, national government) was able to shirk responsibility for poor service delivery. In this way, the ANC would not lose credibility in the eyes of the public, and blame would be assigned to underperforming municipalities and its respective political party.

As can be seen then, the political imperatives which informed and shaped the established of South Africa’s DLG at a national level during its transitionary period unknowingly created a fissure for excessive local political actors and factors to permeate the administrative and political space of local government and widen and exploit it for their political gains to the detriment of democratic development well into the future.

This article, therefore, seeks to contribute to the growing literature on South Africa’s DLG by assessing the extent to which South Africa’s political system (and its resultant local political actors and factors) have facilitated the functioning of its ‘micro-institutional developmental state’ from its inception in 1996 up until the recent 2021 local government elections. This is especially important given that the DS model is – at its core – a bureaucratic state model and a thought is seldomly spared for its applicability in varying political environments. For this reason, it is essential to determine the types of political systems and factors which would best facilitate its operability within South Africa’s local context. Adopting a political perspective to the topic is significant as it allows us to situate the DLG’s theoretical framework within the ‘real world’ context of South African politics. Isolating and diagnosing politics as one of the determining pervasive root causes of local government’s poor performance and measuring it against the inherent logic of the DS enables us to provide a holistic assessment and arrive at a workable and appropriate solution.

Methods and materials

This article conducts a theoretical case study in its interrogation of South Africa’s DLG. It does so by evaluating the functioning of DLG against three key micro-foundations of the DDS model:

• Development-Oriented Local Leadership: The presence of develop-oriented and incorrupt elected and appointed local officials/leaders who are dedicated to inclusive socioeconomic growth and transformation and who possess the capacity to realise this vision.

• Effective Local ‘Pilot Agency’ and Meritocratic Bureaucracy: This is characterised, firstly, by the presence of a local ‘pilot agency’ that exercises power and authority needed to formulate, coordinate and implement local development plans. Secondly, it safeguards civil servants from external influences in such a way as to prevent political pressures from having an excessive bearing on or potentially overturning the developmental project. Thirdly, it attracts and appoints the most technically competent and highly trained local civil servants and recruits and promotes them on the basis of merit.

• `Developmental Performance: The extent to which municipalities have upheld their developmental mandate through the provision of service delivery and the inclusion of local citizens in the developmental process via popular participatory mechanisms.

The impact of politics within developmental local government: results

Developmental-oriented leadership

It is no secret that Africa’s post-colonial public sectors are highly politicised arenas – and South Africa has, unfortunately, not been exempted from this trend (Booysen 2012a; Cameron 2003, 2010; De Visser 2010). Undue, excessive and inappropriate political interference in the functioning of local municipalities has been flagged by Jaap De Visser (2009) as one of the main variables affecting the performance of South Africa’s DLG. Similarly, Purshottama S. Reddy (2016, 1) draws a correlation between, ‘political infighting and related clashes between the political and management components’, and South Africa’s poor service delivery track record.

Indeed, the beginning of the politicisation of South Africa’s DLG occurs at the apex; within its leadership structures. According to Purshottama Reddy (2016), the infiltration of politics within local government has been unavoidable given the ANC’s insistence that municipal leaders share their political ideologies and developmental vision. This insistence is on the basis that a common political ideology and developmental vision will assist in the achievement of developmental goals. Consequently, close ties to the ruling party has been a major consideration in the appointment of senior officials regardless of their qualifications, knowledge and skills (Masuku and Jili 2019). Reddy (2016, 8) draws on Werner Zybrands (2012, 82) in making the following illustration to drive home the point:

For example, X is a school principal, who has been fired for fraud, and has been appointed a municipal manager; Y is a geography teacher who has been appointed a chief financial officer of a municipality; and Z, who does not have any technical skills, is appointed as technical manager after the provincial premier intervened.

Political affiliation and the proximity of candidates to the ANC also has a bearing on the nomination and election of councillors – again, irrespective of whether these individuals hold the necessary credentials (Masuku and Jili 2019).

In sum, then, the scourge of nepotism and political patronage has ultimately resulted in, ‘corruption and fraud, with political ‘mandates’ that are illegal and have obscure origins leading to, inter alia, negative audit opinions due to poor financial management’ (Reddy 2016, 5). This has severely impacted local governance and the ability of local government to deliver on its developmental mandate and has caused an uproar among South Africans: According to Susan Booysen (2012b, 352), ‘faltering local government, graphically exposed to policy realisation deficits and multiple cases of overt corruption, mismanagement and inappropriate appointments – often elicits popular disdain’.

The solution to the increased politicisation of local government, as noted by Zybrands (2012, 87), lies in ‘the appointment of competent and qualified staff and compliance with the laws, rules and regulations’. However, the impetus behind this solution, unfortunately, is also the cause of the problem; and that is politics, or more specifically, political will.

Effective local ‘pilot agency’ and meritocratic bureaucracy

There has been an increasing concern around the weakening of the political-administrative interface within South Africa’s local government: According to Jaap De Visser (2010), there has been excessive political influence exerted on municipalities by regional party structures which has negatively affected their performance. Unsurprisingly, then, the politicisation of South Africa’s DLG has trickled down from its political and administrative leadership structures and taken hold of the local bureaucracy.

Within the context of DLG, ward committees serve as the localised version of a ‘pilot agency’: Ward committees comprise of up to 10 members who are democratically elected and serve as an important link between the councillor, municipality and community. They play an important democratic role in relaying the needs of the community to the councillor, determining and involving public participation within the formulation of Integrated Development Plans (IDPs), municipal budget, municipal performance management and local economic development projects (DPLG and German Agency for Technical Cooperation [GTZ] South Africa 2005).

However, political factors have also negatively affected the functioning of ward committees. A study conducted by Laurence Piper and Roger Deacon (2008) found that ward committees are infiltrated by politics either through intense inter-party competition; intra-party competition and factionalism; or through what is referred to as term ‘policy competition’ where the role of the ward committee is determined by the political party instead by the legislature. In certain instances, Piper and Deacon found that the relationship between ward committees and political party branches were so close that they mirrored each other in structure and membership.

Regardless of local government’s elevated position in the post-1994 dispensation, prospective civil servants still view it as the lowest tier of government rather than an independent sphere of equal weighting and importance and on par with national and provincial spheres. For this reason, local government has an especially difficult time attracting the best and most talented officials. This is aggravated by the small proportion of total national revenue allocated to local government (9 percent in comparison to national and provincial government’s 48 and 43 percent, respectively) which translates into fewer resources, making local government less attractive to highly skilled candidates (Khambule 2020). Important to note is that the division and allocation of national revenue among the three spheres is informed by ‘political judgement’ rather than a set formula (National Treasury 1999, 64). Local government’s small allocation is premised on its alleged ability to raise the majority of its revenue – a point which will be deliberated below.

Compounding this issue has been has been the persistence of cadre deployments within South Africa’s local civil service. This has led to a highly politicised local bureaucracy where ANC party affiliations and loyalty trumps technical and administrative competency in the recruitment of public officials (Nagar 2015). The ANC’s policy of cadre deployment began in 1997 and involves the placement of party loyalists in prominent positions within the civil service (Willis 2022).

This has comprised the professionalisation and meritocracy of local municipalities, blurred the line between the ruling party and the local public service and has resulted in unpredictable and exceedingly low levels of capacity and performance: ‘A fraudulent curriculum vitae, poor to zero qualifications, a history of mismanagement, and personal connections influencing appointment are defining characteristics of the questionable ‘cadre’’ (Willis 2022). A 2008 survey conducted over 373 ward committees in the Nelson Mandela Municipality found that a mere 9 percent of members held post-matric qualifications (Bendle 2008). It is argued that this figure may be lower within rural areas (Bendle 2008).

Adam Habib (2015) notes that when municipal leaders are queried about poor performance they instinctively respond with, ‘look at the (poor) quality of the people that I have around me’. Yet, when further questioned around the basis for the appointment of under-qualified staff, municipal leaders quip, ‘to disown the appointments one had made, and the consequences thereof, is a manifestation of unaccountable leadership’ (Habib 2015).

Developmental performance

Overall, South Africa’s local government has made remarkable progress in the provision of basic services since 1994 (Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation [DPME] 2014): Figures from its 20-year review conducted in 2014 show that access to water supply has increased from 70 percent in 1996 to approximately 90 percent in 2011. Over the same period access to sanitation increased 20 percent from 51 to 71 percent and access to electricity increased from 62 to 85 percent. However, local government still has a way to go in providing public goods and services to its entire population: According to the 2021 Governance Performance Index (GPI), ‘at least half of all local municipalities are providing help to 100% of indigent households with access to adequate water, electricity, sewerage systems and refuse removal’ (Corruption Watch 2022).

Important to note is that performance varies among the different categories of local government. Two factors affecting local government’s varying performance are uneven capacity and geographical location: Rich urban districts (historically occupied by the wealthy white minority during apartheid) perform better in terms of service delivery in comparison to poor rural ones (comprised of the poor disenfranchised black majority) (Sartorius and Sartorius 2016). This is because rich urban districts have a greater tax base from which local government sources much of its revenue. For example, in 2021, the GPI rated the City of Cape Town (a large urban metropolitan municipality) as the top-performing municipality and the City of eThekwini (where 45 percent is rural) the worst (Corruption Watch 2022).

As can be seen, apartheid’s legacy of racial segregation continues to have an effect and impede on the ability of local government as a whole to provide adequate and equitable service delivery across the board irrespective of geographical location.

Other key political factors which have contributed to poor service delivery includes, as alluded to above, poor leadership and incompetent human resources (Kalonda and Govender 2021). As noted, both these two issues stem from the increasing politicisation of South Africa’s local government: Politically appointed leaders have a tendency to politicise the rolling out of service delivery and often do not fully grasp the required key management principles (Ndevu and Muller 2017). Likewise, incompetent civil servants, a product of cadre deployment, lack the necessary skills and expertise to arrive at efficient and innovative ways of delivering services to the community. Ultimately, poor leadership and incompetent civil servants gives rise to corruption, fraud and the mismanagement of public funds and assets which detracts from the municipality’s ability to effectively deliver services. Another political factor which serves as a further barrier to effective service delivery and performance is general distrust among councillors from opposing political parties within various municipalities, between officials and regulatory institutions, and among councils and senior officials (Masiya, Davids, and Mangai 2021): Here, ‘the power struggles, political interference and political appointments of party agents are contributory factors which limit trust between officials’ (Masiya, Davids, and Mangai 2021, 110). General distrust creates a culture of suspicion within local government and prevents elected and appointed officials from working harmoniously towards the provision of public goods and services (Masiya, Davids, and Mangai 2021, 110).

Since South Africa’s advent of democracy, it has radically transformed itself from one which was previously ‘secretive and authoritarian’ to one which welcomes popular participation within its development and governance processes (Houston, Liebenberg, and Dichaba 2001, 71). Key institutional mechanisms and channels for popular participation which have been created since 1994 include: public hearings, petitions, ‘Izimbizo’ (public gatherings), Green and White Paper processes, public access to parliamentary portfolio committee meetings, integrated development planning (IDP) processes and ward committees (Houston and Liebenberg 2001, 1; Buccus and Hicks 2011, 105–110). However, South Africa’s popular participation mechanisms suffer from the following limitations which impede on the country’s ability to achieve social embeddedness (Nagar 2015): poor attendance and engagement at public hearings; a lack of meaningful deliberation and consultation with the public; the use of technical jargon and language barriers makes it difficult for the layperson to understand and effectively participate within popular participation processes; and the capture of public participation processes by local elites to springboard their careers in politics.

Towards a Developmental Civil Society (DCS): a discussion

Much like its pursuit of building a capable DDS, the above analysis has shown that South Africa’s attempts at constructing a ‘micro-institutional developmental state’ within local government has underestimated and failed to properly account for the unintended effects of applying and introducing local democratic politics to inherently bureaucratic model of state-led development in the face of grave institutional incapacities. Consequently, the developmental and constitutional mandate of local government has been distorted to serve alongside the arsenal of local politicians in their respective campaign toolkits.

This has been evident in the latest 2021 local government elections (as in the ones before), in which the developmental responsibility of local government has once again been overshadowed by seasonal politicking and electioneering: Across the board, the promise of service delivery – an administrative function of local government – has been used by local politicians as a selling point and a political commodity within their particular political campaign manifesto’s with which to barter with their constituencies in exchange for votes (Managa 2012, 2). Sadly though, promises of ‘a better life for all’ are largely unmet in the aftermath of elections (Managa 2012, 2).

More worrying, though, has been the distribution and issuing of food parcels and social grants to poor communities by the ANC government in the run-up to elections as a means to attract support. Coupled with this has been threats made that, ‘if the ANC-led government lost power, they would lose grants and food parcels’ (Graham, Sadie, and Patel 2016, 110). This practice is particularly problematic given that access to sufficient food is a human right enshrined in the Constitution. This moral deficiency of local politicians was magnified in the midst of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak where poor and marginalised communities (as a result of the stringent national lockdown regulations) had even fewer access to food. Certain local politicians, who had the important task of distributing food parcels, used this opportunity to electioneer; granting food parcels to party supporters and denying (or selling) food parcels to politically unaffiliated communities (Mudua 2022).

The increasing politicisation of local government’s developmental mandate poses a threat to South Africa’s democracy for the following three reasons: Firstly, it strips South Africans of their democratic and human dignity by placing them in a situation wherein they must decide which political party will deliver on basic public goods and services come election time. Access to basic public goods and services is a basic human right which can only be attained through the provision of service delivery. It is in poor taste for local politicians to use the promise of service delivery as a selling point in their respective election campaigns and minimises the constitutional right of South Africans.

Secondly, it detracts from the intended objective of local government elections; i.e. electing the best candidate to politically govern. Rather than electing candidates whose political manifestos and policy priorities align with their own interests and political beliefs, the politicisation of developmentalism skews the public’s assessment by having them conflate administrative with political governance. South Africans are, therefore, stripped of the opportunity to thoroughly engage in democratic politics by exploring various ideologies as they are wholly consumed with surface-level administrative matters of service delivery. Within this context, one can hardly expect the country’s democracy to ever reach full maturity when its electorate are given little chance to familiar themselves with the various policy and underlying ideological positions which exist within South Africa’s political landscape thereby refining their own political beliefs and better articulating their choices.

Conversely, it places less demands and pressure on political candidates to fully acquire a developmental-orientation: By focusing exclusively on matters of service delivery, other factors which are equally important to the realisation of democratic developmental, fall by the way side. These include – rule of law, good governance etc.

Thirdly, and following from the above point, it misleads the public into thinking that the implementation of service delivery is a political activity when, in fact, it falls under the purview of the civil service. As a result, street-level bureaucrats are often branded falsely by the public as political agents of the respective political party which falls under their jurisdiction and not as politically neutral officials for which they are. This, in turn, brands poor service delivery as a political issue and not as an administrative problem distinct and separate from the ‘politics of the day’. Consequently, ‘seasonal politicking’ deludes the public into thinking that the solution to poor service delivery lies exclusively within the realm of politics and, thus, less attention is paid to strengthening the administrative machinery of government which gives effect to public policy.

In overcoming the ‘politics of the day’, which has placed constraints on the ability of DLG to fulfil its constitutional mandate, this article offers the DCS approach as a possible solution to local government’s capacity deficiencies. The DCS is defined as a hybrid model that brings together the concepts of social entrepreneurship, free market ideology and social solidarity (Nagar 2021b). It advocates a bottom-up approach to development whereby the population is given back their agency within developmental matters that directly affect them: On the one hand, by empowering the poor as consumers, the DCS seeks to tap into low-income markets. It aims to create a conducive environment in which local industries in low-income markets can adopt innovative marketing strategies and business plans that are aimed at providing the poor with affordable goods and services while simultaneously creating a profit. On the other hand, by empowering the poor as producers, the DCS sets out to raise the real income of the poor. Through the combined efforts of the private sector and the civil society at large, the DCS enhances the productivity of the poor by investing in skills development and in creating employment opportunities. The ultimate goal is the creation of a local productive capitalist class which is independent of the state and vital to the achievement of inclusive economic growth and development in South Africa. Enterprises identified as being best suited to drive inclusive development, poverty alleviation, job creation and social transformation include both local Small, Medium and Micro-sized Enterprises (SMMEs) and social enterprises.

The DCS has, in part, its theoretical foundation in Friedrich Hayek’s (1979) theory of ‘spontaneous order’ which provides the basis from which civil society can organise itself independently of the state and become the site of inclusive economic growth and development. It thus acts as a guide from which the DCS can construct a solid coordination mechanism. However, in departing from Hayek’s notion of ‘spontaneous order’, the DCS arises through conscious design. This is where the need for social solidarity comes in: Consensus building in civil society concerning issues pertaining to development is required in order for the DCS to function effectively and to enhance democracy. To this end, it will need to construct a dense set of networks in order to incorporate a large number of civil society agents within its developmental agenda (Nagar 2021b).

In a similar fashion in which the Classical East Asian Developmental State acted as an entrepreneur in the pursuit of rapid and sustained economic growth and development during the 1950s up until the 1980s, the DSC assumes the role of a social entrepreneur in its pursuit of inclusive economic growth and development by empowering the poor and marginalised as both producers and consumers (Nagar 2021b). Poor people, who make up the bulk of the consumers in poor communities, reside at the base of the economic pyramid and are mainly served by the informal economy. While having a large market of poor consumers is commonly viewed as negative occurrence, the DCS regards it as an opportunity in which it can facilitate and assist local SMMEs and social enterprises in tapping into the relatively untapped and unexplored low-income markets whereby they can provide affordable and accessible goods and services (Nagar 2021b). The poor will be empowered as consumers, by having increased access to goods and services, while local enterprises will benefit from exploring new opportunities for growth and the accompanying increase in market-share and profit growth. In so doing, the DCS will achieve its objective of democratic development.

By working together to empower the poor and marginalised as producers, the DCS seeks to generate wealth by raising the real income and the standard of living among the poor. This will firstly be achieved through increasing the intensity of job creation among the poor particularly within the production and distribution processes. In this manner, the generation of new employment opportunities will see the inclusion of the poor within the development process. The employment of local people within the enterprise’s production and distribution processes will also assist in the transference of local knowledge from society to the business which will assist it in the production of more sustainable and superior products and services that are more suited to the needs and tastes of its consumers. The employment of locals within the supply chain management and distribution process will assist the local businesses in making its goods and services available to its consumers. Businesses targeting consumers in low-income markets often face the challenge of making its products accessible due to non-existent or otherwise underdeveloped distribution chains and high marketing costs. Together, SMMEs and social enterprises can overcome these obstacles by seeking local solutions and innovations to its supply chain management. Innovative local solutions will be best achieved by including local entrepreneurs and poor residents within the business’ supply chain management.

Secondly, the attainment of inclusive development within society necessitates a cooperative intersectoral approach in order to address the complex wicked issues of development (Nagar 2021b). A coordinated and cooperative response is required to solve these intractable ‘wicked’ societal problems through the formation of horizontal, intersectoral linkages and collaborations that connects civil society actors from various fields ranging from education, human resource and skills development, health, food, sanitation, housing and infrastructure. In this manner, a cooperative, coordinated and intersectoral approach to social innovation is indispensable to combating wicked issues (Nagar 2021b).

Conclusion

Efforts at localising South Africa’s DDS under the umbrella of developmental local government have been futile: By bringing development closer to the people, South Africa’s process of decentralisation bestowed local government with a sweeping developmental mandate without equipping it with sufficient technical capacity. Struggling under the weight of its developmental duties, South Africa’s local government has not been able to shoulder its administrative responsibilities in the wake of seasonal politicking, electioneering and local politics. For these reasons, attempts at devolving power and authority to local government has not brought about democratic development.

For South Africa to truly achieve bottom-up democratic development, the country needs to burrow deeper and locate the site of inclusive socioeconomic development within a progressive civil society. The introduction of DCS is an attempt to do just that. While many may question the capability of civil society to succeed where the government has failed, one needs only to think back to the pivotal role which civil society and everyday South Africans played in the fight against the apartheid regime: In that instance, civil society showed its ability to mobilise, coordinate and cooperate around political matters in the struggle for political freedom. However, 28 years later, the fight for economic freedom has yet to be won. Increasingly so, civil society must band together around matters of inclusive socioeconomic development in its ongoing struggle to truly realise democratic development.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to extend my sincerest gratitude to Professor Chris Landsberg for his encouragement and support.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the NRF SARChI Chair: African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the University of Johannesburg.