South Africa and the international controversy surrounding its nuclear capability

Abstract

This article focusses on South Africa's position regarding the nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty; an issue which was pushed into prominence by the Russian allegation in August 1977 that the Republic was on the verge of testing a nuclear device. The Soviet Union's objective was to embarrass the Western powers during the Lagos Conference on Apartheid, as well as to bring them in disrepute among African countries during the sessions of various United Nations bodies where South Africa's nuclear potential was discussed. Subsequent reaction from especially the United States shows that the Carter Administration will use continued nuclear co‐operation with the Republic as a lever to press for political change and to secure South Africa's adherence to the NPT.

The Republic has however steadfastly declined to sign the NPT. although it has made clear on several occasions that it will not allow its uranium sales to be used to increase the number of nuclear‐weapon states. South Africa's refusal to sign the NPT does not necessarily reflect any desire to acquire nuclear weapons, but rather a fear that the application of “safeguards” might be economically harmful to the Republic's uranium mining industry, while the development of a new enrichment process has finally raised real concerns about possible commercial espionage.

It would seem very unlikely that South Africa has in actual fact produced a nuclear device, but it would also seem imperative for the Republic neither to surrender nor to exercise the nuclear option — especially seen in the light of the peculiar politico‐economic and military‐strategic position it finds itself in in the international arena. South Africa's high‐level nuclear technology is seen as a valuable diplomatic and strategic bargaining counter with the super powers, as well as with Black Africa. The Republic is in potential conflict with African states over its racial policies, and should its present superiority in conventional weapons be eroded by UN mandatory arms embargoes, South African strategists may begin to consider a nuclear deterrent not only as feasible, but indeed as absolutely essential. Presently, however, it is difficult to see the military value of nuclear weapons for a state whose main threat takes the form of insurgency promoted from beyond its borders.