The electoral system as a democratic norm

Abstract

The electoral system is a major, positive contribution of democracy in the sense that it ensures an orderly succession of governments; yet it is easy to misunderstand its nature.

Identification of the advantages of the electoral system with those of democracy itself is wrought with dangers. (The question arises whether to call a State democratic when a single element in the electoral system — like franchise — is missing. Both H.B. Mayo and C.B. Macpherson imply that restrictions on the Jranchise or on the eligibility for office do not undermine the State's ‘democratic’ basis. Mayo, however, as this article is trying to demonstrate, is not consistent in his views.)

In the public mind, the State's particular electoral system equals demo‐cracy. Thus particular practices are converted into principles of the system. Voting becomes a source of norms. This explains why socio‐political analyses have moved from pure theory to pragmatic studies of actual practices. In these circumstances there is no incentive to analyse the abstract requirements of the normative order. At the same time political practice loses all possible justification. This is precisely what has happened to the system of universal adult suffrage in Western democracies. Focussing on the defects of the electoral system, this paper provides a philosophic argument for the possibilities of change in both franchise and eligibility for office.