Group rights in South Africa: a philosophical exploration

Abstract

A philosophical exploration of the concept of group rights is attempted. In the first instance a distinction between individual rights (rights against the interference of others accompanied by liberties on the part of rightholders) and group rights (based on positive support from the State and demanding duties from the rightholders) is developed. Subsequently the sort of groups that can lay claim to special rights are investigated, the conclusion being that such entities involved in the identity formation of its contituents usually qualify. It is also mentioned that power is a key variable in this context and that a tendency to accord rights to powerful groups is then investigated, while the criteria for judging the claims to such rights are also discussed. Using some pertinent South African examples the author initially disputes the legitimacy of the concept. In conclusion he notes, however, that since South Africa is a plural society, and such societies often have needs (like that involved in reflecting and official language) incompatible with the theoretical arguments against groups rights. An attempt is made to abridge this problem by, following Nozick, maintaining a distinction between being entitled to wield a certain power and being entitled to be the entity to wield that power. Finally it is stated that the recognition of individual rights protects the rights of groups. The author holds the belief that South African political culture (s) are not particularly sympathetic to any rights talk, however.