Too little knowledge is a dangerous thing: South Africa's bargained transition, democratic prospects and John Rawls's ‘veil of ignorance’

Abstract

The way in which transitions to democracy are achieved is often held to shape the polity which they produce. An influential view thus relies on John Rawls's ‘veil of ignorance’ to stress uncertainty among political protagonists as the optimal guarantor of democratic institutions: the less those who draft the rules know about the likely outcome of their choices, the more likely is it that they will choose democratic mechanisms. The article argues that this approach is inapplicable to the South African case and therefore, perhaps, to other pacted transitions. A key expectation underpinning the settlement was that the outcome of majority rule was certain: the National Party therefore sought to negotiate a constitution which diluted its effect. But inadequate information prompted it to choose options which were suboptimal both for its own interests and for democratic consolidation: the electoral system is analysed as a case in point. In South Africa, therefore – and perhaps in other pacted transitions – information deficits are a constraint, rather than an asset, to the design of appropriated democratic institutions.