How does transition work in Central Asia? Coping with ideological, economic and value system changes in Uzbekistan

ABSTRACT

This article attempts to measure and quantify the dramatic ideological, economic and value system changes in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, using data from the Asia Barometer survey. It offers a snapshot of the situation in Uzbekistan by describing the basic changes in people's everyday lives, the way they think and act, what they aspire to and how they relate with each other. Two traceable trends in respondents' answers are a certain distrust of each other and a desire to protect themselves through close kinship or residential ties. This results in a situation where people build ‘barriers’ along family or community lines while preserving close relations within these units. Maintaining a balance between traditionalism, conservatism and modernization, and establishing societal trust not only within limited social networks but also between them are of crucial importance for Uzbekistan as it strives to rebuild its economy and society.

Notes

1. Regarding the methodology of this poll, local subcontractors were used to collect the information, while the questionnaires and requirements concerning the interviews were defined and formulated by a core team of 10 Japan-based AB scholars. Conducting the poll and the choice of subcontractors for such polling is not easy because of various reasons which include pressure on various research institutions to provide ‘politically correct’ information to the international community but also restraint on the side of ordinary people approached for the purpose of interview. To deal with these problems, respondents were given a choice of not answering sensitive questions. Subcontracting polling companies were selected out of companies that are not normally involved in political polling. There were instances of self-censorship by respondents out of a concern for the real or perceived consequences of their responses. Another possible bias of this poll is that although the surveys were carried out in 2003 and 2005, they were based on different samples. Therefore, the data of the survey is used mainly to suggest general trends rather than offer statistically significant comparisons.

2. One of the best-known polling agencies in Uzbekistan is Ijtimoii Fikr. For examples of social polling conducted by Ijtimoii Fikr, refer to Problemy izucheniia i formirovaniia obschestvennogo mneniia v Uzbekistane (Problems of researching and the formation of public opinion in Uzbekistan) (Tashkent: Izhtimoii Fikr, 2003), 129 pp; R. A. Ubaidullaeva, O. Ata-Mirzaeva and M. Ganieva, Sotsialnyi portret Uzbekistantsa (Social portrait of residents of Uzbekistan) (Tashkent: Izhtimoii Fikr, 2002), 114 pp; Rano Ubaidullaeva and Tatiiana Sysina, ‘Uzbekistan: obschestvennoe mnenie’ (Uzbekistan: public opinion), Iztimoii Fikr, No 2, 2005.

3. There is a considerable debate about the nature of the term ‘transition’. While certain IMF, World Bank and some of the other policy oriented institutions, especially during the initial post-Soviet years tend to support the view that post-Soviet transition symbolized the change from the old system of governance to one closer to the Western type of governance, there were many scholars and policy makers who disagreed with assumptions that ‘post-communist transition’ amounted to a simple shift from socialism to reformed European or US style of governance. They also dispute whether the idea of characterizing many post-Soviet states as transitional, which was popular among international scholars and government officials for several years, is still valid. This article acknowledges this debate but it does not aim to make this term the focus of its analysis owing to space limitations. It refers to the notion of transition to imply the period of economic, social and political transformation in which many former Soviet constituencies have been engaged over the past 15 years. For an interesting discussion of ‘transition’ see Thomas Carothers, ‘The end of the transition paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, Vol 13, No 1, 2002, pp 5–21; also see Catherine Poujol, ‘How can we use the concept of transition in Central Asian post-Soviet history? An attempt to set a new approach’, in Illusions of Transition: which perspectives for Central Asia and the Caucasus? (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2004), pp 7–19. For an earlier discussion of transition in Uzbekistan, see Islamov Bakhtiyor, ‘State and transition in post-Soviet republic: case of Uzbekistan’, Northeast Asian Studies, Vol 1, 1997, pp 55–74.

4. While ethnicity formed the cornerstone of Soviet policies, the importance of ethnicity was always underemphasized in comparison with the importance of the perceived ‘Soviet’ identity.

5. For instance, to properly maintain housing, residents of once government-owned and recently privatized apartments have been largely forced to organize into Resident Associations (Shirkats). These associations, among other duties, are charged with the task of controlling communal payments of residents for the supply of water, gas and heating and maintaining housing using resident membership fees or charity contributions from other organizations. One of the new features introduced during this transitional period is government-installed meters to control and measure the consumption of water, gas, and phone in the majority of apartments. Residents are expected to pay for those communal services according to the meters in their apartments. This caused some frustration among the residents, because in the post-Soviet period people claim that communal payments are set at a very high level and that their salaries barely match their costs. Moreover, many are not accustomed to these meters. In the time Soviet period, people paid a fixed fee for these communal services – a system widely practiced under the Soviet government and in the early years after the independence.

6. Akram Asrorov, ‘Ozhidaniya Uzbekskikh obladatelei telefonov’ (Expectations of Uzbek phone owners), GAZETA.KZ, 31 January 2006. Available online at www.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid = 70755 (last accessed 31 January 2006).

7. Ibid.

8. Around 1.49%, according to the data of the State Committee on Statistics of Uzbekistan.

9. This is much higher than the data about those who consider their living conditions to be low (1.8%) indicated in the previous surveys of Ijtimoii Fikr. See Ijtimoii Fikr, ‘Conditions and factors of conducive to women's reaching social capacities in Uzbekistan: based on findings and data of comprehensive opinion polls’, Iztimoii Fikr, No 3 (19), 2002, pp 81–107 (in particular p 99).

10. This assumption is also complementary with the argument of Radnitz that declining economic conditions were of primary importance in the motivation of the population in Uzbekistan to look for employment opportunities abroad. See Scott Radnitz, ‘Weighing the political and economic motivations for migration in post-soviet Space: the case of Uzbekistan’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol 58, No 5, 2006, pp 653–677.

11. In the answer choice of ‘high quality product even if it is a little expensive’, the amount of how much more expensive was not clearly defined in the questioner which might have led to broad interpretation by respondents.

12. These figures, to a large extent, contribute to our understanding of the nature and role of Islam in Uzbekistan. They support the arguments developed by many scholars on Central Asian Islam that ‘muslimness’ is not considered to be a mutually exclusive concept when considered on par with being communist, Soviet, or Uzbek in Soviet and post-Soviet Uzbekistan. For a similar argument see Khalid Adeed, Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007), in particular, p 85.

13. Many Soviet surveys also reported an increase in religious observance in the post-retirement stage. However, Soviet scholars of Islam largely connected this phenomenon to the low level of education among those in the older generational group. For them, high level of religiosity was an indicator of low level of education and general knowledge. For an interesting Soviet account of religiosity, see T. S. Saidbaev, Islam I Obschestvo: Opyt Istoriko-Sotsialogicheskogo Issledovaniia (Islam and society: experience of historical and sociological research) (Moskwa: Nauka, 1978), especially pp 186–187. While later Soviet surveys showed that Islam was increasingly popular among all generations, not only limited to women and the elderly, there is little evidence to believe that Soviet authorities changed their views on Islam as being driven by negligence and lack of knowledge. For the survey mentioned above, see Sostoianie religioznosti i ateisticheskogo vospitaniia v regionakh traditsionnogo raspostraneniia islama (State of religiosity and atheistic education in regions of traditional spreading of Islam) (Moscow: Akademiia obschestvennykh nauk pri Tsk KPSS, Institut nauchnogo ateisma; Sovetskaia sotsiologicheskaia assotsatsiia, 1989), pp 5–8, quoted in Yaacov Ro'i, ed., Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp 13–14.

14. For the same phenomenon in Soviet times, see Saidbaev, op cit, Ref 13, especially p 191. For modern aspects of community life, see Z. H. Arifkhanova, ‘Dukhovnaiia zhizn’ Uzbekskoi gorodskoi sem'i: traditsionnye formy' (Spiritual life of Uzbek urban family: traditional forms), in Sovremennye Etnokul'turnye Protsessy v Makhalliakh Tashkenta (Current ethno-cultural processes in makhalla of Tashkent) (Tashkenta, Tashkent: Fan, 2005), pp 123–170.

15. These were organized at the workplace or area of residence and served as a tool of public criticism of those who committed actions which contradicted socialist morality or norms of the time. These normally resulted in punishments which included public works and influenced public standing and possibility of promotion (within party or place of work) of those punished.

16. The figure for importance of religion is much higher in AB survey than in similar surveys conducted in previous years by other scholars, indicating increase in the religiosity. For instance Lubin reports that only one tenth of those asked in 1993 selected ‘people of my belief’ when asked about groups they felt they belonged to. See Nancy Lubin, ‘Islam and ethnic identity in Central Asia: a view from below’, in Ro'i, op cit, Ref 13, pp 53–70, see p 56.

17. This assumption is also supported by locally conducted public polling data. For example, see Ijtimoii Fikr, op cit, Ref 9, in particular p 89.

18. For the post-communist gender policy of the Uzbek government, see David Abramson, ‘Engendering citizenship in postcommunist Uzbekistan’, in Kathleen Kuehnast and Carol Nechemias, eds, Post-Soviet Women Encountering Transition: Nation Building, Economic Survival and Civic Activism (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), pp 65–84.

19. Extramarital relations are especially considered inappropriate for Uzbek women due to religious constraints and the ethical expectation of ‘uzbekness’, while women of other ethnic origins (like Russians, etc.) are not subject to the same logic. On this see, see Abramson (ibid, p 71).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Timur Dadabaev

Timur Dadabaev is an Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1 Tennodai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-8571 Japan (Tel: [phone]; Fax: [phone]; E-mail: [email protected]).