A war of perception: the struggle for legitimacy, influence and power through media in post-2001 Afghanistan

Abstract

The international community and the Afghan government tout the expansion of domestic media in post-2001 Afghanistan as an indication of progress. However, much of Afghan media has been appropriated by powerful ex-warlords to expand their influence and maintain their grip on power. Jamiat-e Islami and Hezb-e Islami – former jihadist groups who continue to wield considerable political influence within the country – are fierce rivals currently wielding their affiliated media outlets to wage a propaganda war against each other. Each seeks to justify its own right to power and to delegitimize the opponent – ratcheting up tension in a country whose future after 2014 remains precarious and uncertain. This study examines the media campaign of each group, analyzing the salient narratives in their media messages, the intended audiences of these narratives, and what the narratives tell us about the intents and concerns of each group.

Keywords:

• Afghanistan
• media
• politics
• conflict
• Jamiat-e Islami
• Hezb-e Islami

Acknowledgements

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author.

Notes

1. Jamiat-e Islami was one of the key members of the so-called Northern Alliance, a loose coalition of anti-Taliban, former mujahidin groups that assisted US Forces in toppling the Taliban regime in 2001. Shura-e Nezar was a military wing of Jamiat established in 1985 by the famous mujahidin commander Ahmad Shah Masood and composed mainly of military commanders from his native Panjshir, just northeast of Kabul. The original Hezb-e Islami was established by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and is now known as HIG (Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin). The legally-registered Hezb-e Islami (HIA) has members in key positions of the Karzai government.

2. Vimeo. 2013. ‘Political Conference in Mazar i Sharif’. http://vimeo.com/58630291. Accessed 7 June 2013.

3. These media have also expended considerable effort in attacking the main Taliban insurgency group, but this article's scope will focus solely on anti–Hezb-e Islami efforts.

4. Facebook. 2013. Facebook page ‘Saricha Press’. http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=344406028993480&set=pb.325832104184206.-2207520000.1364995965&type=3&theater, accessed 5 June 2013.

5. Traditional Afghan council held to prepare for major events, such as selecting national leaders, adopting a constitution, or discussing other important political affairs that concern the entire country.

6. YouTube. 2013. ‘Part 1 of 2’ and ‘Part 2 of 2’. Zhwandoon TV Speenaway Discussion program, accessed 10 June 2013. Part 1: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EwgKtadHEJk. Part 2: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DjcOzdn8c0o.

7. YouTube. 2013. ‘Eng Gulbadeen Hekmatyar Interview with Zhwandoon Television’ Parts 1 through 4. Zhwandoon TV. Part 1: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B-brQ1CrIn0. Part 2: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IK5g_QK3CgY. Part 3: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8s_PSaHR480. Part 4: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fy5gRurpcJY, accessed February 25, 2013.

8. Kabul News TV, 6 November 2012, 8:00 PM newscast.

9. Facebook. 2013. ‘Agreement Between Jamiat-e Islami of Afghanistan and Hezb-e Islami of Afghanistan’. https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.450609195056685.1073741844.233038883480385&type=1, accessed 1 October 2013. Facebook. 1 October. https://www.facebook.com/pages/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%DA%86%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%B1%D8%B3/325832104184206, accessed 4 October 2013. Ariana TV Evening News Broadcast. 2013. Viewed 1 October 2013.