Benefactor, industry or intruder? Perceptions of international organizations in Central Asia – the case of the OSCE in Tajikistan

ABSTRACT

Soon after the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991, a civil war started in Tajikistan (1992–97). This was also the period when a number of international organizations arrived in the country to distribute humanitarian assistance and assist in conflict resolution and stabilization. After the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was the second key organization which appeared in the conflict-stricken country. Like other key international organizations in Tajikistan, the OSCE, which has been in the country since 1994, has seen a shift in its original functions of monitoring and emergency assistance. Some see its avowed objectives in the new century as formalistic, virtual and ineffective. By capturing perceptions of foreign assistance to Tajikistan among employees of the OSCE and other international organizations, NGO workers, government officials and ordinary citizens, this article explores how Tajikistan ‘socialized’ the OSCE, making the organization simultaneously a benefactor, an industry and even an intruder.

KEYWORDS:

• Central Asia
• international organization
• NGO
• OSCE
• post-communism
• post-conflict rehabilitation
• post-Soviet
• public opinion
• socialization
• Soviet Union
• Tajikistan
• UN

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Corrigendum

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to the three anonymous reviewers, who provided very helpful comments on the first and second versions of this article, as well as to Mr Payam Foroughi for his support in writing this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. The Tajik civil war (1992–97) involved two blocks of the Islamist-dominated United Tajik Opposition versus the post- or neo-Soviet pro-governmental forces, comprising four regional groups: the opposition was dominated by ethno-regional Gharmis and Pamiris, who stood up against government forces dominated by Leninabadis and Kulobis.

2. Mahalla means neighbourhood. Despite different degrees of institutionalization, in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, mahallas fulfilled functions of local self-government.

3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan (Undated).

4. Net official development assistance includes both grants from official agencies and disbursements of loans made on concessional terms.

5. OSCE Permanent Council, Decision No. 500, 31 October 2002.

6. OSCE Permanent Council, Decision No. 852, 19 June 2008.

7. OSCE Permanent Council, Decision No. 1158, 30 December 2014.

8. OSCE Permanent Council, Decision No. 1196, 31 December 2015.

9. Lancaster gives a 70-year history of aid, arguing that after WWII, international aid was used by the US not only to bolster the economies of Turkey and Greece but also to pull them over to the Western side in the face of increasing pressures from the Soviet bloc.

10. Interview with a former employee of the OSCE, 31 July 2014. As a side note, the interviewee refers to the dispute between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan concerning a planned hydroelectric power plant in Roghun on the Vaksh River in Tajikistan. The project has drawn complaints from the Uzbek side, which fears that the power station will have a negative impact on its water resources and cotton crops. And though the World Bank, as an IO, has recently approved Tajikistan’s plan to build the Roghun hydroelectric power plant and its associated potentially record-breaking 335-metre-high dam, Uzbekistan’s opposition and lack of international investment in the needed capital (as much as US$ 5 billion) have put a temporary hold on construction (Forss 2014).

11. OSCE Permanent Council (2015).

12. Interview with a former employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan, 31 July 2014.

13. Interview with a former employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan, 31 July 2014.

14. Ibid.

15. Interview with a former employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan, 18 July 2014.

16. Interview with a person working for an environmental international NGO, 19 July 2014.

17. It is also noteworthy that the government confiscated the mission’s new premises from a private owner soon after the same owner was arrested, and later tried and imprisoned in 2009 (interview with a former employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan, 26 December 2014).

18. Interview with a former employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan, 26 December 2014.

19. Interview with a person working for a NGO focusing on vulnerable groups in society, 18 August 2014.

20. Interview with a former employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan, 31 July 2014.

21. Interview with a person working for an IO focusing on vulnerable groups in society, 1 August 2014.

22. Interview with a person working for an IO focusing on vulnerable groups in society, 31 July 2014.

23. Interview with an accountant living in Dushanbe, 29 July 2014.

24. Interview with a worker in a centre which receives grants from the OSCE, 27 July 2014.

25. Expatriate OSCE employees working in Central Asia, for example, receive an estimated €150–200/day, or €4500–6000/month, in per diem or living allowance from the OSCE. This exorbitant amount is in most cases on top of what their individual government pays the seconded employee as salary base. For OSCE workers coming from the Scandinavian countries, for example, the monthly salary and living allowance is thought to be in the range of €15,000–18,000/month, or €180,000–240,000/year (interview with a former employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan, 26 December 2014).

26. Interview with a person working for an IO focusing on vulnerable groups in society, 1 August 2014.

27. Ibid.

28. Interview with a former employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan, 26 December 2014.

29. Interview with a person working for an IO focusing on vulnerable groups in society, 1 August 2014.

30. Interview with a former employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan and other IOs, 31 July 2014.

31. Interview with a former employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan, 26 December 2014.

32. Interview with a former employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan, 31 July 2014.

33. For literature which problematizes knowledge production by IOs and makes a strong case against idealizing the role of international experts, see Boswell (2009); Broome and Seabrooke (2012); Autesserre (2014).

34. Interview with a former employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan and other IOs, 31 July 2014.

35. A reviewer provided a negative comment on the critical stance of this article towards income-generating activities, claiming that this focus on entrepreneurship ‘is because the country is facing a major economic crisis and the return of labour migrants from Russia. This does require an economic response that IOs are willing to support. [It] makes sense and does not in any way represent a misjudgement or a wrong assessment.’ I recognize this point of view (and the noble intentions of donors); however, at the same time, I believe that it is useful to question this approach and study more carefully whether the boom in income-generating communities and microfinance really leads to sustainable socio-economic development. Until now there has been no work on Tajikistan which would support this claim. See e.g. the criticism of local neoliberalism in Bangladesh by Sanyal (1991) and in East Asia by Bateman (2010).

36. Interview with a person working for an IO focusing on vulnerable groups in society, 1 August 2014.

37. The lack of sufficient oversight of the civil society by donors is nothing new and dates back to the civil war, when NGOs learned how to make a profit from international aid. A pensioner from the north of Tajikistan says about distribution of humanitarian aid, mostly flour, cooking oil and sugar during that period: ‘They [IOs] would keep 40% of the donated humanitarian goods for themselves and their relatives, distribute another 40%, and sell the last 20% for cash’ (interview, Istaravshan, 27 July 2014).

38. Interview with a person working for an NGO focusing on vulnerable groups in society, 18 August 2014.

39. Interview with a former employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan, 26 December 2014.

40. Interview with a former employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan, 18 July 2014.

41. Interview with a former employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan and other IOs, 31 July 2014.

42. Ibid.

43. Interview with an employee of an educational foreign government agency, 1 August 2014.

44. Interview with a former employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan, 31 July 2014.

45. Interview with a former employee of a ministry, 9 July 2014.

46. Interview with a former employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan, 18 July 2014.

47. Ibid.

48. Interview with a lawyer from an IO helping vulnerable groups in society, 18 July 2014.

49. Interview with a former employee of a ministry, 9 July 2014.

50. Ibid.

51. Statement by the Delegation of the Republic of Tajikistan at the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting.

52. Interview with an employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan, 12 December 2016.

53. Interview with a person working for an IO helping vulnerable groups in society, 1 August 2014.

54. In September 2016, Kyrgyz authorities downgraded the status of the OSCE in Kyrgyzstan from a ‘centre’ to an ‘office’, following a controversial speech by an opposition leader, Kadyrzhan Batyrov, during the annual OSCE/ODIHR human rights meeting in Warsaw. Anton Lymar, ‘Fergana: Kyrgyzstan Downgrades OSCE because of Kadyrzhan Batyrov’s Speech’, 24 News Agency, 29 September 2016, http://www.eng.24.kg/vlast/182154-news24.html.

55. Interview with a former employee of the OSCE in Tajikistan, 26 December 2014.