Mega‐sporting events in urban and regional policy: a history of the Winter Olympics

Abstract

‘Mega‐events’, such as the Olympic Games, have emerged as an important tool of urban and regional renewal through their ability to justify redevelopment and enhancement, attract inward investment, promote tourism and create new images for host cities. This paper complements previous research into the urban effects of the Summer Games by focusing on the infrastructural legacy of hosting the Winter Games, 1924–2002. The discussion concentrates upon the growing intensity of the intra‐urban competition to host the event and identifies four phases in the changing infrastructural implications of staging the Games. As a component of urban and regional policy, the Winter Olympics present both major risks and clear opportunities for the effective transformation of host centres.

Introduction

In a period of deindustrialization, economic restructuring and globalization, the promotion of ‘urban spectacles’ or ‘mega‐events’ has become a key strategy by which urban areas justify significant projects of renewal and regeneration, advertise their status and personality and, thus, attract new inward investment and modernize their economies [1]. The Olympics, especially the Summer Games, because of their increasing scale and ability to command substantial income from television rights, have triggered a wide range of urban transformations within host cities [2]. Indeed, the costs involved in staging the Games are now so high that host cities can often only justify the expenditure as part of a major programme of regeneration and modernization [3], although the precise effectiveness of this form of urban renewal policy is contested and difficult to measure. To date, much of the research focus has been on the Summer Games, with virtually no effort to develop a comprehensive body of academic knowledge on the impact of the Winter Olympics [4]. Although there have been some studies of individual Winter Games, there has been no overarching review or analysis at a broader level.

The article's main aim is, therefore, to examine the effects of the Winter Olympic Games on the built and natural environments of the various settlements and regions that have acted as hosts, 1924–2002. Source material comes principally from the archives of the Olympic Studies Centre, Lausanne, including official reports produced by the host organizing committees and documents relating to the organization of the events. The official reports include a factual record of the main physical developments associated with the Games. They are required by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), first, as a full and complete printed report within two years of the close of the Games and, second, as a guide for future organizers [5]. The documents are, of course, written from the viewpoint of the organizers, but can be contextualized by other more independent published accounts and commentaries. In addition to the official reports, the archives held at Lausanne were also relevant. However, the files mainly comprised correspondence relating to the general organization of the Games rather than to the development of related infrastructure. Access to some files, especially concerning the bidding process, was prevented by 30‐year and more general embargoes imposed by the IOC. In using these sources, this paper's aim is not a complete cost‐benefit analysis for the Games, but to focus primarily on their role in changing and modernizing the built and natural environments and their increasing role within urban policy.

Spectacle in urban policy

Mega‐events, such as the Olympics, have always had implications for the host centre's urban infrastructure by providing opportunities for new investment and tourism. These impacts have become more significant as the scale and profile of the Games has grown. Wider changes in the global economy, especially the transition from industrial city to postindustrial city, have accentuated the role of mega‐events as catalysts of substantial urban transformation. Globalization, deindustrialization and deregulation have made cities less dependent upon a production‐based economy of manufacturing, local capital investment and public sector intervention. Instead, in order to respond to a consumption‐based economy, more emphasis has to be placed on service industries and tourism [6]. Securing new inward investment has become highly competitive, given post‐Fordist modes of production and the mobility of global capital (see Fig. 1). The local state often adopts a ‘boosterism’ role and uses its power and resources to encourage and support potential inward investment [7]. The nature of the local state is thereby transformed from bureaucratic and hierarchical forms of decision‐making to more responsive, entrepreneurial and business‐orientated approaches [8]. As a consequence, major developments can often occur very rapidly, although incomplete evaluations may permit long‐term detrimental effects on the economy, society or environment. Potential opposition from local communities may be muted or even mobilized into active expressions of support and consensus, dependent on the measures taken by local growth coalitions to legitimate the investment [9].

The emergence of mega‐events as a tool of urban and regional public policy in the postindustrial city.

In this context, mega‐events have become an attractive option in urban policy as a means of improving the appearance of the environment, creating a ‘spectacle’ to attract global investment, facilitating fast‐track development and promoting a new image through place marketing [10]. The Olympics are one of the most visible and spectacular examples of a public cultural event in modern societies [11]. The Summer Olympics are often presented as the archetypal and most prized example of this type of spectacle [12]. From small‐scale origins, the Games have gradually emerged, especially since the 1960s, as a significant catalyst for urban regeneration. The event not only underpins the building of new sports facilities, but also wider investment in tourism, transport infrastructure (including public services), hotel accommodation, environmental improvement and sustainability [13]. Certainly, since 1992, competition to stage the event has intensified tremendously [14]. Even unsuccessful bids have stimulated infrastructural and other improvements in potential host cities [15]. The bid by Cape Town for the Olympic Games of 2004, for example, broadened the expected urban transformations induced by the event to include human development and social equality [16].

However, while the legacies of staging the Olympic Games can be positive, such as economic growth, increased tourist flows, new transport and cultural facilities, environmental improvements and enhanced global prestige, the impacts can also be less beneficial, for example wasteful investments and the establishment of major debts. Other problems can include price inflation and housing gentrification, thereby accentuating social disadvantage and exclusion, and attracting adverse publicity [17]. By definition, the Olympics are an élitist sporting event requiring large public expenditures to support selected athletes and to build facilities that are primarily for élitist sport competition and training [18]. To date, these kinds of issues have been examined principally within the context of the Summer Games. This article considers the extent to which the Winter Olympics present similar opportunities and problems for host settlements. In the case of the Winter Olympics, the term ‘urban’ refers to the built environment of what can be quite small, isolated settlements, and ‘regional’ to the wider geographical area affected, beyond the immediate environs of the host centre itself.

The Winter Olympics

The modern Olympic movement was revived by Baron Pierre de Coubertin (1863–1937) in 1896 to give expression to his theories of physical exercise as the basis of a balanced education and organized sport as an agent of international unity and social equity. He established the principle that a major sporting competition should be held in different locations every four years to promote and diffuse the Olympic spirit of freedom, progress and equality throughout the world [19]. Coubertin created the IOC to control the conduct of Olympic sports and chose 15 members from 12 nations, largely from the ranks of royalty and the aristocracy, for his first committee. Today, the committee remains highly exclusive, with new members selected by existing members to keep it relatively free from political interference from nation states, although there are now more than 100 members drawn from over 80 countries. The IOC works with the International Sports Federations (ISFs), which determine the conduct of individual events and National Olympic Committees (NOCs), responsible for organizing teams for each Olympic Games. The IOC is also responsible for selecting hosts for Summer and Winter Games and overseeing the provision of facilities and supporting infrastructure for these events by the host Olympic organizing committee.

Winter sports were not included in the original conception of the Olympics. Coubertin objected to their inclusion partly because of Scandinavian fears about the possible detrimental effect on their traditional sports festivals, such as the Nordic Games and Holmenkollen Week. However, as the popularity of winter sports spread, the movement to include them on the Olympic programme gained momentum. Figure skating was included in the 1908 London Summer Games and skating and ice hockey at the 1920 Antwerp Summer Games. As part of the 1924 Paris Summer Games, the French incorporated a winter sports week into their Olympiad at Chamonix, six months before the main event [20]. The winter event was known as the ‘International Sports Week of 1924’ and was so successful that the IOC amended its Charter in 1925 to establish the Winter Olympics. Chamonix was retrospectively recognized as the first Winter Olympic Games by the IOC. The country organizing the Summer Games was automatically given the opportunity to host the Winter Games until 1948 when Britain hosted the Summer Games. From then, different countries could host Summer and Winter Games in the same Olympiad. In 1986, the IOC decided to alternate, from 1992, the staging of Summer and Winter Games every two years, rather than holding both events in the same year. This change was intended to maximize the profile of the Olympics and its television revenue [21].

The Winter Olympics is, of course, a very different cultural product to the Summer Olympics. While the Summer Games provoke wide popular interest, the Winter Games have a narrower appeal, related to the more constrained locations suitable for the sports and high costs of equipment. These differences influence the profile and the infrastructural requirements of the events. The Summer Games involve roughly five times as many athletes and command almost double the television revenue of the Winter Games. Proportionally, however, there is less difference between the infrastructural demands of the two events on host centres. Both require new or refurbished sports facilities, investment in transport and accommodation and other expenditure to facilitate the smooth running of the event. Whereas the Summer Games are usually staged in cities with large populations, the Winter Games are constrained to alpine environments and, therefore, generally smaller and more remote settlements. Some host settlements have large cities nearby (for example, Lake Placid is close to New York), which can assist with funding and organization, but, generally, the strains of hosting the Winter Games are borne by relatively small communities. The Winter Olympics have been hosted by centres with populations ranging from 2700 (Chamonix, 1924 and St Moritz, 1928) to 1 010 100 (Sapporo, 1972), with an average figure of 236 042. By contrast, the Summer Games have been hosted by cities with populations ranging from 107 700 (Athens, 1896) to 10.1 million (Seoul, 1988), the average being 2 840 004.

The legacy of the investment required for the Winter Olympics can pose special problems for hosts who, based in smaller communities, do not necessarily have the capacity to fund, digest and absorb major new developments or transport networks. Nor do they always have sufficient demand to make new investments profitable in the longer term. With smaller population thresholds, decisions about investment in new Winter Olympics facilities have to consider after‐use very seriously. To emphasize this, and recognizing that financial evaluations of this kind are fraught with doubts over the accuracy, completeness, reliability and comparability of data, there is evidence suggesting that the cost of Winter Olympics per capita of host population is considerably greater than the Summer Games [22] (see Table 1).

Comparison of the costs of staging the Summer and Winter Olympic Games, 1984–2002

Winter Games			Summer Games
	Cost	Cost per citizen of host city		Cost	Cost per citizen of host city
	$US million	$US million		$US million	$US million
Sarajevo, 1984	179	400	Los Angeles, 1984	412	121
Calgary, 1988	628	981	Seoul, 1988	3297	326
Albertville, 1992	767	38 350	Barcelona, 1992	9165	5578
Lillehammer, 1994	1511	65 695	Atlanta, 1996	2021	5129
Nagano, 1998	3412*	9451	Sydney, 2000	3438	929
Salt Lake City, 2002	1330	7628	Athens, 2004	–	–
*excludes speed train (Shinkansen) and highway network ($US8408 million). Source: Preuss [22]. Source: Preuss [22].

Infrastructural demands of the Winter Olympics

The organization of a Winter Games presents its host with several challenges. Investment in sporting infrastructure can be expensive. Ski slopes and ice sports facilities can have tourist and recreational functions and so usually contribute to winter tourism and community amenities after the Games. Some facilities, however, such as ski jumps and the bobsleigh/luge track, have limited use outside international competitions. Investment in such facilities requires careful justification to avoid creating a legacy that is expensive to sustain. All hosts of Winter Games have incurred substantial investment in new sports venues, even those which have previously staged the event. Three centres have acted as hosts twice, namely St. Moritz (1928 and 1948), Lake Placid (1932 and 1980), and Innsbruck (1964 and 1976), but new investment and refurbishment have been required each time. The introduction of new events, advances in equipment and technology, and changes in the specifications of the ISFs usually demand new facilities, or at least substantially refurbishing of existing facilities. The demands of ISFs can introduce totally different development prospects and agendas from those of local planners and decision‐makers [23].

As an indicative guide, Table 2 compares the sports infrastructure required to stage the Games of 1932, 1980 and 2002. The Winter Olympics of 1932 were held in Lake Placid and involved three new constructions and two substantial renovations of existing facilities. When the Games returned to Lake Placid in 1980, all existing facilities were refurbished, with the old Olympic Stadium being replaced by a modern Speed Skating Oval. An Olympic Village was also built, used as a correctional centre after the Games. For the Winter Olympics of 2002 in Salt Lake City, a total of 14 separate developments were required to stage the event, including a separate village for judges and referees. The legacy of such facilities can be positive in terms of stimulating the economy through the staging of other events and by facilitating wider participation in sport. It can also, however, be negative if the facilities are little used and so drain the local area's resources, which has occurred on several occasions. For example, the ski jump built for the Grenoble Games of 1968 is now derelict because it is poorly sited and too expensive to operate [24].

Comparison of sports facilities provided for the Winter Olympic Games of 1932, 1980 and 2002

Lake Placid, 1932	Lake Placid, 1980	Salt Lake City, 2002
Bob‐run (Mt Van Hoevenberg) – new construction	Luge and Bob‐run (Mt Van Hoevenberg) – renovated	Olympic Village
Cross‐country ski‐trails – 70 miles of new trails	Cross‐country ski‐trails	Olympic Stadium
Indoor Ice Arena (Main Street) – new construction	Indoor Ice Arena (Main Street) – renovated and new construction	Olympic Medal Plazza
Intervales Ski‐hill – extended	Intervales Ski‐hill – renovated	Media Center
Olympic Stadium – new construction	James B. Sheffield Speed Skating Oval – new construction on site of old Olympic Stadium	Judges' and Referees' Village
Olympic Village – new construction	Delta Center (Ice hockey and figure skating)
		Salt Lake Arena (Ice hockey and short‐track speed skating)
		Ogden/Weber Ice Arena (Women's Ice hockey)
		Oquirrh Park Oval (Speed skating)
		Cottonwood Heights Ice Arena (Curling)
		Mountain Dell Park (Biathlon, cross‐country and Nordic skiing)
		Winter Sports Park (Bobsleigh, Luge, Nordic combined Ski jump)
		Park City/Deer Valley Ski Areas (Alpine skiing and freestyle)
		Snow Basin ski area (Alpine skiing)
Source: Various [106].

The construction and operation of event facilities for the Winter Olympics in remote rural regions can have considerable physical and aesthetic implications for natural and seminatural landscapes within the region. The installation of large structures and the use of chemicals, such as ammonia for artificial freezing, represent two examples of obvious Olympic intrusions into fragile environments. Awareness of the environmental impacts of the Winter Olympics has, therefore, been more central to their organization for a longer period than for the Summer Games.

The hosts of Winter Olympics are obliged under their contract with the IOC to provide accommodation for athletes, usually in an Olympic Village, and also for the ‘Olympic Family’ (officials and visiting Olympic dignitaries), usually in hotels. In addition, there has to be sufficient accommodation for international media and spectators. Such demands represent a considerable strain on small communities that have staged the event. The issue presents a dilemma for hosts, namely whether to build new accommodation and risk a huge debt and under‐utilized infrastructure in the long‐term or to use existing facilities, which may be of poorer quality and spread over a wider area (and, thus, accentuate the transport difficulties).

An essential ingredient in successfully staging the Winter Olympics is an efficient transport infrastructure, usually involving both temporary and permanent investments. The isolation of many sports venues and the often dispersed accommodation, mean that many athletes and spectators need to be speedily moved across large areas in difficult terrains. In Innsbruck in 1976, there were 1.5 m spectators, with up to 40 000 requiring access to confined valleys to see skiing events. The transport infrastructure also has to be flexible enough to meet adverse conditions, such as postponement of events and sudden weather changes. Permanent investments in airport facilities and road and rail construction are often needed to create a transport infrastructure with the necessary efficiency and flexibility. In some cases, the event simply provides a stimulus to investments that had already been identified, but were programmed over a longer period. Road construction or improvement is the most common investment to enhance access to sports facilities both in the mountain environments of the region and within the main centre itself. The transport and wider infrastructure implications of staging the Winter Olympics are, therefore, substantial, but have not curbed enthusiasm for entering the inter‐urban competition to bid for the event.

Selection of host centres for the Winter Olympic Games

The bidding process begins about eight years before the event, with the IOC inviting applications from potential hosts via the NOCs. The IOC permits only one candidate from each country, so the first stage for any prospective host is to be approved by the relevant NOC, with national government support. Each approved candidate city has to prepare and submit a ‘bid book’, outlining how IOC criteria are to be fulfilled. The IOC Bid Manual for the 2002 Winter Games suggested that submissions should contain details on 23 evaluation criteria including: proposed organization; current state of, or plans for, sports facilities; capacity of accommodation, transport and telecommunications; potential impact on city and region; and financial aspects [25]. The IOC also specifies the length and format of the bid books.

Until 1999, IOC members were allowed to make inspection visits to all potential host centres to assess proposed facilities, their observations being supported since 1988 by evaluative reports by the IOC, NOCs and ISFs. To select the 2002 Winter Games, an IOC Selection College chose the final short‐list for these visits and organized the subsequent secret vote by IOC members, six to seven years before the event. Rounds of voting then progressively eliminated centres receiving least votes until there was an outright majority for one. When a host city has been selected, an IOC Coordination Commission is formed to assist the Organizing Committee in the planning, construction and implementation. The host city is tied to a contract with the IOC, setting out the Games' organization.

Despite the importance of host selection to the success and stability of the Olympics, this system has caused controversy and concern [26]. The intensity of competition has encouraged many candidates to spend millions of dollars on entertainment and gifts to impress IOC members. As IOC members are not elected, not accountable to their home NOC and vote in secret, they cannot be held responsible for their voting decisions [27]. As a result, it has been alleged that some IOC members have ‘feathered their own nests’, demanding material, political, business, educational, health and/or sexual favours from prospective hosts in return for promises of support and votes [28]. The IOC and others suggest that these allegations have been exaggerated [29]. Nevertheless, IOC guidelines to protect the integrity of voting procedures, introduced in the early 1990s, included limits on the value of gifts and confined inspections to three days, with no second visits. Some commentators have alleged that these rules appear to have been violated on several occasions since their introduction [30], although genuine logistical problems can make rigid compliance difficult [31].

In relation to the Winter Games, serious allegations were made about an IOC member on an inspection visit to an unsuccessful candidate city, Falun (Sweden), in the competition for the 1992 Games. Elsewhere, to assist its own earlier bid preparations, the 1988 host, Calgary, had prepared dossiers on the business interests and likes and dislikes of each IOC member. It later shared these dossiers with Atlanta to assist its bid for the 1996 Summer Games [32]. Indeed, the relationship between the Summer and Winter events is important because both cannot be held in the same country during any four year period. The selection of Albertville as host of the Winter Games of 1992, by a vote taken unusually before selection of the Summer Games, meant that Paris was ruled out as host of the Summer Games in the same Olympiad. The decision increased the chances of Barcelona, home city of the IOC president, becoming the Summer host instead [33].

The culmination of this dubious practice came in serious bribery allegations, which emerged in December, 1998, concerning the decision to locate the Winter Games in Salt Lake City. The Salt Lake Bid Committee, making their second application and determined to secure the event, allegedly made payments to IOC members for holidays, medical treatment and members' children while at university or working in America, in return for electoral support [34]. These claims were investigated by an ad hoc IOC Commission of Inquiry. Their considerations were fraught with difficulties. Thus, gift giving is viewed differently by different cultures: some see it as improper while others regard it as an honourable tradition. The IOC had also encouraged bidding cities into a highly competitive process, which had established gift giving (within limits set by rules) almost as a matter of protocol [35]. Following IOC inquiries, three members resigned, while the IOC decided to exclude a further seven, giving warnings to ten and exonerating two [36].

This ‘crisis’ and related adverse publicity prompted changes within the IOC, although their full effectiveness remains to be seen. A new Ethics Commission formulated a set of ethical principles and investigated complaints and breaches. An IOC2000 Commission was also set up to consider the composition and role of the IOC and devise reforms for selecting hosts from the Summer Games of 2008 [37]. Amongst its recommendations was that the IOC should not exceed 115 members, with representatives from active Olympic athletes (15), NOCs (15), ISFs (15) and nominated individuals (70). The IOC's financial transparency was to be improved by additional reporting requirements. New eligibility criteria for ‘applicant cities’ would be introduced, ensuring that bid submissions are technically and financially viable before being considered as official ‘candidate cities’. NOCs would be made jointly responsible for the conduct of their applicant or candidate city [38]. In November 2002, the 114th IOC Session decided to eliminate member visits to candidate cities altogether [39].

The vote for host of the 2006 Winter Games, taken in June, 1999 (six months after the Salt Lake City scandal), considered two candidates after an IOC Selection College had examined the merits of six finalists. All IOC member visits were banned. However, the outcome raised concerns that the system remained fundamentally flawed. Turin (Italy), making its first bid, received 53 votes. Sion (Switzerland), making its third bid and having received top marks by the IOC Evaluation Commission, received only 36 votes. Some suggested a possible explanation was IOC members seeking revenge on Marc Hodler (the Swiss IOC member) for triggering the bribery scandal with public allegations over Salt Lake City [40].

The competition to stage the Winter Olympics

Despite such concerns, inter‐urban competition to stage the Winter Games has intensified, especially since the early 1990s, because of the palpable economic effects and stimuli to development of previous Summer and Winter events (see Fig. 2). The pattern of bids to stage the Winter Olympics follows a similar trend to the Summer Games, albeit at a much reduced scale because of the more constrained range of suitable locations and smaller size of the event. The hosts of the first four Winter Games were not subject to competition as the Summer hosts automatically determined their selection. After 1948, venues for Summer and Winter Games were selected separately. With the growing interest during the 1950s and 1960s in winter sports and tourism, there was a steady rise in the number of bids as resorts saw the event's potential for developing new or improved infrastructure and for raising their area's international profile for winter sports.

The number of bids to stage the Winter Olympics, 1924–2022. (Source: Olympic Almanac [103].)

As with the Summer Olympics, the substantially increased interest in staging the Winter Games appears to have developed following growing awareness of the financial success of the Los Angeles Summer Games of 1984 and then the urban renewal effects of the Barcelona Summer Games of 1992. Jennings [41] also suggests that the IOC deliberately encouraged as many bidding cities as possible for the events of 1992 and beyond to generate greater interest and revenue from selling television rights. Before 1992, the total number of potential bids for the Winter Games never exceeded nine. Although the number of serious bids has not increased, many more locations have expressed an interest in staging the Games. Thirty‐one locations expressed an interest in hosting the 2002 Winter Games, with 24 potential bids for the 2010 Games. There are already nine bids for the 2014 event.

The range of possible locations is obviously more constrained than for the Summer Games. In practice, both hosts (and indeed candidates) have been concentrated almost exclusively in Europe and North America, with two events in Japan (see Fig. 3). As noted, three locations have actually staged the Games twice. Several locations have made three or more unsuccessful bids: Lake Placid (4), Chamonix (3), Cortina d'Ampezzo (3), Lahti (3) and Östersund/Åre (3). There have been no really serious bids from alpine locations in South America, Africa and SE Asia. This geographical distribution reflects general levels of economic development, long‐standing involvement in winter sports and long‐established IOC membership. Suitable locations elsewhere in the world are less able to finance the necessary investment and lack established tourist industries which can easily be extended or enhanced.

Host centres of the Winter Olympic Games, 1924–2006. (Source: IOC [107].)

Winter Games host centres are, by the nature of the event, smaller than Summer hosts (see Fig. 4). The largest Winter hosts so far are Sapporo (1972: 1 010 100), Calgary (1988: 640 000) and Sarajevo (1984: 448 000): Turin (909 700) and Vancouver (560 000) will host the Winter Games of 2006 and 2010, respectively. In 1976, the organizers of the Innsbruck Games suggested that towns of about 100 000 were ideal host cities as they possessed the capacity to deal with the accommodation and traffic problems associated with the number of athletes, officials and spectators. Larger cities are less suited simply because they are rarely in mountainous areas, obviously an absolute prerequisite [42]. There does, however, appear to be a trend towards larger urban centres: certainly very small settlements, typical of early Games, are now uncommon. The trend is neither strong nor completely linear, yet it has obvious implications for the scale of associated urban transformations.

Population size of host centres of the Winter Olympic Games, 1924–2006. (Source: Population Statistics [104].)

Organization and funding

Despite suggestions that organizing events such as the Olympics demands less bureaucratic and more entrepreneurial forms of urban governance, the public sector seemingly retains a pivotal role in initiating, organizing and funding the Winter Olympics. In some cases, the initial push comes from local business interests and the local community. Local organizers have used various fund‐raising methods, such as business/voluntary contributions and sponsorship, to prepare the bid and contribute to some facilities. For the Sarajevo Games of 1984, citizens of the region agreed to make a voluntary contribution from their monthly salary to an Olympic Development fund between 1982 and 1984 (for Bosnia and Hercegovina, 0.2% and for Sarajevo itself, 0.3%). This raised 1 208 350 dinars or 6% of the Games' total income [43]. However, national, regional and local governments have normally been willing to subsidize the main infrastructure investments, often generously.

Recognizing the problems of reliability and comparison between events, available data [44] suggest a substantial rise in expenditure on the Winter Olympics (see Fig. 5). Costs first rose significantly between the Games of 1952, 1956 and 1960. Since 1960, costs have roughly doubled every eight years but have stabilized at about $US500 million since 1992. There are exceptions, such as Innsbruck in 1976, which re‐used facilities from 1964; Sarajevo in 1984, whose currency may have depressed real costs; and Lillehammer in 1994, which appears particularly expensive. Details of costs of associated non‐Olympic urban development are incomplete and suggest no discernible pattern, except to illustrate that such investment can be much more substantial than that for the event itself (see Fig. 5). The ratio of public to private expenditure on the Games suggests three groups or models of funding (see Fig. 6). Two early Games (1924 and 1936) appear to have had roughly balanced public and private funding. The Games of the 1950s to 1970s were largely publicly financed, while the Games from the 1980s have been predominantly privately financed, coinciding with IOC efforts to maximize television and sponsorship revenue. The cost of non‐Olympic urban development has, however, usually been publicly financed.

Expenditure on the organization and non‐Olympic urban development of the Winter Olympic Games, 1924–2006 (values $US 1982–4). Dark‐shaded bar represents organisational costs and the light‐shaded bar non‐Olympic infrastructural costs. (Source: Official Reports of the Organizing Committees (1924–98); data for 1976–92 and for 2002 from IOC [77] and Salt Lake City Bid Committee [106], respectively. Conversion from host currency into US dollars used Officer [44] and was standardized using US Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics [44].)

Funding models of the Winter Olympic Games, 1924–2006. (Source: Official Reports of the Organizing Committees (1924–98); data for 1976–92 and for 2002 from IOC [77] and Salt Lake City Bid Committee [106], respectively.)

The role of the public sector in funding Winter Games is longstanding. Although the initial idea to stage the 1932 Lake Placid Games came from the American Olympic Committee in 1927, it was the Lake Placid Club, with existing sports facilities in the area, which investigated the event's feasibility. The Lake Placid Chamber of Commerce established a $US50 000 guarantee fund to support the bid in July 1928, but New York State mainly funded the sports facilities. New York State's involvement eased local residents' concerns about the magnitude and responsibility of the task [45]. The organization was a partnership between New York State, Essex County Park Commission, North Elba Town Board, North Elba Park Committee and Lake Placid Village Board, all coming together as the New York Olympic Winter Games Commission [46].

Similarly, the Squaw Valley Games of 1960 were initiated by the Squaw Valley Development Company, but depended upon state (California and Nevada) and federal funding [47]. For the Grenoble Games in 1968, the French government treated these Games as an ‘affaire nationale’ [48], giving 80% of basic sports installation costs and subsidizing operational expenses to the tune of 20 m francs [49]. For Calgary 1988, the Calgary Olympic Development Association and Canadian Olympic Association played major roles in securing the Games [50], but the event was also underwritten by federal, provincial and municipal funds. The idea for the Albertville bid for the Games of 1992 came from two individuals, Jean‐Claude Killy (an Olympic ski champion) and Michel Barnier (Conseiller), who wanted the event to promote modernization of France's Savoy region [51]. Once again, the French government provided most of the finance. The Norwegian government covered the huge costs and debts of Lillehammer in 1994 and also provided extra support for planning and post‐operation costs [52]. The one exception to generous public sector support for Winter Olympics was at Lake Placid in 1980, which made a loss of $US6.5 million. The organizers were refused a final Federal subsidy for $US3.5 million to partly cover the debt, though New York State subsequently paid all outstanding bills [53].

Television, both as a source of income and a means of raising the host's global profile, has emerged as a really powerful force since 1980 (see Fig. 7). In 1956, the organizers at Cortina d'Ampezzo actually had to subsidize the Italian Television Service to cover the event. Since 1960, revenue from television has increased, especially during recent years. Thus, the television rights for the 2002 Salt Lake City Games were sold for $US545 million, making a major contribution to funding the event. In contrast, the lower income of the 1994 Lillehammer Games reflected the unfavourable time difference, preventing live screenings on US networks at peak viewing times.

Cost of television rights for the Winter Olympic Games, 1956–2006. (Source: Olympic Almanac [103].)

The urban impact of the Winter Olympic Games, 1924–2002

On several measures, the scale of the Winter Olympics steadily increased over the twentieth century (see Fig. 8). Four phases in the event's development are apparent (see Table 3). Although covering slightly different periods from those identified for the Summer Games in earlier work by the authors, they show similarities and provide insights into the changing infrastructural implications for host cities. These phases indicate how the Winter Olympics have been used as a catalyst of urban and regional renewal and modernization, as well as highlighting the dangers.

Scale of the Winter Olympic Games and phases in the evolution of the event, 1924–2006.

Changes in the scale of the Winter Olympics, 1924–98

Phase	Countries	Sports	Events	Athletes	Spectators
1924–32	16–25	5–6	14	252–464	10 044–78 310
	(19)	(5)	(14)	(325)	(127 736)
1936–60	28–32	6–7	17–27	665–820	59 037–561 438
	(30)	(6)	(22)	(703)	(312 02)
1964–80	36–37	8	34–38	1006–1158	337 731–732 726
	(36)	(8)	(36)	(1090)	(529 978)
1984–98	49–67	7–10	39–68	1274–1801	433 784–1 338 199
	(59)	(9)	(54)	(1559)	(974 256)
Figures refer to range (with mean in brackets)

first phase, 1924–32: minimal infrastructural transformations

During the first phase (1924–32), the low interest and participation in winter sports produced small‐scale events that could be staged easily in communities with relatively small populations. Only 250 to 500 athletes competed in each Games during this phase. The combined resident population of the first three hosts was only 9400, though the events were an opportunity to develop resort potential. Thus, staging the 1928 Olympics (and again in 1948) helped consolidate St Moritz as an international tourist mecca [54].

For the first four Games, investment in major infrastructural projects, such as transport, accommodation and even sports facilities, was neither necessary nor financially feasible. The construction of a skeleton run for St Moritz in 1928 proved an expensive and unviable legacy [55]. Less than 30 people used the facility after the Games. As a result, the organizers of the 1932 Lake Placid Games questioned whether $US25 000 required to build another skeleton run there could be justified [56]. The event was subsequently eliminated from the programme at Lake Placid in light of expected high costs and low post‐use [57] and was not re‐introduced until Salt Lake City in 2002.

Yet, the organizers of the Lake Placid Games of 1932 did accommodate the IOC's demand for a facility – an indoor ice rink – that New York State thought extravagant and unnecessary. The organizers were responding to a suggestion by the IOC President that the rink would provide an alternative venue in the case of bad weather (which had so badly disrupted the St Moritz Games in 1928) and would also be a tangible memorial to the event. However, the State refused support the organizers' rather late decision to go ahead because of its proposed $US375 000 costs. Faced with the prospect of the already cleared site remaining derelict in the middle of town, the local authorities funded the rink via a bond issue [58]. According to the organizers, it proved its worth as an alternative venue for events affected by unseasonally warm weather, so preventing disruption of the programme [59].

The construction of Olympic Villages or new hotels was certainly not justified in this early phase because of fears of over‐provision. Instead, existing accommodation within a wide geographical catchment area was used and/or ‘winterized’. Hotel and cottage owners in the vicinity of Lake Placid were urged, by the organizers of the Games of 1932, to ‘winterize’ their summer accommodation to house the expected 10 000 visitors. Eventually, accommodation in Montreal, three and a half hours from Lake Placid, had to be utilized to cater for demand [60].

Despite its small scale, some Olympic‐related development proposed for early Winter Games could still raise environmental protests. In March, 1930, a local action group (the Association for the Protection of the Adirondacks) brought a successful legal action against a proposed Olympic bobsled run for the Lake Placid Games on environmental grounds and because building on state land was unconstitutional. A less sensitive site was found at South Meadows Mountain, later renamed Mount Van Hoevenberg [61].

second phase, 1936–60: emerging infrastructural demands

Substantial growth in the number of participating countries and athletes marked the second phase (1936–60). Accordingly, some hosts during this phase were much larger (e.g. Garmish‐Partenkirchen, 1936: 12 600 and Oslo, 1952: 447 100), with greater capacity to develop related infrastructure, though this was sometimes necessary because of increased size. For example, larger urban centres were often more distant from competition sites and, therefore, required transport for athletes and spectators. Many athletes and spectators had to be moved considerable distances to isolated locations in difficult terrains and within short times, sometimes compounded by adverse weather. Investment in transport infrastructure, such as new roads, bridges and ski‐lifts, became essential at the 1952 Oslo Games and subsequent events. Oslo was also the only host before 1960 to build an Olympic Village, albeit dispersed around the city, with planned post‐Olympic uses such as student residences, a hospital and an old people's home [62]. The extent of infrastructural investment for the Oslo Games was controversial at the time. It was seen by some as an extravagance when Europe was still emerging from severe post‐war austerity.

However, the trend to greater host size was not uniform. Two hosts in this second phase had less than 5000 population each, constraining investment in Olympic‐related infrastructure for the same reasons as in the first phase. Initial plans for an Olympic Village in Cortina d'Ampezzo for the 1956 Games were abandoned after opposition from local hoteliers who feared an increase in competing accommodation capacity [63]. The development of the Olympic Village for the 1960 Squaw Valley Games was out of scale with the small local community, but the number of athletes and use of local hotel capacity for officials and journalists made it unavoidable [64]. Yet, it was only a temporary construction as the town's small population (c. 4000) meant there was no viable post‐Olympic use. These developments show the infrastructural implications that became usual as the event continued to grow.

third phase, 1964–80: tool of regional development

The third phase (1964–80) brought more significant implications as numbers of athletes and sports events continued to rise. Four of the five hosts during this period had more than 100 000 populations, one over a million. Only one host [65] had a population similar to previous phases. Hosts with larger local populations had greater capacity to accommodate the Games' growing demands, while hosts with smaller populations began to face problems justifying major infrastructural investment. It was also during this phase that television revenue became an important source of income (see Fig. 7). While television income contributed $US597 000 to the 1964 Innsbruck Games, the 1980 Lake Placid Games were able to command $US15.5 million.

With larger local resident populations of host centres, the post‐Games viability of purposebuilt Olympic Villages became more assured, especially after 1960. In most host centres, the Olympic Village has subsequently become a residential area or a student hall for a local university or college. For example, the Olympic Village at Grenoble was built in a Priority Urbanization Zone (ZUP) and subsequently used as an 800‐room university hall, a 300‐room hostel for young workers and a tower block with 52 apartments [66]. In Innsbruck, which staged the 1964 and 1976 Games, organizers were forced to build an Olympic Village for both events. That built for the 1964 Games was unavailable for 1976 as it had become a residential suburb in the interim. A new Village was built on an adjacent site. The 1976 organizers later reported that having to build a Village was, perhaps, rather extravagant, as not all athletes wished to stay there, some preferring to be closer to event sites. In retrospect, the organizers felt that accommodating athletes in hotels might have been preferable from cost, security and transport perspectives [67].

Partly because of increased size, the Winter Olympics were recognized as a tool of regional development from the 1960s. According to the organizers, the award of the 1960 Games to Squaw Valley, transformed the remote mountain valley into a ‘throbbing city’ [68]. The 1964 Innsbruck Games were a showcase for Austrian businesses, especially those related to ski equipment [69], while the 1968 Grenoble Games were used to accelerate the modernization of the Isère Département [70] and to remodel its planning system following rapid growth (1946–68) [71]. Japan's government viewed the Sapporo Games of 1972 as a unique economic opportunity to invigorate the island of Hokkaido [72]. Less than 5% of capital improvements for these Games were on sports facilities, with most spending on investment in urban infrastructure [73].

Olympic‐related investment in transport infrastructure often formed the key contribution to regional development objectives. Road construction associated with the 1968 Grenoble Games accounted for a fifth of total investment in the Games [74]. The network was designed to decentralize the region and facilitate economic growth, including a motorway link from Grenoble to Geneva which was a catalyst for the regional economy, transforming Grenoble into a major conference and university centre [75]. The city's old airport at Grenoble‐Eybens was closed to make way for the Olympic Village and replaced by two new airports at Saint‐Etienne‐de‐Saint‐Geoirs and Versoud [76]. For the 1972 Sapporo Games, there were extensions to two airports, improvements to the main railway station, 41 new or improved roads (213 km) and a new rapid transit system (45 km). This last project had already been started by the City of Sapporo, but could now be completed with government funding.

With a scale that often now went well beyond local financial and organizational capacity, the problems associated with hosting the event also grew. Thus, the focus and impact of the Games became dissipated as they were staged in larger cities and wider regions. At Grenoble in 1968, sports venues lay across the region, with competitors preferring to be accommodated closer to venues rather than in the Olympic Village. Critics claimed that the dispersed geography had detracted from the camaraderie of the event and increased problems of transport [77]. Warnings about the event's long‐term limitations as a tool of regional development began to grow in view of the debt accumulated by the Grenoble organizers and the abandonment or demolition of some venues.

This third phase also saw the reassigning of the 1976 Winter Olympics from Denver, the only time that this has occurred [78]. It reflected local concern about the event's rising cost and about how the organizers, led by business interests, were ignoring environmental considerations. An action group, ‘Citizens for Colorado's Future’, managed to put the issue on the State and City ballots in November 1972, with citizens voting on whether the Games should be staged using state funding. Turnout was high (93.8%), with 60% voting against the Olympics, so that neither State nor federal funding would be forthcoming. Denver was, therefore, forced to withdraw its candidacy for the 1976 Games, which were then staged at short notice in Innsbruck.

There was also growing consideration of environmental factors elsewhere, though in different ways. For the 1972 Sapporo Games, the only mountain close to the host city and suitable for downhill ski events was Mount Eniwa, within the Shikotsu‐Toya National Park. The National Park Council gave permission on condition that all related facilities were removed and the terrain in the affected area restored to its original state [79]. Whether this condition was realistic or merely a compromise favouring the Olympic development is debatable. A comparable instance concerned the 1980 Games at Lake Placid, where the town itself lay within Adirondack Park, designated in 1971 and regulated by Adirondack Park Agency. The park's public lands were directly administered by the State Department of Environmental Conservation (ENCON) which also operated bob‐sled and luge runs, the biathlon and cross‐country trails and the Whiteface Mountain Ski area [80]. The extensions of the ski jumps, originally built for the 1932 Games, had to comply with standards set by the Adirondack Park Agency and the Federal Environment Agency [81].

fourth phase, 1984–2002: large‐scale transformations

The fourth phase (1984–present day) has seen the biggest increase in participation of both athletes and support staff. By 1994, the ratio of support staff to athletes was 6.5 times bigger than in 1956 (see Table 4). Numbers of athletes were also growing, with 2400 athletes at Salt Lake City in 2002. After 1988, two or more Olympic Villages have become necessary to accommodate athletes closer to event venues. Accommodation of media personnel was also a growing challenge, so that separate villages for the media were also necessary. Television revenue had, of course, become an important income source after 1960, although the most substantial increases came after 1980. Television income rose from $US91.5 million in 1984 to $US545 million in 2002 (see Fig. 7), the higher revenues partly funding urban transformation on a larger scale.

Ratio of athletes to personnel involved in the Winter Olympic Games

Personnel	Cortina D'Ampezzo, 1956	Albertville, 1992
Athlete	1	1
Performers (Ceremonies)	0	2
Reporters	0.4	4
Security	1.3	5
Volunteers	not available	5
Staff	2	10
Source: Various [105]

These various demands began more obviously to favour centres with larger populations. Since 1984, the Games have been staged in centres with an average population of about 370 000, although two of the seven hosts have been substantially larger and two smaller. The role of the Winter Games as a means to secure major urban infrastructural change and modernization has intensified. Thus, the 1984 Sarajevo Games became an opportunity to modernize the city, while the 1988 Calgary Games and 1994 Lillehammer Games were sought as stimuli to revive the local economies [82]. At Calgary, the Organizing Committee (OCO'88) moved some venues originally selected by the Calgary Olympic Development Association to make them more viable after the Games [83]. In Calgary, the Games also caused some facilities to be provided much earlier than otherwise would have occurred. For example, the construction of the Olympic Saddledome (20 000 seats, $Can7 million), home for a professional ice hockey team established in 1980, was fast‐tracked to show the city's commitment to its bid [84]. Large investments required to stage the 1992 Albertville Games appear, however, to have made more difficulties for other northern French Alpine resorts seeking finance for restructuring [85]. This shows that Olympic investment has ‘opportunity costs’ which may postpone or eliminate other forms of investment.

Given these changing circumstances, smaller hosts now faced problems justifying investment in permanent, purpose‐built Olympic Villages. Albertville (1992), with only 20 000 population at the time, renovated a small spa at Brides‐les‐Bains as the Olympic Village rather than constructing a purpose‐built facility. However, it proved too distant from sports facilities, so seven smaller Olympic Villages were established in existing hotel accommodation, closer to the event sites. After this experience, the IOC stated that it favoured a single Olympic Village in future Games to promote international contact between athletes [86]. In Lillehammer (1994), with a population of 23 000, a temporary Olympic Village of 200 wooden chalets, was constructed. These examples were significant departures from the trend to large‐scale infrastructural investment.

The Games' increasing scale also necessitated more formal recognition of environmental issues [87]. The intrusion of built structures into fragile environments and the use of chemicals, have become major issues when preparing for Winter Olympics. Preparations for the 1994 Lillehammer Games for the first time embraced the principles of sustainable development. The proposed location of a main indoor arena was moved to protect a bird sanctuary and its heat circulation used excess heat from its refrigeration unit. Contracts with suppliers and contractors also included environmental clauses. The approach influenced the IOC to add an environmental commitment to its Charter and inspired Sydney, host of the 2000 Summer Games, to make sustainable development a core theme in its own preparations. The candidates for the 2002 Winter Games were the first to be required to describe their environmental plans in their bid documents [88]. These attempts to incorporate environmental sustainability into Olympic planning have, however, been criticized as essentially shallow public‐relation exercises [89].

Future Winter Olympics

The next Winter Olympics will be in Turin, the second time that the Games will be held in a city of around one million people. In familiar fashion, the Games form part of a longerterm modernization strategy for the city, based on a master development plan formulated in the 1990s in response to a decline of the traditional economic structure, based on the Fiat Car Company which closed in 1980. The city wishes to transform its image from an industrial city to a post‐industrial city, based on quality tourism, conventions, culture and gastronomy, with linkages to the Piedmont region. Turin's goal is to have transformed its character and its reputation by 2011, which is exactly 150 years after Italian unification when Turin was the state capital (1861–4).

Facilities for the Winter Games are currently being constructed within the city and the surrounding mountain communities [90]. The ice sports venues are being built within Turin itself, while skiing and bobsled/luge venues are spread over eight mountain sites within 100 km of the city. There will be two Olympic Villages. The ‘mountain’ village is planned in Sestriere as part of the tourist resort's modernization, establishing the area as one with an international reputation. The ‘city’ village is now planned as four or five small sub‐villages distributed around Turin based on main university sites. This decision was taken to ensure viable after‐use as halls for university students. The International Broadcast Centre will be in the Lingotto Building, the old Fiat Factory, renovated in the early 1990s to become an exposition and convention centre. Although not linked directly to the Olympic preparations, major work is planned for the transport infrastructure, including a rail link between the two local airports and the city centre and new roads to improve links across the city. The event is being taken as an opportunity for the city to rediscover its mountains, though incorporating surrounding mountain communities into the investment benefits of the Games remains a challenge.

Conclusions

This article is the first comparative analysis of the infrastructural implications of all previous Winter Olympic Games. The event differs from the Summer Games in that its potential hosts are lower down the urban hierarchy and are constrained geographically and topographically. Investment is almost always required in both sporting and supporting infrastructures, even though long‐term use of facilities created can create problems for the often small host communities. For this reason, national, regional and local governments have to give subsidies, often to levels out of all proportion to local population. Despite this, settlements remain keen to secure the event, shown in the increasing intensity of the bid and selection process and associated claims of unfair competition and corruption.

The increasing scale of the Winter Games is reflected in the infrastructure required in host centres. Throughout the Games' history, development or refurbishment of sports facilities has been required. From some of the earliest events, environmental concerns have been a major issue in developing venues. Denver, the only would‐be host to have relinquished the Games, did so partly on environmental grounds. Lillehammer in 1994 became the pioneers of sustainable development within the Olympic movement, a theme that seems set to continue. Increasing size has also had other impacts. Thus, construction of an Olympic Village or new hotels only occurred after 1960 because of fears of over‐provision, although accommodation for the 1992 and 1994 Games (in small host centres) was refurbished and temporary, respectively. Investment in transport infrastructure became essential from the 1950s. Whereas early Games were used to develop the potential of particular winter resorts, later Games (especially from 1964) became a tool for wider regional development. As the Games became larger, venues spread over a wider area, also widening regional impacts. In the long‐term, of course, many infrastructure projects might have happened without the Olympics but usually were developed much earlier than would otherwise have been the case. Similar trends have also been apparent for the Summer Games [91]. Both Summer and Winter Olympics have, thus, become tools of urban and regional development and, therefore, important aspects of planning policy in prospective host cities. Yet, this type of planning policy raises important questions.

A key issue is whether Olympic‐related investment fulfils organizers' intentions by leaving viable and worthwhile long‐term legacies. Spilling's work on the economic impacts of the Lillehammer Winter Games of 1994 described the effects as ‘intermezzo’, a short dramatic interlude but yielding only a poor return on investment [92]. New business start‐ups were substantial immediately after the Games were awarded, but many did not survive. These tangible economic impacts might be short‐lived but intangible impacts, such as the creation of new networks, skills and images, can have longer‐term importance. Research into the effects of the 1988 Games on Calgary's image in 22 centres in America and Europe between 1986 and 1989 showed an increased awareness immediately before and after the event [93]. Such outcomes are measured as ‘recognition factors’, showing the place marketing importance of these more intangible benefits.

However, growing ‘gigantism’ means that ‘Olympic legacies’ (of whatever kind) are only likely to be experienced by larger urban centres in the developed world. These places have both the financial capacities to stage the event and established tourism industries that can be enhanced. Winter Olympic hosts, actual and potential, are also concentrated almost exclusively in Europe and North America. Indeed, increasing Olympic gigantism and growing requirements for sustainable development, raise doubts as to whether the less developed world could ever stage events on the required scale. This means that the accumulation of international capital associated with these events, increasingly from television revenue and sponsorship, concentrates on further improving already prosperous ‘Western’ towns, cities and regions. From an urban policy perspective, the benefits of Olympic resourcing might arguably be better focused on poorer cities more deserving of large‐scale investment and environmental improvement [94]. Furthermore, within the developed world, only urban areas with larger population sizes can really afford the required investment and have the population thresholds to make facilities viable after the Games. The Winter Olympics have, therefore, begun to be more commonly hosted by larger cities or wider regions rather than the small resorts of the 1920s and 1930s.

Although the Winter Games have grown substantially over the last 20 years, size has been a recurrent concern throughout Olympic history. During preparations for the 1952 Oslo Games, a Special Committee proposed reducing the number of individual events because the increasing size of each Winter Games would damage their character and make it impossible for any town to undertake the necessary arrangements [95]. The fate of this proposal is not indicated but, in practice, the Games continued to grow. The IOC's President from 1952 to 1972, Avery Brundage, objected to the commercial endorsements associated with some winter sports and the real estate boom that usually occurred in host resorts [96]. As a consequence, he hoped that the whole Winter Olympics would receive a ‘decent burial’ at Denver, the original intended host of the 1976 Games [97]. Brundage had also criticized the huge expenditures at the 1968 Grenoble Games, writing that,

…the French spent $240m in connection with these Grenoble Games and when you consider that this was for ten days of amateur sport, it seems to be somewhat out of proportion. With that kind of money involved there is bound to be commercialisation of one kind or another [98].

A reformist agenda was heralded by the appointment of Jacques Rogge as IOC President in 2001. At the IOC's 115th Session in Prague in July, 2003, over 100 proposals made by the IOC Olympic Games Study Commission to reduce the size, cost and complexity were approved. The Commission's main recommendation was to develop a Games ‘template’ specifying staging requirements, allowing easy identification of extravagance. Key principles within the Commission's report were to encourage shared venues and facilities; to maximize temporary installations and only permit permanent facilities if a positive legacy could be demonstrated; to reduce the amount of reserved seating for dignitaries; to promote knowledge transfer between host cities; and to optimize government and host city involvement throughout the planning process [99]. The IOC, and the Evaluation Commissions in particular, have a duty to apply these guidelines in selecting and monitoring future host cities. These changes might increase less developed nations' chances in securing the event, though high quality facilities for athletes and strict security would still be required.

When set against the high public‐sector subsidies required to stage the event, anticipated and actual benefits can be controversial and contested. In the clamour to stage an event successful in both economic and image terms, organizers often give lesser priority to local community and environmental impacts. Indeed, delegation of responsibility to separate agencies can create discontinuities, contradictions and conflicts between original objectives and final outcomes and legacies. The bid committee must secure the event for the host centre, often reflecting the enthusiasm and drive of the initial vision. The organizing committee feels it has to deliver ‘the best games ever’ within strict constraints, as well as achieving consensus and understanding between the various stakeholders. The legacy and the task of finding viable after‐uses is left to the host centre authorities, which often have been only loosely integrated into actual preparations. Cashman [100] has suggested that some of the Olympics' more detrimental aspects might be mitigated by integrating the legacy concept within all stages of preparation, especially bidding. Hiller [101] has suggested that the Olympics must be more fully rooted in normal urban decision‐making processes, particularly involving local urban planners, rather than independent event planners.

Sometimes, however, Winter Olympics hosts have been more sensitive to local needs than Summer Games' hosts. The organizers of the 1932 Lake Placid Games convinced the IOC that the skeleton run was not a viable proposition after the 1928 experience of St Moritz. Local concerns about post‐Olympic use of a new Olympic Village on hotel capacity in Cortina in 1956 were heeded. Similarly, local opposition to the Winter Games in Denver in 1976 on environmental and financial grounds saw the event transferred to another host.

Yet, other preparations have had damaging impacts on the daily lives of local people. These implications usually appear in sources other than the official reports. As an example, Victoria Park in Calgary shows how an area used as a venue for several proposed and actual mega‐events, including the 1988 Winter Games, has changed from a living community into an area of residential obsolescence. Uncertainty about whether the proposed mega‐events would actually occur has produced planning blight and impeded private housing improvement and investment. Moreover, once the sporting infrastructure has been put in place, commercially‐focused development has improved the attractiveness of the residential environment. The result has eliminated residential rehabilitation, replacing it with tourism and entertainment land uses [102]. The emergence of local action groups opposing bids for Winter Games in several potential hosts shows some local perceptions of the negative impacts (for example, Helsinki 2006 Anti‐Olympic Committee; Nolympics!, Turin, 2006; Bread not Circuses, Vancouver, 2010).

A key conclusion is, therefore, that host cities need to have carefully integrated and realistic strategies for all aspects of Olympic‐related development. The most successful Winter Games, regarding urban infrastructure, have had long‐term development plans for investment that have not depended exclusively on the Olympics for their implementation. To be worthwhile, individual developments, such as sports facilities, accommodation and transport, also need long‐term viability with appropriate multiple‐use wherever possible. A key challenge for Olympic hosts is, therefore, to ensure beneficial long‐term legacies through careful strategies for urban infrastructure, economic development, land use planning, tourism and the environment, while also providing an attractive and exciting two‐week festival of sport.

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to acknowledge use of the IOC Archives, Olympic Studies Centre, Lausanne during March, 2002 for the material presented in this paper. The authors would like to thank Brian Rogers, Tim Absalom, Marzuki Haji and Gareth Johnston in the School of Geography, University of Plymouth for the cartography.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

BRIAN CHALKLEY

* Stephen Essex is Principal Lecturer in Human Geography at the University of Plymouth (UK). His teaching and research focuses on rural planning and tourism and the infrastructural implications of the Olympic Games. Brian Chalkley is Professor of Geography at the University of Plymouth. His teaching and research focuses on geographical education, urban planning and the infrastructural implications of the Olympic Games.

Notes

* Stephen Essex is Principal Lecturer in Human Geography at the University of Plymouth (UK). His teaching and research focuses on rural planning and tourism and the infrastructural implications of the Olympic Games.

Brian Chalkley is Professor of Geography at the University of Plymouth. His teaching and research focuses on geographical education, urban planning and the infrastructural implications of the Olympic Games.

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• For the purpose of this paper, information on the costs related to the organization and investment in urban development for each Olympic Games was obtained from the Official Reports of the Organizing Committee. These data, however, have to be treated with caution, as the basis of the costs for each Games is not always made explicit in the reports. In some cases, the cost of non‐Olympic urban development (such as in hotel accommodation and transport infrastructure) is not reported separately, while in others the costs are included in the organization. There is no way of knowing whether the figures are accurate. Investment in non‐Olympic urban development, especially by the public sector, is often excluded from the costs on the justification that it would have been made at some point in the future.

• The costs of each Olympic Games were obtained in the currency of the host in the year of the event. Conversion of these figures to allow international comparisons and to normalize inflation was problematic. The conversion method adopted in this study was to use the average exchange rate between the host country and America in the year of the event (L. H. Officer, Exchange rate between the United States dollar and forty other countries, 1913–1999. Economic History Services, EH.Net, 2002. http://www.eh.net/hmit/exchange rates (accessed on 7 February, 2003)). These values (in US dollars) were then adjusted to account for inflation using the US Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index 1947–2002, which presented the costs at 1982–4 values (United States Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers: All Items, Index 1982–84 = 100, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred.2/series/CPIAUCSL/9/Max (accessed on 7 February, 2003)). A potential limitation of this method is that the adjusted values are based on inflation rates as experienced in America across the period rather than in each of the host countries. However, alternative methods were equally problematic.

• One alternative approach attempted was to obtain a historical deflator (Consumer Price Index) for each host country and convert the costs into values for a common date (say, 2001). These values could then be converted into international dollars for that year using purchasing power parities (i.e. the number of units of a country's currency required to purchase the same amount of goods and services in that country as compared with another). In practice, not all National Statistical Offices had Consumer Price Index datasets back to 1924 or used the same common date (World Trade Organization, Web sites of national statistical offices, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/natl_e.htm (accessed on 1 March, 2003)). Purchasing power parities also had limited coverage, with the UN/World Bank International Comparison Programme dating from 1970 and the Penn World Table dating from 1950 (World Bank, The International Comparison Programme and Purchasing Power Parities, http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2002/index.htm (accessed on 7 February 2003). Penn World Table, http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu (accessed on 29 January, 2003)). Consequently, the costs calculated by the exchange rate method are presented in this paper, albeit they give only an approximate indication of the changing costs of staging the Winter Games.

III Olympic Winter Games Committee, Official Report III Olympic Winter Games, Lake Placid. New York: III Olympic Winter Games Committee, 1932, p. 43.

Ibid., p. 74.

California Olympic Commission, VIII Olympic Winter Games Squaw Valley, California, Final Report. Squaw Valley: Organizing Committee, 1960, pp. 19, 21.

F. Borja, op. cit. [21].

Comité D'Organisation des Xemes Jeux Olympiques D'hiver, Official Report Xth Winter Olympic Games. Grenoble: Organizing Committee, 1968, p. 39.

XV Olympic Winter Games Committee/Calgary Olympic Development Association, XV Olympic Winter Games: Official Report. Calgary: Organizing Committee, 1988, p. 5.

Organizing Committee of the XVI Olympic Winter Games of Albertville and Savoie, Official Report of the XVI Olympic Winter Games of Albertville and Savoie. Albertville: Organizing Committee, 1992, p. 12.

O. Spilling, L'impatto economico dei Mega Event: il caso Lillehammer 1994, in L. Bobbio and C. Guala, C. (eds), op. cit. [22], pp. 115–44.

Lake Placid Olympic Organizing Committee, op. cit. [5], p. 220.

J. R. Brent Ritchie and M. Lyons, Olympulse VI: A Post‐Event Assessment of Resident Reaction to the XV Olympic Winter Games. Journal of Travel Research 28 (1990) 14–23.

The skeleton event should not be confused with the bobsleigh event. A skeleton is a sled that consists of a metal frame only, upon which a single competitor lies and can steer by transferring weight on the frame. The bobsleigh is also a sled, but has a body within which one or two competitors sit, and which can be steered through use of rudders.

Olympic Museum Archive, Lake Placid General file 1928–1991, Letter, G. Dewey, Chairman of Lake Placid to M. Le Comte, President of the International Federation of Bobsleigh and Tobogganing, Paris, 9 November, 1929.

Olympic Museum Archive, Lake Placid General file 1930–31, Letter from IOC, 29 March, 1930.

G. C. Ortloff and S. C. Ortloff, Lake Placid: The Olympic Years, 1932–1980. Lake Placid: Macromedia, 1976, p. 77.

III Olympic Winter Games Committee, op. cit. [45], p. 154.

Ibid., p. 112.

Ibid., p. 47. G. C. Ortloff and S. C. Ortloff, op. cit. [58], p. 58.

Organisasjonskomiteen, VI Olympiske Vinterleker Oslo 1952. Oslo: Organisasjonskomiteen, 1952, pp. 23, 42.

Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano, VII Giochi Olimpici Inversnali, Cortina D'Ampezzo, Rapporto ufficiale. Rome: Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano, 1956, p. 267.

J‐L. Chappelet, From Chamonix to Salt Lake City: Evolution of the Olympic Village Concept at the Winter Games, in M. De Moragas, M. Llines and B. Kidd (eds) Olympic Villages: A Hundred Years of Urban Planning and Shared Experiences, International Symposium on Olympic Villages. Lausanne: Documents of the Museum, 1997, pp. 81–8 (p. 83).

Lake Placid Olympic Organising Committee, op. cit. [5].

Comité D'Organisation des Xemes Jeux Olympiques D'hiver, op. cit. [49], p. 71.

Herausgegeben vom Organisationskomitee der IX Olympischen Winterspiele in Innsbruck, Offizieller Bericht der IX Olympischen Winterspiele Innsbruck 1964. Wien und Munchen: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1967, p. 400.

California Olympic Commission, op. cit. [47], p. 27.

R. Espy, The Politics of the Olympic Games. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, p. 90.

F. Borja, op. cit. [21].

Comité D'Organisation des Xemes Jeux Olympiques D'hiver, op. cit. [49], p. 46.

F. Borja, op. cit. [21].

C. M. Hall, op. cit. [1], p. 69.

Comité D'Organisation des Xemes Jeux Olympiques D'hiver, op. cit. [49], p. 46.

J‐L. Chappelet, A short overview of the Olympic Winter Games. Barcelona: Centre d'Estudis Olimpics I de l'Esport (UAB), 2002, p. 11.

Comité D'Organisation des Xemes Jeux Olympiques D'hiver, op. cit. [49], p. 290.

IOC, The IOC: One Hundred Years – The Idea, The Presidents, The Achievements. Lausanne: IOC, 1996, Volume 2, p. 182.

L. L. K. Olson, Power, Public Policy and the Environment: The Defeat of the 1976 Winter Olympics in Colorado. University of Colorado: PhD thesis, Department of Political Science, 1974.

The Organizing Committee for the XIth Olympic Winter Games, Official Report Sapporo 1972. Sapporo: The Organizing Committee for the XIth Olympic Winter Games, 1972, p. 246.

Lake Placid Olympic Organizing Committee, op. cit. [5], p. 18.

Ibid., p. 38.

XV Olympic Winter Games Committee/Calgary Olympic Development Association, op. cit. [50], p. 5.

Ibid., p. 53.

H. Hiller, Impact and Image: the convergence of urban factors in preparing for the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics, in G. J. Syme et al. (eds), op. cit. [1], pp. 119–31 (p. 124).

J. Tuppen, The Restructuring of Winter Sports Resorts in the French Alps: Problems, Processes and Policies. International Journal of Tourism Research 2 (2000) 327–344 (p. 330).

R. Charmetant, Albertville: Olympism and Architecture, in M. De Moragas et al. (eds), op. cit. [64], pp. 109–15 (p. 115).

V. May, Environmental implications of the 1992 Winter Olympic Games. Tourism Management 16 (1995) 269–75.

IOC, Building a Positive Environmental Legacy though the Olympic Games. IOC Commission on Sport and the Environment, June 1999, Lausanne: IOC, 1999, p. 5.

H. Lenskyj, op. cit. [17].

E. Dansero and A. Segre, I XX Giochi Olimpici Invernali Torino 2006: Breviario minimo (XX Olympic Winter Games Turin 2006: A Compendium, Bollettino della Societa Geografica Italiana, Series XII, 2002, 7, 4, pp. 853–60.

B. Chalkley and S. Essex, op. cit. [2].

O. Spilling, op. cit. [52].

J. R. Brent Ritchie and B. H. Smith, The impact of a mega‐event on host region awareness: a longitudinal study. Journal of Travel Research 30 (1991) 3–10.

S. Essex and B. Chalkley, op. cit. [3].

Olympic Museum Archive, Oslo Correspondence COJO, 1947–1953, Undated draft of suggestion of the Special Committee regarding the reduction of the sports' program of the Olympic Games, Jeux Olympiques de 1952 Oslo Correspondence COJO, 1947–1953.

J‐L. Chappelet, op. cit. [75], p. 9.

R. Espy, op. cit. [69], p. 135.

Ibid., p. 136.

IOC, Olympic Games Study Commission: Report to the 115th IOC Session, Prague, July, 2003. Lausanne: IOC.

R. Cashman, What is ‘Olympic Legacy’?, Paper at Symposium on the Legacy of the Olympic Games, 1984–2000, Olympic Museum, Lausanne, 14–16 November, 2002.

H. Hiller, Toward a Science of Olympic Outcomes: The Urban Legacy, Paper at Symposium on the Legacy of the Olympic Games, 1984–2000, Olympic Museum, Lausanne, 14–16 November, 2002.

H. Hiller and D. Moylan, Mega‐events and Community Obsolescence: Redevelopment versus rehabilitation in Victoria Park East. Canadian Journal of Urban Research 8 (1999) 47–81.

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