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Notes
1 UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Condemns Nuclear Test by Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1718 (2006)’, 14 October 2006, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8853.doc.htm>, accessed 20 October 2015.
2 Ibid.
3 Joseph Khan, ‘Angry China is Likely to Toughen its Stand on North Korea’, New York Times, 10 October 2006.
4 This paper will use the two names interchangeably.
5 Major conventional weapons systems were defined as including: ‘any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms, or related materiel including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council’ or by the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to the resolution. UN Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006), S/Res/1718 (2006), 14 October 2006, para. 8(a).
6 Ibid., para. 8(a)(i). ‘Related materiel and services' is a term that has yet to be defined by the relevant UN Sanctions Committee. Instead, it has been subject to interpretation by UN member states, and by the UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to the resolution. Some points of clarity have emerged as a result of specific incidents, and a more general consensus appears to be emerging that items or services can be categorised as ‘weapons-related’ if they contribute directly to the use or manufacture of lethal armaments. Machine tools used in weapons production lines would therefore be considered ‘weapons-related’, for example.
7 Circumstances underpinning the decision to exempt small arms and light weapons are not entirely clear. In most of the author's informal conversations on the subject, it has been asserted that China insisted on the provision. Two claims have been made in particular: that the exemption was inserted because North Korea should be allowed access to these weapons for self-defence, and that the comparatively small revenue generated by the export of these weapons means they are not relevant to efforts to inhibit Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programmes. UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), S/Res/1874 (2009), 12 June 2009, para. 10.
8 Statement by Ambassador Ripert of France to the UN Security Council, S/PV.6141, 64th year, 6141st meeting Friday, 12 June 2009.
9 US Department of the Treasury, ‘United States Designates North Korean Entities and Individuals for Activities Related to North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction Program’, 30 August 2010, <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg840.aspx>, accessed 20 October 2015.
10 See Malta Independent, ‘1982 Labour Government “Secret” Agreement with North Korea – “Times Change” – Alex Sceberras Trigona’, 7 February 2010, <http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2010-02-07/news/1982-labour-government-secret-agreement-with-north-korea-times-change-alex-sceberras-trigona-270034/>, accessed 20 October 2015; US Department of State and Department of Defense, Grenada: A Preliminary Report (Washington, DC: Government Press Office, 1983), p. 24.
11 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2014/147, 6 March 2014.
12 The term ‘designate’ is used in this study to refer to a government's decision to sanction an individual or entity for carrying out activity counter to its laws. Designations ordinarily involve the freezing of assets, as well as prohibiting the nationals of the country taking the action from dealing with the sanctioned individual or entity. In the US, those sanctioned by the Office of Foreign Assets Control are collectively referred to as ‘Specially Designated Nationals’.
13 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Designates Burmese LT. General Thein Htay, Chief of Directorate of Defense Industries’, 2 July 2013, <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl1998.aspx>, accessed 20 October 2015. See also US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Designates Burmese Companies and an Individual with Ties to the Directorate of Defense Industries’, 17 December 2013, <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2247.aspx>, accessed 20 October 2015.
14 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2012/422, 14 June 2012.
15 Con Coughlin, ‘Hamas and North Korea in Secret Arms Deal’, Daily Telegraph, 26 July 2014.
16 Andrea Berger, ‘North Korea, Hamas and Hezbollah: Arm in Arm?’, 38 North, 5 August 2014, <http://38north.org/2014/08/aberger080514/>, accessed 20 October 2015.
17 See, for example, Leon V Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Jonathan D Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security, Adelphi series 418–19 (Abingdon: Routledge for IISS, 2011); Su Hoon Lee (ed.), Nuclear North Korea: Regional Dynamics, Failed Policies, and Ideas for Ending a Global Stalemate (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012). Some work has been done on proliferation and North Korean illicit trade networks generally defined. See, for example, Sheena Chestnut, ‘Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks’, International Security (Vol. 32, No. 1, Summer 2007).
18 It is possible, and perhaps likely, that a single contract for large-ticket weapons, systems, or programmes such as ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction could account for more than the entire revenue from conventional-arms sales and services. However, as this paper will show, aside from those with Syria and possibly Iran, North Korea is today believed to have few such contracts.
19 Examples of the valuable system-specific literature that has been produced, which encompasses analysis of North Korean exports, include Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2003). Janne E Nolan's work on the missile market in the developing world remains relevant and is an exception to the supply-centric focus of the majority of the literature. Janne E Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991). Similarly, while Joshua Pollack's analysis focuses on North Korea's ballistic-missile exports, his work importantly recognises the more recent comparative significance to Pyongyang of conventional-systems sales, particularly in light of the declining global demand for its missile products. Joshua Pollack, ‘Ballistic Trajectory: The Evolution of North Korea's Ballistic Missile Market’, Nonproliferation Review (Vol. 18, No. 2, July 2011). Among others, Balázs Szalontai of Kookmin University has produced quality analysis of North Korea's bilateral partnerships, including military partnerships, in regions such as the Middle East. Balázs Szalontai, ‘Cracks in the North Korea-Iran Axis’, NK News, 5 August 2014, <http://www.nknews.org/2014/08/cracks-in-the-north-korea-iran-axis/>, accessed 20 October 2015. Outside of the Middle East, only a few of North Korea's bilateral military relationships have received attention. See, for example, Joost Oliemans and Stijn Mitzer, ‘North Korea and Ethiopia, Brothers in Arms’, NK News, 4 September 2014, <http://www.nknews.org/2014/09/north-korean-military-support-for-ethiopia/>, accessed 20 October 2015.
20 See, for example, Claudia Rosett, ‘North Korea's Middle East Webs and Nuclear Wares', Forbes, 13 February 2013.
21 See footnote 19 for information on system-specific analysis, which is heavily concentrated on North Korea's ballistic-missile exports.
22 In fact, in 1999 North Korea insisted that it would cease its sale of ballistic missiles if the US paid it $3 billion over three years – a proposal that was a non-starter in Washington. US Department of State Daily Press Briefing, DPB #40, 30 March 1999 at 2:50 pm, available at <http://fas.org/news/dprk/1999/990330db2.htm>, accessed 20 October 2015. See also Joseph S Bermudez, Jr, ‘A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK’, Center for Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper No. 2, 1999; Paul K Kerr, Steven A Hildreth and Mary Beth D Nikitin, ‘Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation’, Congressional Research Service, Report 7-5700, 16 April 2014.
23 Charles K Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950–1992 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).
24 John S Park, ‘North Korea, Inc.: Gaining Insights into North Korean Regime Stability from Recent Commercial Activity’, United States Institute of Peace Working Paper, 22 April 2009, <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/North%20Korea,%20Inc.PDF>, accessed 20 October 2015.
25 UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), S/Res/1874 (2009), 12 June 2009.
26 See, for example, Oliemans and Mitzer, ‘North Korea and Ethiopia, Brothers in Arms'. Bertil Lintner similarly focuses on price as the reason Burma started buying from North Korea. Bertil Lintner, ‘Clouded Alliance: North Korea and Myanmar's Covert Ties', Jane's Intelligence Review, October 2009, p. 49, available at <http://www.asiapacificms.com/articles/pdf/clouded_alliance.pdf>, accessed 20 October 2015. See also ‘Breaking the Iran, North Korea, Syria Nexus', Joint Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 113th Congress, First Session, 11 April 2013, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20130411/100636/HHRG-113-FA13-20130411-SD002.pdf>, accessed 20 October 2015.