I. North Korea in the Global Arms Market

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Notes

1 Andrea Matles Savada (ed.), North Korea: A Country Study (Washington, DC: GPO for Library of Congress, 1994), chapter on ‘Relations with the Third World’.

2 Author's visit to the Korean Workers' Party Museum, Pyongyang, June 2014.

3 Translation of Republic of Korea National Intelligence Service, ‘North Korean Military – Munitions Industry’, January 1999, available at <http://fas.org/irp/world/rok/nis-docs/defense09.htm>, accessed 20 October 2015.

4 Charles K Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950–1992 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), pp. 140–45, 168–204.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., pp. 179–80.

8 Not all recipients of military support from the communist bloc received assistance from both the Soviet Union and China. The Sino-Soviet split manifested itself in some overseas conflicts. In Angola, for example, the Soviet Union allied itself with a faction opposing the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), which China and North Korea supported.

9 US Department of State and Department of Defense, Grenada: A Preliminary Report (Washington, DC: Government Press Office, 1983), pp. 22–24.

10 Savada (ed.), North Korea, chapter on ‘Relations with the Third World’.

11 Ibid.

12 Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak, pp. 230–33.

13 An excellent example of the effect of the end of the war of ideas on Pyongyang's military markets is Madagascar. For further details, see Helen Chapin Metz (ed.), Madagascar: A Country Study (Washington, DC: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994).

14 Kathryn Weathersby, ‘Dependence and Mistrust: North Korea's Relations with Moscow and the Evolution of Juche’, U.S.-Korea Institute, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, Working Paper 08-08, December 2008, pp. 20–21.

15 Andrei Lankov, ‘N Korea and Russia: A Step towards a Worldwide Anti-Hegemonic Front?’, Al Jazeera, 22 June 2014.

16 Sergey Denisentsev and Konstantin Makienko, ‘The Arms Trade Treaty and Russian Arms Exports: Expectations and Possible Consequences', United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Sources Series, translated by Ivan Khotkhotva, 2013, p. 15, <http://www.unidir.org/files/medias/pdfs/background-paper-the-arms-trade-treat-and-russian-arms-exports-expectations-and-possible-consequences-sergey-denisentsev-and-konstantin-makienko-eng-0-257.pdf>, accessed 20 October 2015.

17 Joshua Pollack, ‘Ballistic Trajectory: The Evolution of North Korea's Ballistic Missile Market’, Nonproliferation Review (Vol. 18, No. 2, July 2011).

18 North Korea allegedly extended the range of the original Scud design it received from Egypt during the reverse-engineering process, making it capable of striking targets 320 km away. As a result, all of North Korea's ballistic-missile exports have been relevant to the Missile Technology Control Regime and the norms it helped steadily to strengthen. Markus Schiller, Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), p. 24.

19 Sharon A Squassoni, Steven R Bowman and Carl E Behrens, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Publishers, 2002), p. 52.

20 US arms exports to North Korea had already been banned in 1955 with the introduction of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). ITAR is a set of US government regulations designed to control the export and import of US items, technology and services with direct defence applications. It imposes stringent licensing requirements on those dealing with such equipment and services, in order to ensure they are not transferred to foreign persons or entities.

21 Squassoni, Bowman and Behrens, Proliferation Control Regimes, pp. 52–53.

22 22 U.S. Code § 2797b (a)

23 According to a declassified US National Intelligence Assessment, the UAE bought a first batch of between eighteen and twenty-four Scud missiles from North Korea in 1988. Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate, ‘Prospects for Special Weapons Proliferation and Control’, NIE 5-91C, Volume II: Annex A (Country Studies), July 1991, p. 6, available at <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116907>, accessed 20 October 2015.

24 ‘August 2008 Visit to North Korea by a UAE Delegation for Meetings with KOMID’, Cable #08STATE123035, 19 November 2008, accessed via Wikileaks on 27 May 2014.

25 Admittedly, the promise of rewards for better behaviour on the part of the Qadhafi regime may have been equally significant in his decision to renounce WMD ambitions and ties to North Korea. This will be discussed further below.

See ‘Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): North Korea's Missile Program’, Cable #08STATE105029, 1 October 2008, accessed via Wikileaks on 27 May 2014. There is an active debate over the factors that led Libya to renounce its WMD and missile ambitions. In particular, the degree to which the incident can be portrayed as a success of US non-proliferation policy is contested. For a summary of this debate see John Hart and Shannon N Kile, ‘Chapter 14: Libya's Renunciation of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons and Ballistic Missiles’, in SIPRI Yearbook 2005, available at <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2005/14>, accessed 20 October 2015.

26 For background on the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiations, see Leon V Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Scott A Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behaviour (Washington, DC: United States Institute For Peace Press, 1999).

27 Joshua Pollack, ‘Ballistic Trajectory: The Evolution of North Korea's Ballistic Missile Market’, Nonproliferation Review (Vol. 18, No. 2, July 2011).

28 Washington Times, ‘Iraq Paid N. Korea to Deliver Missiles’, 4 October 2003.

29 Analysis by the author of the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database. The author is particularly grateful to Michele Capeleto for his assistance in compiling, reviewing and summarising this information.

30 Syria's recent use of Scud missiles during its civil war is a notable exception.

31 US intelligence reports about North Korea's offer to supply Sudan with Scud missile technology can be found in Bill Gertz, ‘North Korea Continues to Develop Missiles', Washington Times, 28 October 1999. According to Wikileaks, the US believed that Sudan had explored the possibility of purchasing short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and technology from North Korea again in mid-2008. ‘Informing Sudan of U.S. Concerns Regarding Missile Purchases From North Korea’, Cable #09STATE10394, 4 March 2009, accessed via Wikileaks on 27 May 2014. For information on Nigeria's discussions regarding North Korea's ballistic missiles, see ‘Nigeria and DPRK Missiles', Cable #04ABUJA149, 29 January 2004, accessed via Wikileaks on 27 May 2014.

32 UN Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006), S/Res/1718 (2006), 14 October 2006, para. 8(a).

33 The original seven positions on the Panel are filled by representatives of China, France, Japan, Russia, South Korea, the UK and the US. The new eighth position is intended for developing-country nationals. Members can be government officials or non-governmental experts.

34 These are an important source for this study.

35 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, 23 February 2015, S/2015/131, p. 12.

36 Ibid. Member states are required to submit a report detailing their efforts to implement a new resolution within a specified timeframe following the resolution's adoption. For instance, Resolution 1874 (2009) specifies a window of forty-five days in which member states must report, while Resolution 2094 (2013) specifies ninety days.

37 Ibid.

38 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Testimony of Assistant Secretary Daniel L. Glaser before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Confronting North Korea's Cyber Threat’, 13 January 2015, <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9738.aspx>, accessed 20 October 2015.

39 Ibid.

40 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Designates Burmese LT. General Thein Htay, Chief of Directorate of Defense Industries', 2 July 2013, <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl1998.aspx>, accessed 20 October 2015.

41 Official Journal of the European Union, ‘EU Council Decision 2015/1066 of 2 July 2015 Amending Decision 2013/183/CFSP Concerning Restrictive Measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea’, 2 July 2015, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32015D1066>, accessed 20 October 2015.

42 Because the focus of this paper is on the customers of North Korean military goods and services, this chapter will not consider in depth the policy tools available for reducing supply.

43 ‘Cancellation of DPRK-Iran Flight: Thanking Central Asian States for their Cooperation’, Cable #08STATE91989, 27 August 2008, accessed via Wikileaks on 27 May 2014.

44 For example, ‘Informing Sudan of U.S. Concerns Regarding Missile Purchases From North Korea’, Cable #09STATE10394.

45 For example, see ‘Greece Confirms Missile Parts Included in Suspect Shipment’, Cable #07ATHENS2345, 12 December 2007, accessed via Wikileaks on 27 May 2014.

46 UN Security Council Resolution 2094 (2013), S/RES/2094, 7 March 2013, para. 16.

47 One example is the government of Singapore, which upon US request detained a cargo of precision lathes destined for the Burma office of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation. Singapore subsequently released the items as it determined there was insufficient evidence to conclude they were controlled goods. ‘GOS Releases Precision Lathes to Shipper’, Cable #07SINGAPORE224, 31 January 2007, accessed via Wikileaks on 27 May 2014. A second example occurred in 2011, when an East African country detained a shipment of milling and slotting machines from North Korea bound for Eritrea. Upon inspection it was determined that the contents of the cargo did not meet the criteria in lists of controlled items, and there was no conclusive evidence that they were intended for an arms-related end use. The machines were released, and it was only later that their military application was determined. See UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2014/147, 6 March 2014, pp. 33–34.

48 UN Security Council Resolution 2094 (2013), S/RES/2094, 7 March 2013, para. 18.

49 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874(2009)’, S/2013/337, pp. 33–34.

50 The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was launched in May 2003 by the US, following its interdiction of North Korean ballistic-missile-related cargo bound for Yemen the previous year. The aim of the initiative is to create a partnership of states and improve their collective ability to pre-emptively interdict cargo suspected of containing WMD- or missile-related goods or materiel. Countries which join the PSI agree to a Statement of Interdiction Principles that commits them to interdict shipments within their jurisdiction, strengthen the processes and legal authority to facilitate interdiction, and develop procedures to exchange information with other partner countries. See US Department of State, ‘Proliferation Security Initiative 10^th Anniversary High-Level Political Meeting’, 28 May 2014, <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm>, accessed 20 October 2015.

51 ‘Cancellation of DPRK-Iran Flight: Thanking Central Asian States for their Cooperation’, Cable #08STATE91989, 27 August 2008, accessed via Wikileaks on 27 May 2014. See also ‘Air Koryo Flight of Proliferation Concern’, Cable #08STATE84151, 5 August 2008, accessed via Wikileaks on 27 May 2014.

52 See ‘Demarche to Yemeni FM Qirbi on DPRK Military Contacts', Cable #03SANAA2769, 23 November 2003, accessed via Wikileaks on 27 May 2014. See also, David E Sanger and Thom Shanker, ‘A Region Inflamed: For the Iraqis, A Missile Deal that Went Sour; Files Tell of Talks with North Korea’, New York Times, 1 December 2003.

53 Ibid.

54 Frank Sauer, ‘Nuclear Iran? Optimistic Pessimists vs Pessimistic Optimists', International and Security Relations Network, ETH Zurich, 26 February 2014, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=176995>, accessed 20 October 2015.

55 US Department of Treasury, ‘Treasury Imposes Sanctions against the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea’, 2 January 2015, <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9733.aspx>, accessed 20 October 2015.

56 Office of Foreign Assets Control, US Department of the Treasury, ‘North Korea: An Overview of Sanctions with Respect to North Korea’, 6 May 2011, <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/nkorea.pdf>, accessed 20 October 2015. See also US Department of the Treasury, ‘Testimony of Assistant Secretary Daniel L. Glaser before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Confronting North Korea's Cyber Threat’.

57 For further information on negotiations between the UAE and US, see ‘August 2008 Visit to North Korea by a UAE Delegation for Meetings with KOMID’, Cable #08STATE123035. In Libya, a combination of threats of penalties, normative pressure and conditional incentives was applied by the US and UK. For substantiation of the issuance of threats of penalties, see ‘Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): North Korea's Missile Program’, Cable #08STATE105029. As mentioned above, there remains an active debate about the causes of Libya's disarmament decision. On Pakistan, see Chidanand Rajghatta, ‘Pak Cracked under Hard US Proof’, Times of India, 8 February 2004, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/Pak-cracked-under-hard-US-proof/articleshow/483777.cms>, accessed 20 October 2015.

58 BBC News, ‘Yemen Protests Over Scud Seizure’, 11 December 2002.

59 ‘Continuing Cooperation between North Korea's KOMID and Yemen’, Cable #09STATE50258, 15 May 2009, accessed via Wikileaks on 27 May 2014.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.

62 Jeffrey Lewis and Catherine Dill, ‘Myanmar's Unrepentant Arms Czar’, Foreign Policy, 9 May 2014.

63 Arms Control Association, ‘Chronology of Libya's Disarmament Relations with the United States’, February 2014, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronology>, accessed 20 October 2015; Paul Kerr, ‘Libya Pledges Military Trade Curbs, but Details are Fuzzy’, Arms Control Today, 1 June 2004.

64 Arms Control Association, ‘Chronology of Libya's Disarmament Relations with the United States’.

65 The author is grateful to Joshua Pollack for this point.

66 Qadhafi's son was convinced that ‘agreements on military and security cooperation’ would follow Libya's disarmament decision. See Norman Cigar, ‘Libya's Nuclear Disarmament: Lessons and Implications for Nuclear Proliferation’, Marine Corps University, Middle East Studies Monograph No. 2, January 2012, p. 4. In terms of specific arms deals, Libya agreed to inspections of short-range Scud missiles in exchange for permission to purchase Russian SS-26 (Iskander) missiles, for example, though it ultimately chose not to move ahead with the procurement. See Alex Bollfrass, ‘Details Bedevil Libyan Grand Bargain’, Arms Control Today, October 2007.

67 Ibid. See also ‘North Korea: Ethiopia Requests Alternate Supplier Information’, Cable 08ADDISABABA952, 7 April 2008, accessed via Wikileaks on 27 May 2014.

68 ‘Yemeni Military Leaders Brief Ambassador on DPRK Contacts’, Cable #03SANAA1990, 12 August 2003, accessed via Wikileaks on 27 May 2014.

69 ‘Scenesetter for Under Secretary Bolton's Visit to Yemen’, Cable #03SANAA1373, 16 June 2003, accessed via Wikileaks on 15 May 2014.