I. Balance and Order in Europe

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Notes

1 The word ‘natural’ is used here in full knowledge of the excellent analysis provided by Ernst B Haas in ‘The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda’, World Politics (Vol. 5, No. 4, 1953). Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that the balance of power as prescription, concept or propaganda ‘has persisted for the best part of five hundred years. And public criticism of it began only two hundred and fifty years ago’. See Jonathan Haslam, No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations since Machiavelli (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 89.

2 Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 162.

3 See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1977).

4 See, for example, John J Mearsheimer, ‘Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe’, International Security (Vol. 9, No. 3, Winter 1984/85); Geir Lundestad, ‘Empire by Invitation: The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952’, Journal of Peace Research (Vol. 23, No. 3, 1986); Steve Weber, ‘Shaping the Postwar Balance: Multilateralism in NATO’, International Organization (Vol. 46, No. 3, 1992).

5 Brendan Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714–83 (London: Penguin Books, 2008).

6 Ibid.

7 See, for example, John J Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: WW Norton & Company Inc., 2001), pp. 83–137.

8 Nicholas J Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1942; updated 2007), p. 104.

9 See, for example, Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (Amherst, MA: Humanity Books, 1976); Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660–1783 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1890); Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat.

10 See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York, NY: Random House, 1987), pp. 194–346.

11 Halford J Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’, Geographical Journal (Vol. 23, No. 4, 1904).

12 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, pp. 205–38.

13 Robert and Isabelle Tombs, That Sweet Enemy: The British and the French from the Sun King to the Present (London: Pimlico, 2007), pp. 459–72.

14 For a detailed discussion of Germany’s evolving role in the European system, see Brendan Simms, Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy, from 1453 to the Present (New York, NY: BasicBooks, 2013).

15 Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics.

16 Norman A Graebner and Edward M Bennett, The Versailles Treaty and its Legacy: The Failure of the Wilsonian Vision (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

17 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, pp. 275–356.

18 John Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942–1949 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993).

19 See William I Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954 (Chapel Hill, NC and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1993).

20 See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Detlef Junker et al. (eds), The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

21 NATO, ‘NATO Leaders’, <https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/declassified_137930.htm>, accessed 24 November 2017.

22 See Stanley R Sloan, Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama (New York, NY: Continuum, 2010); see also G John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

23 Sloan, Permanent Alliance?

24 On the importance of the Eurasian rimland in US geostrategy, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York, NY: Perseus Books, 1997).

25 Lundestad, “Empire” by Integration.

26 Winston Churchill, speech delivered at the University of Zurich, 19 September 1946, <http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/astonish.html>, accesssed 24 November 2017.

27 Michael J Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Lundestad, “Empire” by Integration.

28 Hitchcock, France Restored.

29 See, for example, John A Reed, Germany and NATO (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1987).

30 Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism.

31 Hitchcock, France Restored.

32 See Wolfram F Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 1989).

33 See, for example, Alessandro Brogi, Confronting America: The Cold War Between the United States and the Communists in France and Italy (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).

34 For a perceptive analysis of how European integration resulted in the strengthening of Europe’s nation-states, see Alan S Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State (New York, NY and London: Routledge, 1994).

35 See, for example, Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

36 Ikenberry, After Victory.

37 See Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism; Michael M Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Frédéric Bozo, La France et l'OTAN: De la guerre froide au nouvel ordre européen (Paris: IFRI and Masson, 1991).

38 See Helga Haftendorn, Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy Since 1945 (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).

39 Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), p. 16.

40 See, for example, Stephen M Walt, ‘Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power’, International Security (Vol. 9, No. 4, 1985).

41 A seminal discussion on the security dilemma can be found in John H Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1951). See also Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics (Vol. 30, No. 2, 1978), pp. 167–214.

42 See, for example, Luis Simón, ‘Neorealism, Security Cooperation, and Europe's Relative Gains Dilemma’, Security Studies (Vol. 26, No. 2, 2017).

43 Primacy is simply understood as being much more powerful than any other state according to most measures of power (economic, military, diplomatic), and implies that the state has greater ability than any rival to influence a broad range of issues and many states. It is not to be confused with hegemony, which is usually understood as a ‘work in progress’, a sort of ideal state that countries may strive for but never quite achieve. For a discussion on primacy, see Robert Jervis, ‘International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle’, International Security (Vol. 17, No. 4, 1993). For a discussion on hegemony, see Ronald R Krebs and Jennifer K Lobasz, ‘Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion and the Road to War in Iraq’, Security Studies (Vol. 16, No. 3, 2007).

44 See, for example, Christopher Hemmer and Peter J Katzenstein, ‘Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism’, International Organization (Vol. 56, No. 3, 2002); Celeste A Wallander, ‘Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War’, International Organization (Vol. 54, No. 4, 2000).

45 See, for example, Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 5. See also Haslam, No Virtue Like Necessity, pp. 128–60.

46 Esther Brimmer and Stefan Fröhlich (eds), The Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).

47 For a perceptive account of how this new ‘grammar’ served to weaken US influence in Europe, see Jakub J Grygiel, ‘The Faulty Logic of the European Union and its Consequences for the United States’, Orbis (Vol. 56, No. 4, 2012), pp. 517–29.

48 Grygiel, ‘The Faulty Logic of the European Union and its Consequences for the United States’.

49 See, for example, Speck, ‘German Power and the Ukraine Conflict’.

50 Margaret Thatcher, ‘Europe’s Political Architecture’, speech delivered in the Hague on 15 May 1992. On the link between the euro and the need to contain German power, see Michael J Baun, ‘The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany, France, and European Integration’, Political Science Quarterly (Vol. 110, No. 4, Winter 1995/1996).

51 Franz-Josef Meiers, ‘The Stress Test of German Leadership’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (Vol. 52, No. 2, April/May 2015), pp. 47–55.

52 Andrei S Markovits, Simon Reich and Frank Westermann, ‘Germany: Hegemonic Power and Economic Gain?’, Review of International Political Economy (Vol. 3, No. 4, 1996), pp. 698–727.

53 Lever, Berlin Rules.

54 BBC News, ‘The Greek Debt Crisis Story in Numbers’, 10 July 2015.

55 Peter Spiegel, ‘A Comparison of Greece’s Reform List and Creditors’ Proposals’, Financial Times, 10 July 2015.

56 Wolfgang Schäuble, ‘Eurozone at a Crossroads (Again): A Conversation with Wolfang Schäuble’, speech at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 16 April 2015, p. 7 of transcript.

57 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Europe after the Crisis: How to Sustain a Common Currency’, Foreign Affairs (Vol. 94, No. 3, 2012).

58 Haslam, No Virtue Like Necessity, p. 248; Henry Kissinger, World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 91.

59 Kissinger, World Order, p. 91.

60 Lundestad, ‘Empire by Invitation’. On the indirect and ‘benign’ nature of US primacy, see G John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011); David A Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 2009).

61 Robin Niblett, ‘What Next for the EU?’, Chatham House, 5 August 2015.

62 See, for example, Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World: And the Rise of the Rest (London: Penguin Books, 2008); Charles Kupchan, No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Nye Jr, The Future of Power.

63 For an analysis of these and other trends, see Luis Simón and Daniel Fiott, ‘Europe after the United States Pivot’, Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs (Vol. 58, No. 3, 2014), pp. 413–28.

64 See Luis Simón and Vivien Pertusot, ‘Making Sense of Europe’s Southern Neighbourhood: Main Geopolitical and Security Parameters’, Elcano Royal Institute and Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 30 January 2017.

65 Some commentators still see a need for US involvement in Europe. See Robin Harris, ‘Britain and Europe: Where America’s Interests Really Lie’, Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 131, 29 April 2013.

66 White House, ‘Fact Sheet: European Reassurance Initiative and Other US Efforts in Support of NATO Allies and Partners’, 3 June 2014.

67 See, for example, Carol Matlack and Matthew Philips, ‘NATO is Getting Distress Calls From Eastern Europe. How Should it Reply?’, Bloomberg, 2 May 2014. As argued by Lanoszka and Hunzeker, these deployments are very vulnerable to a Russian first strike; see Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A Hunzeker, ‘Confronting the Anti-Access/Area Denial and Precision Strike Challenge in the Baltic Region’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 161, No. 5, 2016).

68 Stephen M Walt, ‘The Ties that Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart’, National Interest (No. 54, 1998–1999).

69 Daniel Hamilton and Steven Blockmans, ‘The Geostrategic Implications of TTIP’, Centre for European Policy Studies, Special Report No. 105, April 2015, p. 3.

70 Ibid.

71 For an interesting account of Russia’s resurgence and Europe’s political order, see Sten Rynning, ‘The False Promise of Continental Concert: Russia, the West and the Necessary Balance of Power’, International Affairs (Vol. 91, No. 3, 2015).

72 Lever, Berlin Rules.

73 Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From “Empire” to Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (Oxford and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 1910.

74 Ole Waever, ‘Three Competing Europes: German, French, Russian’, International Affairs (Vol. 66, No. 3, 1990), p. 480.

75 Brendan Simms, ‘Germany’s Triumph: From the Ruins of War, How a New European Empire was Built’, New Statesman, 30 July 2015.

76 Moravcsik, ‘Europe after the Crisis’.

77 William E Paterson, ‘The Reluctant Hegemon? Germany Moves Centre Stage in the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies (Vol. 49, No. S1, 2011), p. 73.

78 Sikorski, ‘I Fear Germany’s Power Less than her Inactivity’.

79 Von Gerhard Gnauck, ‘Die EU soll nicht versuchen, ein Superstaat zu werden’, Die Welt, 28 May 2016.

80 Paterson, ‘The Reluctant Hegemon?’, p. 74.

81 Despite several official statements saying that Germany is willing to play a more prominent role in defence policy, the country appears to be still unable or unwilling to fulfil a serious role in security and defence policy. See Ulrich Speck, ‘Why Germany is Not Becoming Europe’s Hegemon’, FRIDE Policy Brief (No. 126, April 2012).

82 See Franz-Jozef Meiers, ‘The Reform of the Bundeswehr: Adaptation or Fundamental Renewal?’, European Security (Vol. 10, No. 2, 2001); Tom Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security: Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the Post-Cold War Era (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2008).

83 For a comprehensive overview of Germany’s role in NATO’s eastern flank, see Justyna Gotkowska, ‘High on Reassurance, Low on Deterrence – Germany’s Stance on Strengthening NATO’s Eastern Flank’, OSW Commentary, 5 July 2016.

84 Deutsche Welle, ‘Tapping Refugees to Combat Germany’s Labor Shortage’, 2 September 2015.

85 BBC News, ‘Migrant Crisis: Why Central Europe Resists Refugee Quota’, 22 September 2015.

86 Deutsche Welle, ‘Hungary’s Orban Criticizes Merkel’s “Moral Imperialism”’, 23 September 2015.

87 See, for example, Mikhail Suslov, ‘Geographical Metanarratives in Russia and the European East: Contemporary Pan-Slavism’, Eurasian Geography and Economics (Vol. 53, No. 5, 2012).

88 Waever, ‘Three Competing Europes’, p. 478.

89 See Laurent Murawiec, ‘Putin’s Precursors’, National Interest (Vol. 60, Summer 2000).

90 See Nicu Popescu, Eurasian Union: The Real, the Imaginary and the Likely (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2014).

91 Harold James, ‘Cosmos: Chaos: Finance, Power and Conflict’, International Affairs (Vol. 90, No. 1, 2014), pp. 37–57.

92 Kissinger, World Order, p. 9.

93 Ibid.

94 Jean-Claude Juncker, ‘State of the Union 2015: Time for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity’, speech to the European Parliament, 9 September 2015.