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Notes
1 See David Blagden, ‘Global Multipolarity, European Security and Implications for UK Grand Strategy: Back to the Future, Once Again’, International Affairs (Vol. 91, No. 2, 2015), pp. 333–50.
2 For a comprehensive assessment of UK defence capabilities and contribution to NATO, see Andrew Dorman, ‘The Future of British Defence Policy’, Focus Stratégique 74 (IFRI: Paris, 2017).
3 For a comprehensive analysis of how to move towards a constructive and positive sum UK–EU relationship, see Jean Pisani-Ferry et al., ‘Europe after Brexit: A Proposal for a Continental Partnership’, Bruegel, 29 August 2016.
4 François Heisbourg, ‘Preserving Post-Cold War Europe’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (Vol. 57, No. 1, 2015), pp. 31–48.
5 Jan Zielonka, ‘America and Europe: Two Contrasting or Parallel Empires?’, Journal of Political Power (Vol. 4, No. 3, 2011), pp. 337–54.
6 Arguably, US disengagement in the Middle East is also likely to have serious ramifications for European and British security. See Allin, ‘Obama and the Middle East', pp. 165–84. On its implications for the UK, see Gareth Stansfield and Saul Kelly, ‘A Return to East of Suez? UK Military Deployment to the Gulf’, RUSI Briefing Paper, 26 April 2013.
7 Hugo Swire, ‘The UK in the Asian Century’, speech delivered at Carnegie Institute in Washington, DC, 15 July 2014.
8 Nicholas Watt, Paul Lewis and Tania Branigan, ‘US Anger at Britain Joining Chinese-led Investment Bank AIIB’, The Guardian, 13 March 2015.
9 Aisha Gani, ‘Xi Jinping Signs Nuclear Deal as UK and China Clinch £40bn of Contracts’, The Guardian, 21 October 2015.
10 The Economist, ‘We Can Pivot Too’, 24 October 2015.
11 See Luis Simón, ‘The “Third” US Offset Strategy and Europe’s “Anti-Access” Challenge’, Journal of Strategic Studies (Vol. 39, No. 3, 2016). See also Lanoszka and Hunzeker, ‘Confronting the Anti-Access/Area Denial and Precision Strike Challenge in the Baltic Region’.
12 Daniel Fiott, ‘A Revolution Too Far? US Defence Innovation, Europe and NATO’s Military-Technological Gap’, Journal of Strategic Studies (Vol. 40, No. 3, 2017).
13 See Blagden, ‘Global Multipolarity’.
14 James Rogers, ‘How to Remake European Defence after Brexit’, BrexitCentral, 21 September 2017. For a sober analysis of the UK’s foreign and security policy challenges after Brexit, see Malcolm Chalmers, ‘UK Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit’, RUSI Briefing Paper, January 2017.
15 See, for example, Peter van Ham, ‘Brexit: The Strategic Consequences for Europe’, Clingendael Report, February 2016; Luis Simón, ‘Beyond Brexit: The Future of the Spanish-British Relationship’, ARI 71/2016; Alexander Mattelaer, ‘Towards a Belgian Position on Brexit: Actively Reconciling National and European Interests’, Egmont Paper 99, November 2017.
16 See, for example, James Rogers and Eugenio Cusumano, ‘Cassandra Vindicated: Baltic Perceptions of NATO’s “New Deterrence” of Russia’, RUSI Newsbrief (Vol. 35, No. 4, 2015); Wiktor Szary, ‘Poland Looks to Stronger UK NATO Role After Brexit’, Reuters, 5 July 2016.
17 See Rogers, ‘How to Remake European Defence after Brexit’. For a discussion of Britain’s role in the context of the CSDP, see Sven Biscop, ‘The UK and European Defence: Leading or Leaving?’, International Affairs (Vol. 88, No. 6, 2012), pp. 1297–1313.
18 See HM Government, ‘Foreign Policy, Defence and Development: A Future Partnership Paper’, 12 September 2017, pp. 9–14.
19 See Simón, ‘Neorealism’; Jolyon Howorth, ‘Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (Vol. 42, No. 2, 2000), pp. 33–35.
20 Dan Hamilton and Steven Blockmans, ‘The Geostrategic Implications of TTIP’, CEPS Report No. 105, April 2015.
21 Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, ‘For a US Trade Deal, UK Should Secure its Spot in TTIP after Brexit’, Chatham House, 25 August 2016.
22 Ashley J Tellis, ‘The Geopolitics of the TTIP and the TPP’, in Sanjaya Baru and Suvi Dogra (eds), Power Shifts and New Blocs in the Global Trading System, Adelphi Series (Vol. 450, 10 March 2015), p. 115.
23 Ibid., p. 116.
24 See Jonathan Eyal and Daniel Keohane, ‘Macron’s “Initiative for Europe”: Is this France’s Moment to Take the Helm?’, RUSI Commentary, 29 September 2017.
25 Ulrich Krotz, ‘Three Eras and Possible Futures: A Long-Term View on the Franco–German Relationship a Century after the First World War’, International Affairs (Vol. 90, No. 2, 2014), p. 347.
26 François Heisbourg, ‘The End of an Affair for France and Germany’, Financial Times, 15 July 2015.
27 Ibid.
28 See, for example, Luis Simón, ‘The Spider in Europe’s Web? French Grand Strategy from Iraq to Libya’, Geopolitics (Vol. 18, No. 2, 2013); Alice Pannier, ‘From One Exceptionalism to Another: France’s Strategic Relations with the United States and the United Kingdom in the Post-Cold War Era’, Journal of Strategic Studies (Vol. 40, No. 4, 2017).
29 Patrick Wintour, ‘With UK Sidelined, Macron Forges Unlikely Alliance with Trump’, The Guardian, 13 July 2017.
30 UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045’, Fifth Edition, 2014.
31 See, for example, Harold James, ‘Trump’s Currency War Against Germany Could Destroy the EU’, Foreign Policy, 2 February 2017.
32 For a comprehensive overview of the German and French positions on TTIP see, respectively, Peter Sparding, ‘Germany’s Pivotal Role on the Way to TTIP’, Europe Policy Paper 5/2014, German Marshall Fund of the United States, November 2014; Guillaume Xavier-Bender, ‘France’s Unexpected Role on the Way to a Reasonable and Balanced TTIP’, Europe Policy Paper 2/2015, German Marshall Fund of the United States, June 2015.
33 See, for example, Thomas Forsberg, ‘From Ostpolitik to “Frostpolitik”? Merkel, Putin and German Foreign Policy Towards Russia’, International Affairs (Vol. 92, No. 1, 2016).
34 In this regard, ongoing discussions between Germany and Russia to build a gas pipeline (Nord Stream 2) raise questions about the former’s attitude towards Moscow and how that might impinge on European cohesion. Critically, Nord Stream 2 would provide Russian gas to Germany directly, bypassing other EU member states in the east and evading EU sanctions. See, for example, Ilya Zaslavskiy, ‘The Kremlin’s Gas Games in Europe: Implications for Policy Makers’, Atlantic Council Issue Brief, May 2017.
35 Simón, ‘Balancing Priorities in America's European Strategy’.
36 NATO, ‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation’.
37 See, for example, Matthew Kroenig, ‘Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (Vol. 57, No. 1, 2015), pp. 49–70.
38 Artur Kacprzyk, U.S. Military Presence in Central and Eastern Europe: Consequences for NATO Strategic Adaptation, Deterrence and Allied Solidarity, PISM Report, August 2015.
39 Louisa Brooke-Holland, ‘NATO’s Military Response to Russia: November 2016 Update’, House of Commons Briefing Paper No. 07276, 3 November 2016.
40 NATO, ‘Warsaw Summit Communiqué’, press release (2016) 100, 9 July 2016.
41 Simón, ‘Understanding US Retrenchment in Europe’, p. 163.
42 James Rogers and Ugis Romanovs, ‘NATO’s Eastern Flank: Rebuilding Deterrence?’, RUSI Newsbrief (Vol. 35, No. 3, May 2015), p. 16. Emphasis in original.
43 Simón, ‘Assessing NATO’s Eastern European Flank’, p. 71.
44 UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Sweden and Finland Join UK-led Response Force’, 30 June 2017.
45 Daniel Fiott, ‘Modernising NATO’s Defence Infrastructure with EU Funds’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (Vol. 58, No. 2, 2016), pp. 77–94.