II. Policing Mogadishu

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Notes

1 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Benadir Region: Mogadishu City’, 2012, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/120316_Administrative_Map_Banadir_A4.pdf>, accessed 9 April 2017.

2 United Nations Population Fund, ‘Population Estimation Survey 2014 for the 18 Pre-War Regions of Somalia’, October 2014, p. 31, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Population-Estimation-Survey-of-Somalia-PESS-2013-2014.pdf>, accessed 12 January 2018.

3 Puntland, Somaliland, Jubaland and South West State have their own intelligence agencies.

4 Personal communication with author.

5 Garowe Online, ‘Somali President Meets with Army Chiefs to Address Insecurity’, 7 March 2017, <http://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somali-president-meets-with-army-chiefs-to-address-insecurity>, accessed 7 March 2017. Many soldiers are experienced but undisciplined fighters. As the humanitarian news agency IRIN noted in 2013, ‘Somalia’s armed forces comprise some 20,000 soldiers, defined as those fighting Al-Shabab [sic], including militias not formally integrated into the military. Around 13,000 soldiers receive regular financial payments, most of which are paid by the international community’. See IRIN, ‘Somali Security Sector Reform’, 13 May 2013, <https://www.irinnews.org/fr/node/253499>, accessed 24 May 2013. This prompted a senior diplomat to observe that, ‘[N]ever has so much been invested in so many and turned into so few’. John Aglionby, ‘Somalia’s President Mohamed Takes Power in Fragile State’, Financial Times, 10 February 2017. See also Menkhaus, ‘Non-State Security Providers and Political Formation in Somalia’, p. 23. On 18 May, several hundred soldiers mutinied over unpaid wages, although they soon returned to their barracks.

6 AMISOM Daily Media Monitoring, ‘Parliament Approves Security Architecture with Few Amends’, 3 May 2017, <http://somaliamediamonitoring.org/may-3-2017-morning-headlines/>, accessed 3 May 2017.

7 Judy Maina, ‘Somali President Appoints New Mogadishu Mayor with High Hopes for Change’, AllEastAfrica, 6 April 2017.

8 Somali Update, ‘Somalia: To Ease Pressure, Mogadishu Mayor Appoints New Security Committee’, 9 May 2017.

9 Horn Observer, ‘Somali Government to Form Special Forces in Charge of the Security Officials and Government Offices – Minister’, 18 July 2017.

10 Shabelle News, ‘Somalia Deploys Forces in Mogadishu after President Fires Mayor', 21 January 2018.

11 Some members of the National Security Council argue that the new army (in other words, national security) should be based on the 4.5 power-sharing formula. See AMISOM Daily Media Monitoring, ‘Challenges Emerge at the National Security Council Meeting’, 7 July 2017.

12 For an informative discussion, see the rationale for swarm tactics described in David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (London: Hurst, 2013), pp. 80–86.

13 For example, in May 2017, guards from the SNA and NISA exchanged fire outside the Benadir administration’s headquarters when a NISA convoy was stopped at a security checkpoint. AMISOM Daily Media Monitoring, ‘Gunfire Exchange Between Villa Somalia Guards and NISA Benadir Boss Leaves Two Dead’, 17 May 2017. In July, four soldiers, including the former head of Benadir intelligence, were killed by NISA in a clash near Villa Somalia. See Shabelle News, ‘Former Intelligence Officer Among 4 Killed in Mogadishu Fighting’, 26 July 2017.

14 London Conference Somalia, ‘Security Pact’, 11 May 2017, pp. 6, 9, <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/613720/london-somalia-conference-2017-security-pact.pdf>, accessed 15 May 2017.

15 Abdikahim Ainte, ‘Can the Credibility of Somalia’s Indirect Elections be Salvaged?’, African Arguments, 5 January 2017; Waagacusub, ‘President Sacks HabarGidir Officials and Replaces to his Clansmen’, 19 March 2015; De Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa.

16 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2016’, 2017, <http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/corruption_perceptions_index_2016>, accessed 9 April 2017.

17 Aglionby, ‘Somalia’s President Mohamed Takes Power in Fragile State’. Hence the international community’s welcome of the Communications Act of September 2017, which aims to regulate a sector that the World Bank estimates could potentially contribute up to 11 per cent of Somalia’s GDP. See World Bank, ‘Legal ICT Framework is Pivotal Moment for Somalia’, 2 October 2017.

18 ‘Arena’ is a more accurate description. See Alice Hills, ‘Security Sector or Security Arena? The Evidence from Somalia’, International Peacekeeping (Vol. 21, No. 2, 2014).

19 Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Al-Shabab in Somalia’, 22 February 2017, <http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/al-shabab-in-somalia>, accessed 7 March 2017.

20 Shabelle News, ‘Al Shabaab Vows to Fight New Somali Government’, 13 February 2017.

21 Yann-Cédric Quero, Mireille Widmer and Lindsey Peterson, Safety and Security: Mogadishu (Hargeisa: Observatory of Conflict Violence and Prevention, 2011), p. 36.

22 See, for example, the work of Abdulhakim Mohamed Hadi, director of Somali Neighborhood Organization (SONO) and Benadir’s former director of communities; see Amisom Daily Media Monitoring, ‘Neighbourhood Watch Director Resolute in Restoring Safety In Mogadishu', 13 July 2015; Quero, Widmer and Peterson, Safety and Security; Egal, ‘Police Corruption, Radicalization and Terrorist Attacks in Mogadishu’, pp. 27–30.

23 Quero, Widmer and Peterson, Safety and Security; see also Robert Young Pelton, Mohamed Nuxurkey and Suleiman Osman, ‘The Police of Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland’, SomaliaReport, 31 May 2012, p. 28, <http://piracyreport.com/index.php/post/3402/The_Police_of_Somalia_Somaliland_Puntland_>, accessed 1 June 2012.

24 Virginia Luling, ‘Genealogy as Theory, Genealogy as Tool: Aspects of Somali “Clanship”’, Social Identities (Vol. 12, No. 4, 2006); Joakim Gundel, ‘Clans in Somalia: Report on a Lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop, Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised Edition)’, 15 December 2009, Austrian Red Cross, Vienna, <http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/90_1261130976_accord-report-clans-in-somaliarevised-edition-20091215.pdf>.

25 Quero, Widmer and Peterson, Safety and Security, p. 21.

26 Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, ‘Perceptions of Security and Justice in Mogadishu Interpreting Results of the OCVP Conflict and Security Assessment', 2014, p. 1.

27 OCVP, ‘Mogadishu 2014: Central Zone – Conflict and Security Assessment Report’, p. 11, <http://ocvp.org/docs/201407/Central%20Zone%20CSA.pdf>, accessed 3 February 2016. For further discussion about khat see, for example, James Jeffrey, ‘Khat in the Horn of Africa: A Scourge or Blessing?’, Inter Press Service, 12 March 2017, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2017/03/khat-in-the-horn-of-africa-a-scourge-or-blessing/>, accessed 10 May 2017.

28 Indian Ocean Newsletter, ‘Gulf of Aden, Arms Supermarket’, 1 April 2016.

29 AllAfrica, ‘Nisa Chief Issues Tough Warning to Armed Mogadishu Politicians Over Disarmament Exercise’, 13 June 2017.

30 For example, Mohamed Aden Jimale (Koofe) was appointed Director of Immigration and the Civil Aviation Agency in July 2016, but he was formerly Head of Operations for Benadir’s NISA office and, reputedly, a member of Al-Shabaab. See Indian Ocean Newsletter, ‘Former Shabaab Member Named Immigration Director’, 29 July 2016.

31 Soft power refers to the ability to persuade, rather than coerce. See Joseph S Nye Jr, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2004).

32 Hills, ‘Somalia Works’, p. 103.

33 OCVP, ‘Mogadishu 2014’, p. 16.

34 Ibid., pp. vii, viii.

35 Ibid., p. 16.

36 See, for example, Peter Albrecht and Louise Wiuff Moe, ‘The Simultaneity of Authority in Hybrid Orders’, Peacekeeping (Vol. 3, No. 1, 2015).

37 For a concise overview of Al-Shabaab, see National Counterterrorism Center, ‘Terrorist Groups’, <https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups.html>, accessed 4 December 2016. For details, see Stig Jarle Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamic Group (London: Hurst, 2016). See also Jason Burke, ‘Somalia Bombing May Have been Revenge for Botched US-led Operation’, The Guardian, 17 October 2017.

38 Al-Jazeera, ‘Al-Shabab Attacks CID Headquarters in Mogadishu’, 31 July 2016.

39 See Reuters, ‘Deadly Somalia Blast Reveals Flaws in Intelligence Efforts', 20 October 2017.

40 Reliefweb, ‘SRSG Keating Condemns Increased Attacks against Civilians', 11 April 2017, <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/srsg-keating-condemns-increased-attacks-against-civilians>, accessed 26 January 2018.

41 Somalia Report, ‘Somalia Portraits: Hussein Jiinow Afrah, Policeman', 28 April 2012, <piracyreport.com/index.php/post/3284>, accessed 26 January 2018.

42 Hiiraan Online, ‘Mogadishu’s Traffic Cops Say They are Targeted by Militia, Gov’t Troops’, 30 January 2017.

43 International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War’, Policy Briefing No. 99, 26 June 2014, p. 2, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/somalia-Al-Shabaab-it-will-be-a-long-war.pdf>, accessed 5 July 2014.

44 Ibid., pp. 12–17, emphasis in original. The Shura is a ten-man council.

45 See DefenceWeb, ‘al-Shabaab Inc', 25 May 2017, <http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47967>, accessed 26 January 2018.

46 Insecurity is addressed by anthropology and development studies, rather than conflict studies, and is analysed primarily in terms of individual and societal responses to it. See, for example, Theodore Trefon (ed.), Reinventing Order in the Congo: How People Respond to State Failure in Kinshasa (London: Zed Books, 2005).

47 Egal, ‘Police Corruption, Radicalization and Terrorist Attacks in Mogadishu’, pp. 45–57; see, UNDP, ‘Somalia Human Development Report 2012’, p. 18.

48 For an overview of OCVP’s Mogadishu surveys, see Heritage Institute of Policy Studies, ‘Perceptions of Security and Justice in Mogadishu’.

49 Menkhaus, ‘Non-State Security Providers and Political Formation in Somalia’.

50 Egal, ‘Police Corruption, Radicalization and Terrorist Attacks in Mogadishu’, pp. 27–30.

51 Ibid., p. 29. As Egal notes, Somali experience is comparable to that elsewhere in the world. It confirms the assessment of, for example, Peter Neumann, ‘The Trouble with Radicalization’, International Affairs (Vol. 89, No. 4, 2013) and Fernando Reinares et al., ‘Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism: A Concise Report Prepared by the European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation’, 15 May 2008, <http://www.rikcoolsaet.be/files/art_ip_wz/Expert%20Group%20Report%20Violent%20Radicalisation%20FINAL.pdf.>, accessed 4 February 2017.

52 See M J Fox, The Roots of Somali Political Culture (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2015).

53 Ilya Gridneff, ‘Al-Shabaab Strategy Shifts Toward Clans as Presidential Election Loom’, IPI Global Observatory, 27 January 2017.

54 BBC Somali Analyses, ‘Five Big Challenges Newly Elected President Farmajo Should Address Immediately’, 9 February 2017, <http://somaliamediamonitoring.org/february-9-2017-daily-monitoring-report/>, accessed 14 February 2017.

55 ICG, ‘Somalia’, p. 20.

56 Menkhaus, ‘Non-State Security Providers and Political Formation in Somalia’, p. 24.

57 Ibid.; Mohamed Ahmed Jama, ‘Community Policing in Mogadishu: A Case Study of Bakhara Market’, Humanitarian Practice Network, October 2008, <http://odihpn.org/magazine/community-policing-in-mogadishu-a-case-study-of-bakhara-market/>, accessed 14 January 2018. Since approximately 2010, academics’ preferred approach to police and policing provision has focused on the informal or community-based groups providing the bulk of Africa’s everyday security and justice. See, for example, Helene Mariae Kyed, ‘Introduction to the Special Issue Legal Pluralism and International Development Interventions’, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law (Vol. 43, No. 63, 2013), pp. 1–23.

58 US State Department, ‘Somalia 2015 Human Rights Report’, 2016, p. 4, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/252939.pdf>, accessed 12 December 2016; Waagacusub, ‘Video: NISA Tortures a Government Worker’, 22 May 2016, <http://waagacusub.net/articles/2027/Somalia-Video-NISA-tortures-a-government-worker>, accessed 5 July 2016.

59 In 2016, Dhacdo.com reported that ‘[S]ecurity branches continue to promise monetary awards for police members who either arrest or kill Al-Shabaab assassins’. See AMISOM Media Monitoring, ‘20 Arrested in Mogadishu Security Operation’, 3 October 2016, <http://somaliamediamonitoring.org/november-3-2016-daily-monitoring-report/>, accessed 4 October 2016.

60 Shabelle News, ‘SNA, AMISOM Forces Carry Out Sweep in Mogadishu’, 4 February 2017.

61 Chege Mbitiru, ‘Special Forces May Soon Join the War Against Al-Shabaab’, Daily Nation, 5 March 2017.

62 OECD DAC, Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice (Paris: OECD, 2007), pp. 14, 89.

63 OECD DAC, ‘Aid at a Glance Charts: Somalia’.

64 Intelligence Online, ‘Training Somalia’s Anti-Terrorism Units’, No. 777, 22 February 2017. Turkey has been Somalia’s main benefactor and overseas partner since August 2011 when then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan became the first non-African leader to visit the country in two decades. Domestic concerns ensure that Turkey supports counterterrorism operations in Somalia and Kenya; its agenda focuses on the Fetullah Terrorist Organisation (FETO), which Erdogan blames for the attempted coup in July 2016. See also Daily Sabah, ‘Turkey Opens Biggest Overseas Military Base in Somalia’, 30 September 2017; Mahad Wasuge, ‘Turkey’s Assistance Model in Somalia: Achieving Much with Little’, Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 2016, <http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Turkeys-Assistance-Model-in-Somalia-Achieving-Much-With-Little1-1.pdf>, accessed 7 March 2017.

65 For the original debate, see Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (London: Zed Books, 2001); see also Lars Buur, Steffan Jensen and Finn Stepputat (eds), The Security–Development Nexus: Expressions of Sovereignty and Securitization in Southern Africa (Cape Town: Nordiska Afrikaininstitutet, 2007). For the perspectives that result, see Joanna Spear and Paul Williams (eds), Security and Development in Global Politics: A Critical Comparison (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012).

66 Sophie Jamieson, ‘Priti Patel Sets Out New Vision to Stop International Aid Budget Being “Stolen” and “Wasted”’, Daily Telegraph, 14 September 2016.

67 HM Treasury and Department for International Development (DFID), UK Aid: Tackling Global Challenges in the National Interest, Cm 9163 (London: The Stationery Office, 2015), p. 4.

68 See DFID, ‘Business Case: NGO Health Consortium Somalia (HCS) Extension’, p. 4, <http://iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/3717709.odt>, accessed 9 December 2016.

69 Author’s private conversation with UK analyst, London, August 2016.

70 Hills, ‘Making Mogadishu Safe’, p. 11.

71 Author conversations with UK consultants, Mogadishu and London, July 2016 and October 2016.

72 De Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa, pp. 109–29.

73 Hills, ‘Making Mogadishu Safe’.

74 These acronyms, which reflect the influence of UK and US technical advisers, are in daily use in the offices supporting the city’s security plan.

75 Reuters, ‘13 People Killed in Somali Suicide Bombing Claimed by al Shabaab’, 26 July 2016; Reuters, ‘Suicide Bombers Attack Peacekeepers' Somali HQ, At Least Three Dead’, 2 January 2017.

76 Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS), ‘Perceptions of Security and Justice in Mogadishu: Interpreting Results of the OCVP Conflict and Security Assessment’, Policy Brief No. 8, September 2014, p. 2, <http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/HIPS_Policy_Brief_008_2014_ENGLISH.pdf>, accessed 4 March 2015.

77 See Alice Hills, ‘What is Policeness? On Being Police in Somalia’, British Journal of Criminology (Vol. 54, No. 5, 2014), pp. 765–83.

78 Author personal communication with UK trainer, Mogadishu, 22 July 2016.

79 Ex-diaspora cultural advisers working for international organisations speak of having been to school with, for example, senior officers in NISA and the Immigration Department.

80 Dalsan Radio, ‘Somalia: Lt. Colonel Zakia Hussein! Against All Odds’, All Africa, 28 June 2014.

81 For further details about the SPF’s formal organisation, see Somaligov, ‘Welcome to the Somali Police’, <http://www.police.somaligov.net/Chief%20of%20Somali%20CID.html>, accessed 10 April 2017.

82 Young Pelton, Nuxurkey and Osman, ‘The Police of Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland’.

83 Martin Murphy, Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa (London: Hurst, 2011), p. 156. For further insight into Western policing, see Peter Manning, Democratic Policing in a Changing World (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2011).

84 Egon Bittner, The Functions of the Police in Modern Society (Washington, DC: National Institute of Mental Health, 1970).

85 Markus Höehne and Virginia Luling (eds), Milk and Peace, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics (London: Hurst, 2010).

86 Hills, ‘Somalia Works’.

87 Liban Ahmad, ‘Somalia’s Intelligence Services Mimicry’, Pan African Newswire, 1 February 2013.

88 Police Advisory Committee (PAC), ‘Report on the Somali Police Force, July 2011’, Mogadishu, 2011.

89 Peter Little, Somalia: Economy Without State (Oxford: James Currey, 2003), p. 3.

90 This also applies to politicians; see, for example, Marleen Renders, Consider Somaliland: State-Building with Traditional Leaders and Institutions (Leiden: Brill, 2012).