V. NATO’s China Challenge

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Notes

1 NATO, ‘London Declaration’, 4 December 2019.

2 Xi Jinping, ‘Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’, speech delivered at the 19^th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 18 October 2017, <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf>, accessed 7 February 2020.

3 For example, the new gas pipeline ‘Power of Siberia’ and ambitious goals for future trade volumes of up to $200 billion by 2024, a figure announced during a visit by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in Moscow, or the inclusion of Chinese troops in Exercise Vostok 2018.

4 State Council, People’s Republic of China (PRC), ‘China’s National Defense in the New Era’, White Paper on Defence, July 2019, <http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html>, accessed 7 February 2020.

5 Ibid.

6 Xi, ‘Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’.

7 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), ‘World Military Expenditure Grows to $1.8 Trillion in 2018’, 29 April 2019, <https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2019/world-military-expenditure-grows-18-trillion-2018>, accessed 7 February 2020.

8 Dennis J Blasko, ‘Steady as She Goes: China’s New Defense White Paper’, War on the Rocks, 12 August 2019.

9 Evan A Feigenbaum, ‘The Deep Roots and Long Branches of Chinese Technonationalism’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12 August 2017.

10 Ibid.

11 Elsa Kania, ‘In Military-Civil Fusion, China is Learning Lessons from the United States and Starting to Innovate’, The Strategy Bridge, 27 August 2019, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/8/27/in-military-civil-fusion-china-is-learning-lesssons-from-the-united-states-and-starting-to-innovate>, accessed 7 February 2020.

12 State Council, PRC, China’s National Defense in the New Era (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2019), <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm>, accessed 7 February 2020.

13 Bates Gill and Adam Ni, ‘China’s Sweeping Military Reforms: Implications for Australia’, Security Challenges (Vol. 15, No. 1, 2019), pp. 33–45.

14 Joel Wuthnow, ‘The Re-Conquerors of Hong Kong? A Primer on China’s People’s Armed Police’, War on the Rocks, 23 August 2019.

15 US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘2018 Annual Report to Congress’, November 2018, p. 215.

16 It is active in Xinjiang and has been considered to reinforce police forces in Hong Kong during the 2019 protests.

17 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, ‘China’s Evolving Role as a UN Peacekeeper in Mali’, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 432, September 2018, <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/sr432-chinas-evolving-role-as-a-un-peacekeeper-in-mali.pdf>, accessed 7 February 2020. Chinese peacekeepers are currently deployed to nine UN missions. For further details, see United Nations Peacekeeping, ‘China’, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/china>, accessed 7 February 2020.

18 Minnie Chan, ‘China’s Navy “Set to Pick J-20 Stealth Jets for its Next Generation Carriers”’, South China Morning Post, 27 August 2019.

19 Central Military Commission, ‘China to Create World-Class Air Force’, 12 November 2019, <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-11/12/content_9673613.htm>, accessed 7 February 2020.

20 Werner Pluta, ‘China kündigt Fertigstellung von Beidou an’, golem.de, 28 December 2019, <https://www.golem.de/news/satellitennavigationssystem-china-kuendigt-fertigstellung-von-beidou-an-1912-145761.html>, accessed 7 February 2020.

21 US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘2019 Annual Report to Congress’, November 2019, p. 360.

22 David Martin, ‘Chinese Warships en Route to Baltic Sea’, Deutsche Welle, 18 July 2017, <https://www.dw.com/en/chinese-warships-en-route-to-baltic-sea/a-39735964>, accessed 7 February 2020.

23 Janka Oertel, Andrew Small and Amy Studdart, ‘The Liberal Order in the Indo-Pacific’, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Asia Programme Report, 13 April 2018, p. 22.

24 US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘2019 Annual Report to Congress’, p. 292.

25 John Costello and Joe McReynolds, ‘China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era’, Institute for National Strategic Studies, China Strategic Perspectives (No. 13, October 2018), p. 18.

26 Reuters, ‘China's Xi Awards “Best Friend” Putin Friendship Medal, Promises Support’, 8 June 2018.

27 An overview of the veto record can be accessed at <https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick>, accessed 27 February 2020.

28 According to the World Bank, Russia’s GDP reached $1.658 trillion in 2018, roughly equivalent to that of Italy, while China’s GDP reached $13.608 trillion.

29 Siemon T Wezeman, ‘China, Russia and the Shifting Landscape of Arms Sales’, SIPRI, 5 July 2017, <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/china-russia-and-shifting-landscape-arms-sales>, accessed 7 February 2020.

30 Ethan Meick, ‘China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations: Moving Toward a Higher Level of Cooperation’, US–China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Report, 20 March 2017, p. 12.

31 State Council, PRC, ‘China’s National Defense in the New Era’.

32 Samuel Bendett and Elsa B Kania, ‘China, Russia Deepen Technological Ties’, Defense One, 4 October 2019.

33 Tass, ‘Russia, China Discussing Key Projects for Year of Scientific Cooperation’, 25 December 2019.

34 Hiroyuki Akita, ‘China and Russia Build Anti-US ‘Axis’, but Moscow has Concerns’, Nikkei Asian Review, 11 July 2018.

35 Council on Foreign Relations, ‘China and Russia: Collaborators or Competitors?’, 1 November 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-and-russia-collaborators-or-competitors>, accessed 7 February 2020.

36 Dmitri Trenin, ‘How Cozy is Russia and China’s Military Relationship?’, Carnegie Moscow Center, 19 November 2019; Alexander Gabuev, ‘Why Russia and China Are Strengthening Security Ties’, Carnegie Moscow Center, 24 September 2018.

37 Mike Pence, ‘Remarks by Vice President Pence at the 2019 Munich Security Conference’, speech given in Munich, February 2019, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-2019-munich-security-conference-munich-germany/>, accessed 19 January 2020.

38 Lesley Wroughton and Gergely Szakacs, ‘Pompeo Warns Allies Huawei Presence Complicates Partnership with US’, Reuters, 11 February 2019.

39 Janka Oertel, ‘Germany Chooses China Over the West’, Foreign Policy, 21 October 2019; Janka Oertel, ‘Europe and China after Brexit: The 5G Question’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 19 December 2019, <www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europe_and_china_after_brexit_the_5g_question>, accessed 7 February 2020.

40 NATO, ‘London Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London, 3−4 December 2019’, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm>, accessed 7 February 2020.

41 Fabrice Pothier, ‘How Should NATO Respond to China’s Growing Power?’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 12 September 2019.

42 Robbie Gramer, ‘Trump Wants NATO’s Eyes on China’, Foreign Policy, 20 March 2019; author's conversations with senior policymakers.