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Notes
1 The author would like to thank Jessica Cox and Brad Roberts for their thoughtful comments on a previous version of this chapter.
2 John Foster Dulles, ‘The Evolution of Foreign Policy’, in Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman and Gregory F Treverton (eds), US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1989), p. 124.
3 For historical overviews of NATO’s nuclear policy, see Shaun R Gregory, Nuclear Command and Control in NATO: Nuclear Weapons Operations and the Strategy of Flexible Response (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1996), pp. 15−40; J Michael Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1983), pp. 1−38; Michael O Wheeler, ‘NATO Nuclear Strategy, 1949−1990’, in Gustav Schmidt (ed.), A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years, Volume 3 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 121−39.
4 NATO, ‘The Future Tasks of the Alliance: Report of the Council – “The Harmel Report”’, December 1967, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_26700.htm>, accessed 21 January 2020.
5 NATO, ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence’, 2010.
6 The UK has explicitly committed its nuclear forces to NATO since the early 1960s, with bombers first assigned in 1963. See Lawrence Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons (London and Basingstoke: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Macmillan Press, 1980), pp. 25−26.
7 William Alberque, The NPT and the Origins of NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements, Proliferation Papers, No. 57 (Paris: Ifri, February 2017).
8 Hans M Kristensen and Matt Korda, ‘Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 2019’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Vol. 75, No. 5, 2019), pp. 257–58.
9 NATO, ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence’, paras 17−18.
10 NATO, ‘Deterrence and Defence Posture Review’, 2012, para. 8.
11 See Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy, Proliferation Papers, No. 54 (Paris: Ifri, November 2015); Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Russian Strategic Deterrence’, Survival (Vol. 58, No. 4, August/September 2016), pp. 7−26; Dave Johnson, Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Approach to Conflict (Paris: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 2016); Olga Oliker, ‘Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine: What We Know, What We Don’t, and What That Means’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2016; Bruno Tertrais, ‘Russia’s Nuclear Policy: Worrying for the Wrong Reasons’, Survival (Vol. 60, No. 2, April/May 2018), pp. 33−44.
12 Jacek Durkalec, Nuclear-Backed ‘Little Green Men’: Nuclear Messaging in the Ukraine Crisis (Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2015).
13 Dick Zandee, ‘The Future of Arms Control and Confidence-Building Regimes’, Carnegie Europe, 28 November 2019, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/future-of-arms-control-and-confidence-building-regimes-pub-80427>, accessed 28 January 2020.
14 Among the five types of nuclear-capable delivery systems advertised in Putin’s State of the Nation address on 1 March 2018, Russia considers that only two of the weapons proposed (the Sarmat heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the Avangard hyperglide vehicle) would fall under the New START Treaty limits. The three other systems (Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and Poseidon strategic nuclear torpedo) would be more difficult to bring within the existing categories, although a case could be made for the Kinzhal. See Vladimir Putin, ‘Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly’, Moscow, 1 March 2018, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957>, accessed 21 January 2020; Pranay Vaddi, ‘Bringing Russia’s New Nuclear Weapons into New START’, Lawfare, 13 August 2019, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/bringing-russias-new-nuclear-weapons-new-start>, accessed 21 January 2020.
15 Russian Federation, ‘The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’, 25 December 2014, section I, para. 8m.
16 Dave Johnson, ‘Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds’, Livermore Papers on Global Security No. 3, February 2018, <https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/Precision-Strike-Capabilities-report-v3-7.pdf>, accessed 21 January 2020.
17 NATO, ‘Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8−9 July 2016’, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm>, accessed 21 January 2020.
18 Thomas C Schelling and Morton H Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York, NY: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), p. 2.
19 NATO, ‘The Future Tasks of the’.
20 Richard N Haass, Beyond the INF Treaty: Arms, Arms Control, and the Atlantic Alliance (Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1988).
21 For case studies focused on national positions of European member states on the INF crisis, see Odessa Center for Non proliferation, Responses to the INF Treaty Crisis: The European Dimension (Odessa: Odessa I I Mechnikov National University Press, 2019), <http://odcnp.com.ua/images/pdf/Europe-Responces-to-INF-Crisis.pdf>, accessed 21 January 2020.
22 For an analysis of those trends and response options, see Corentin Brustlein, The Erosion of Strategic Stability and the Future of Arms Control in Europe, Proliferation Papers, No. 60, (Paris: Ifri, November 2018).
23 This package was forwarded to the OSCE. See NATO, ‘Speech by NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg at the High-Level NATO Conference on Arms Control and Disarmament’, Brussels, 23 October 2019, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_169930.htm?selectedLocale=en>, accessed 21 January 2020.
24 Michaela Dodge, ‘New START and the Future of U.S. National Security’, The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 2407, May 2019, <https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/BG3407_0.pdf>, accessed 28 January 2020; Keith B Payne and John S Foster, ‘Russian Strategy: Expansion, Crisis and Conflict’, Comparative Strategy (Vol. 36, No. 1, 2017), pp. 1–89.
25 For a discussion on the uncertainties in a post-New START Treaty era, see Vince Manzo, ‘Nuclear Arms Control Without a Treaty? Risks and Options After New START’, Center for Naval Analyses, 2019, <https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IRM-2019-U-019494.pdf>, accessed 21 January 2020.