VII. More Sensors Than Sense

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Notes

1 Rachel S Cohen, ‘Want to Understand MDC2? Think About Uber, USAF Official Says’, Air Force Magazine, 23 September 2019.

2 Congressional Research Service, ‘Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2)’, 1 July 2021, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF11493.pdf>, accessed 26 February 2021.

3 Caitlin O’Neill, ‘Delivering an On-Demand Sensor to Shooter Warfighting Capability’, US Army, 29 April 2020, <https://www.army.mil/article/235067/delivering_an_on_demand_sensor_to_shooter_warfighting_capability>, accessed 3 March 2021.

4 Ministry of Defence (MoD), ‘Digital Strategy for Defence: Delivering the Digital Backbone and Unleashing the Power of Defence’s Data’, April 2021, pp. 14–15.

5 MoD, ‘Joint Concept Note 1/20: Multi-Domain Integration’, November 2020.

6 Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, ‘The Cooperative Engagement Capability’, Technical Digest (Vol. 16, No. 4, 1995), pp. 377–96.

7 For example, as led to the loss of the SS Atlantic Conveyor during the Falklands conflict. See Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (London: Pan Macmillan, 2012), p. 286.

8 Open Cellid, ‘The World’s Largest Open Database of Cell Towers’, Unwired Labs, <https://www.opencellid.org/#zoom=6&lat=29.59&lon=-76.03>, accessed 3 March 2021.

9 QinetiQ, ‘Free Space Optical Communications’, <https://www.qinetiq.com/en/what-we-do/services-and-products/free-space-optical-communications>, accessed 27 July 2021.

10 ‘BAOR Order of Battle: July 1989’, <https://www.orbat85.nl/documents/BAOR-July-1989.pdf>, accessed 31 March 2021.

11 RUSI, ‘RUSI LWC 2017 – Session 7’, 19 July 2017, 21:54–48:00, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_EcrrD1dBhg>, accessed 8 April 2020.

12 David S Alberts and Richard E Hayes, Power to the Edge: Command and Control in the Information Age (Washington, DC: Command and Control Research Program, 2003).

13 It also accentuates vulnerability to systematic deception. See US Army, ‘FM 3-13.4: Army Support to Military Deception’, February 2019, <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-13-4.pdf>, accessed 30 March 2021.

14 Jack Watling and Sean MacFarland, ‘The Future of the NATO Corps’, RUSI Occasional Papers (April 2021), p. 20.

15 Watling and MacFarland, ‘The Future of the NATO Corps’.

16 Nick Reynolds, ‘Performing Information Manoeuvre Through Persistent Engagement’, RUSI Occasional Papers (April 2021), pp. 37–43.

17 Congressional Research Service, ‘Artificial Intelligence and National Security’, updated 10 November 2020, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45178.pdf>, accessed 3 March 2021.

18 A problem already facing cyber threat intelligence needing to ingest non-digital feeds. See Sean Barnum, ‘Standardizing Cyber Threat Intelligence Information with the Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX™)’, MITRE, 20 February 2014, <http://www.standardscoordination.org/sites/default/files/docs/STIX_Whitepaper_v1.1.pdf>, accessed 30 March 2021.

19 RUSI, ‘Session Twelve: Innovation and Adaptability’, 19 June 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZYzJIcS36Ls>, accessed 3 March 2021.

20 Justin Bronk, ‘Approaching a Fork in the Sky’, in Jack Watling (ed.), Decision Points: Rationalising the Armed Forces of European Medium Powers, Whitehall Paper 96 (London: Taylor and Francis, 2020), pp. 52–62.

21 Justin Bronk, ‘Modern Russian and Chinese Integrated Air Defence Systems: The Nature of the Threat, Growth Trajectory and Western Options’, RUSI Occasional Papers (April 2021).

22 Justin Bronk, The Future of NATO Airpower: How Are Future Capability Plans Within the Alliance Diverging and How Can Interoperability be Maintained?, Whitehall Paper 94 (London: Taylor and Francis, 2020).

23 For example, see Peter R Faber, ‘Interwar US Army Aviation and the Air Corps Tactical School: Incubators of American Airpower’, in Phillip S Meilinger (ed.), The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (New Delhi: Lancer Publications, 2000), p. 215.

24 Douglas Barrie, ‘F-35 Situational Awareness: Sensing Isn’t Enough’, IISS Military Balance Blog, 19 March 2019, <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2019/03/f-35-situational-awareness>, accessed 3 March 2021.

25 Brian W Everstine, ‘The F-22 and the F-35 Are Struggling to Talk to Each Other … And to the Rest of USAF’, Air Force Magazine, 29 January 2018.

26 Myron Hura et al., Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), pp. 107–21.

27 British Army, ‘Bowman Radio Update | Director of Information | British Army’, 13 May 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AYr4Hix-AL0>, accessed 3 March 2021.

28 MoD, ‘Morpheus Programme: Next Generation Tactical Communication Information Systems For Defence’, last updated 18 April 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/morpheus-project-next-generation-tactical-communication-information-systems-for-defence>, accessed 3 March 2021.

29 John Patch, ‘Fortress at Sea? The Carrier Invulnerability Myth’, US Naval Institute Proceedings (January 2010).

30 See MoD, ‘Joint Statement on Carrier Strike Group 2021 Joint Declaration Signing’, 19 January 2021, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-carrier-strike-group-2021-joint-declaration-signing--2>, accessed 3 March 2021. On France, see Elysee, ‘Notre avenir énergétique et écologique passe par le nucléaire. Déplacement du Président Emmanuel Macron sur le site industriel de Framatome’, 8 December 2020, <https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/12/08/deplacement-du-president-emmanuel-macron-sur-le-site-industriel-de-framatome>, accessed 3 March 2021. On the US, see Congressional Research Service, ‘Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress’, 29 September 2021, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS20643.pdf>, accessed 3 March 2021. On China, Japan and South Korea, see Felix K Chang, ‘Taking Flight: China, Japan and South Korea Get Aircraft Carriers’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 14 January 2021, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/01/taking-flight-china-japan-and-south-korea-get-aircraft-carriers/>, accessed 3 March 2021. Russia continues to try, see Paul Goble, ‘Moscow’s Plans for New Kind of Aircraft Carrier Unlikely to Be Realized’, The Jamestown Foundation, 11 March 2021, <https://jamestown.org/program/moscows-plans-for-new-kind-of-aircraft-carrier-unlikely-to-be-realized/> accessed 5 November 2021.

31 This is the objective of the US Navy’s Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air (NIFC-CA) system. See John Andrew Hamilton, ‘Navy Conducts First Live Fire NIFC-CA Test with F-35 at White Sands Missile Range’, US Army, 29 September 2016, <https://www.army.mil/article/175940/navy_conducts_first_live_fire_nifc_ca_test_wtih_f_35_at_white_sands_missile_range>, accessed 3 March 2021.

32 Boeing, ‘MQ-25’, <https://www.boeing.com/defense/mq25/>, accessed 3 March 2021.

33 As demonstrated by the US Air Force’s Golden Horde programme. See Garrett Reim, ‘Golden Horde Collaborative Bombs Hit Four Targets Simultaneously in Test’, Flight Global, 26 February 2021, <https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/golden-horde-collaborative-bombs-hit-four-targets-simultaneously-in-test/142655.article>, accessed 3 March 2021.

34 Bryan Clark and Timothy A Walton, ‘Taking Back the Seas: Transforming the U.S. Surface Fleet for Decision-Centric Warfare’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 31 December 2019.