William Friedman's Bletchley park diary: A different view

Abstract

‘William Friedman's Bletchley Park Diary’ (INS 20/4 (2005) pp. 654–69) stated that Friedman, with Col. Alfred McCormack and Lt.-Col. Telford Taylor (US Army Special Branch), visited Bletchley Park in mid-1943 to negotiate with the British Government Code and Cypher School on how the Travis–Strong Agreement of May 1943 on Sigint cooperation should be implemented. This article shows that they had no substantive negotiating powers, and that they were essentially on a fact-finding mission.

Notes

1 Colin MacKinnon, ‘William Friedman's Bletchley Park Diary: A New Source for the History of Anglo-American Intelligence Cooperation’, Intelligence and National Security 20/4 (2005) pp.654–69, note 2 suggests that it is not known when ‘the SSS morphed into the SSA [Signal Security Agency]’. In fact, the SSS was renamed the Signal Security Agency by Office Memorandum No.73, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 9 July 1943: US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) – Guide to Federal Records – Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, RG 457.1 Administrative History <http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/457.html#457.1> (accessed 30 March 2006).

2 MacKinnon (note 1) pp.658–9. MacKinnon is almost certainly correct in referring to the ‘Travis–Strong’ Agreement, and not the BRUSA Agreement, despite many references to BRUSA in the literature. However, he did not consider statements by the late Sir Harry Hinsley which suggest otherwise, e.g. ‘But I wasn't allowed to tell the Navy any details [of BRUSA] because the Army would have been furious’: Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (London/New York: HarperCollins 1995) p.137. Hinsley was the sole British negotiator of the 1944 Naval BRUSA Agreement, which was signed in January 1944, but he would appear to have had no part in the Travis–Strong Agreement, not least because he was still only a member of Bletchley's naval section (Hut 4) in 1943. On his role in the 1944 Agreement, see Ralph Erskine, ‘The 1944 Naval BRUSA Agreement and its Aftermath’, Cryptologia 30 (2006) p.6.

3 G.C. McVittie, Met. 80, ‘Report on Meteorological Cryptography in the United States’, 19 October 1942: The National Archives of the UK, Kew, Public Record Office (PRO) HW 14/54.

4 Travis to CSS, CXG 564, 29 September 1942: PRO HW 57/9.

5 G.G. Stevens to Tiltman, letter of 4 November 1942: PRO HW 14/57.

6 Stephen Budiansky, ‘Bletchley Park and the Birth of the Very Special Relationship’ in Ralph Erskine and Michael Smith (eds.) Action This Day: Bletchley Park from the Breaking of the Enigma Code to the Birth of the Modern Computer (London: Bantam Press 2001) p.228.

7 W.F. Friedman, memorandum of 14 September 1943 for Colonel Bullock, ‘Project in the Cryptanalysis of German Military Traffic in their High-Grade Cipher Machine’: NARA, College Park,, MD,. RG 457 Historic Cryptographic Collection, Pre-World War I Through World War II (HCC) Box 1283, No.3815.

8 These included the so-called ‘Bluebird incident’ when the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht's cipher section had read very revealing cables sent by Major Bonner Fellers, a US Army attaché in Egypt, until his cipher system was belatedly updated to Sigaba (a machine system): David Kahn, ‘The Black Code’, MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History 18 (Autumn 2005) p.36. The repercussions of this incident were still rumbling on almost a year later. Curiously, for some unknown reason ‘charges were made against [GCCS by the US Army] and have not been withdrawn’: ‘Excerpt from Cable 4771’, 13 May 1943 (‘Colonel McCormack Trip to London’, NARA HCC Box 1097, No.3443).

9 Robert Louis Benson, A History of U.S. Communications Intelligence during World War II: Policy and Administration ([Fort Meade, MD]: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency 1997) p.104.

10 [N. de Grey – no named author], memorandum AZ/404 of 4 May 1943: PRO HW 14/68; ‘Allied Sigint Policy and Organisation’, p.23: PRO HW 43/78.

11 ‘Allied Sigint Policy’ (note 10) p.25; cf. ‘Notes for Commander Travis’ visit to USA May 1943’, 6 May 1943, p.7, citing London cable 463: PRO HW 50/13.

12 ‘Allied Sigint Policy’ (note 10) p.25.

13 ‘Notes for Commander Travis’ (note 11) p.7.

14 Cable 559 of 22 March 1943: I am indebted to GCHQ for this and the other copies it provided. Menzies may be referring to events following the visit of the Sinkov Mission in February 1941, when details about breaking Enigma were given to US Army and US Navy teams, subject to strict conditions as to who they were permitted to tell when they returned home. On the Sinkov Mission, see Benson (note 9), p.19; Ralph Erskine, ‘What did the Sinkov Mission Receive from Bletchley Park?’, Cryptologia 24 (2000) p.97.

15 ‘General Strong’ (a short biography, apparently by McCormack): ‘Col. Alfred McCormack Papers’ (NARA HCC, Box 1097 No.3444).

16 CXG 79 to CSS, 22 April 1943 (no author): copy provided by GCHQ. The first occasion was on 19 March, over a misunderstanding about material given to the Office of Strategic Services: ‘Notes for Commander Travis’ (note 11) p.7.

17 Taylor, memorandum of 3 April 1943 to Colonel Clarke on ‘Cooperation between United States Signal Intelligence Service and British Y Service’: ‘Army and Navy Comint Regs & Papers’ (NARA Box 1417, No.4632, fiche 2).

18 Hastings, 5 January 1943, cited in Benson (note 9) p.100.

19 CSS to Stevens, cable 686 of 20 April 1943: copy provided by GCHQ. ‘C’ addressed his cables on this issue to Stevens, even though Hastings had expressly asked him ‘to allow me to handle the matter as STEVENS has no access to the authorities in G.2, who handle the matter’: CXG 996 to CSS (no author), 24 March 1943 (copy provided by GCHQ).

20 CXG 80 to CSS, 22 April 1943 (no author): copy provided by GCHQ. Although this cable was ‘for C.S.S. only’, Hastings seems to have had Travis in mind as the ‘plenipotentiary’: Menzies lacked the necessary knowledge to discuss Sigint cooperation in detail.

21 JAC stood for ‘Japanese army ciphers’ (sometimes ‘Japanese army communications’). MacKinnon's suggestion in ‘Friedman's Bletchley Park Diary’ (note 1 – his note 21) that the conference was about ‘a Japanese Army diplomatic system’ called JAC by Arlington Hall is incorrect. The conference considered a range of matters relating to known Japanese army ciphers generally, but the JAC army system was not one of them. That system was definitely not ‘Army diplomatic’, which is a contradiction in terms.

22 Edward J. Drea and Joseph E. Richard, ‘New Evidence on Breaking the Japanese Army Codes’, Intelligence and National Security 14/1 (1999) p.67.

23 C to Washington, CXG 699 of 23 April 1943: copy provided by GCHQ.

24 Travis to Stevens, CXG 671 of 19 April 1943: copy provided by GCHQ.

25 ‘Allied Sigint Policy’ (note 10) p.26.

26 MacKinnon (note 1) p.657.

27 Ibid. p.659.

28 MacKinnon suggests (‘Friedman's Bletchley Park Diary’ (note 1 – his note 37)) that Friedman's and McCormack's reports ‘probably give us the most detailed description we have of British wartime Comint operations’. Although their reports are excellent, this ignores countless files in the PRO, as well as others in NARA, such as over 120 of Capt. Walter J. Fried's excellent liaison reports on cryptanalytic work at Bletchley: NARA HCC Box 880, No.2612.

29 ‘History of Hut 3 at BP’, vol.II, pp.513–14: PRO HW 3/120. The September 1943 amplification of the Agreement is set out in Supplement B to that volume (pp.547–8). In September 1944 it was agreed that G-2 should receive a copy of all teleprints and reports sent by Hut 3, which consequentially removed a requirement to notify the War Office and Air Ministry about the items being sent: ibid. p.523. The system was further modified on 13 February 1945, after which all signals sent by the Hut 3 watch were sent directly to G-2, and on 30 March 1945 in relation to the selection of diplomatic and attaché material for US Commands in the European and Mediterranean theatres: Supplements E and G to that volume (pp.556–7, 564–5). See also the text to note 58.

30 MacKinnon (note 1) pp.658–9.

31 Ibid. p.659.

32 Travis–Strong Agreement, in ‘Agreements with GCCS’: NARA HCC Box 1417, No.4632, fiche 2.

33 A.G. Denniston, memorandum of 31 October 1941, para.24 (PRO HW 14/45); cf. A.G. Denniston to Col. Tiltman, minute of 8 March 1942, item 7: PRO HW 14/46.

34 German diplomatic section, minute of 8 August 42: HW 14/48.

35 ‘Conference on Japanese Military Ciphers’, minutes of first meeting, 7 May 1943: PRO WO 208/5074.

36 Ibid.

37 ‘Conference on Japanese Military Ciphers’, minutes of fifth meeting, 17 May 1943, para.(4) (PRO WO 208/5074); ‘Conference on Japanese Military Ciphers’, minutes of the communications sub-committee meeting, 17 May 1943, para.(4): ibid.

38 MacKinnon (note 1) p.657.

39 MacKinnon (note 1) states (his note 13) that Denniston was ‘head of GC&CS’ in May 1943, and that Travis was under him. However, following GCCS's reorganization on 1 February 1942, when Travis was appointed DD(S) and Denniston deputy director, civil (DD(C)), Travis was responsible only to Menzies as the director of GCCS, and was completely independent of Denniston: CSS cable 207 to Washington of 19 February 1942 (PRO HW 14/46); A.G. Denniston, minute of 30 January 1942: PRO HW 14/27.

40 ‘Informal memorandum by Cmdr. Denniston outlining his original concept of the American liaison’, 21 May 1943: ‘Liaison Activities in the U.K.’, p.16, NARA RG 457, Entry 9002, SRH 153.

41 David Alvarez, Secret Messages: Codebreaking and American Diplomacy, 1930–1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 2000) pp.125–31.

42 ‘Informal memorandum by Cmdr. Denniston’ (note 40).

43 ‘Berkeley Street’, p.59 in ‘Conversations with Denniston’: ‘Col McCormack's Trip to London, May–June 1943’, NARA HCC Box 1119, No.3600.

44 MacKinnon (note 1) p.659.

45 W.G. Welchman, minute of 9 June 1943 to Travis: PRO HW 14/78.

46 The Abwehr was the Oberkommando Wehrmacht's intelligence organization.

47 See the reports in ‘Col McCormack's Trip to London’ (note 43). These were conflated later from the McCormack and Taylor cables.

48 Maj. Louis T. Stone, ‘Memorandum describing American Liaison’, 12 October 1945, in ‘Liaison Activities in the U.K.’ (note 40) p.8; ‘Excerpt from Cable 4762’, 12 May 1943: ‘Colonel McCormack Trip’ (note 8); Bradley F. Smith, The Ultra-Magic Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship 1940–1946 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press 1993) p.151.

49 Taylor to Strong for McCormack, cable 5641 of 6 September 1943: ‘McCormack Messages’, NARA HCC Box 1097, No.3445.

50 Ibid.

51 [Taylor – no named author] to Washington, cable 5375 of 2 August 1943: ‘McCormack Messages’ (note 49).

52 Smith (note 48) p.163.

53 [Taylor – no named author] to Washington, cable 5643 of 6 September 1943: ‘McCormack Messages’ (note 49).

54 [Taylor – no named author] to Washington, cable 5655 of 7 September 1943: ibid.

55 McKee to Strong for McCormack, cable 5668 of 9 September 1943: ibid.

56 McKee to Strong for McCormack, cable 5690 of 12 September 1943: ibid.

57 Taylor to Strong for McCormack, cable 5700 of 14 September 1943: ibid.

58 See note 29.

59 For a brief history of 3-US, see ‘History of Hut 3’ (note 29) vol.II, pp.515–20; ‘Operations of the Military Intelligence Service War Department London’: NARA RG 457, Entry 9002, SRH-110.

60 W.F. Friedman, memorandum of 29 March 1944 for Colonel Corderman, ‘Comparison of Our “003” Type of “Bombe” with the Rotary Type’, para.10: NARA HCC Box 950, No.2809.

61 ‘History of the SSA Vol. Two: The General Cryptanalytic Problems’, p.284: NARA RG 457, Entry 9002, SRH-361; cf. ‘Signal Security Agency General Cryptanalytic Branch-Annual Report FY 1945’, p.19: NARA HCC Box 1380, No.4360.

62 ‘Dud-busting’ involved solving messages which did not decipher on broken keys, usually because of garbled indicators.

63 J.N. Wenger, memorandum of 16 February 1945, ‘U.S. Navy and U.S. Army Bombe Equipment’, para.2: NARA HCC, Box 705, No.1736, ‘Bombe History’.

64 Ralph Erskine, ‘Breaking German Naval Enigma on Both Sides of the Atlantic’, in Erskine and Smith (eds.), Action This Day (note 6) p.194.

65 MacKinnon (note 1) p.658.

66 ‘Technical History of the 6813th Signal Security Detachment’ (NARA HCC, Box 970, No.2941); ‘Operations of the 6812th Signal Security Detachment, ETOUSA’ (NARA HCC, Box 970, No.2943). I am indebted to Frode Weierud for copies of these files.

67 Washington cables CXG 45, 46 of 9 April 1943, quoted in ‘Notes for Commander Travis’ (note 11) p.8.

68 McCormack, excerpts from cables V4772 of 13 May 1943, 4762 of 12 May 1943: ‘Colonel McCormack Trip’ (note 8).