Partisan Improprieties: Ministerial Control and Australia's Security Agencies, 1962–72

Abstract

Partisan behaviour and abuses by intelligence and security agencies have often been attributed to the fact that agencies have become ‘out of control’ or ‘rogue elephants’. But a detailed empirical study of the politicization of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) over ten years shows that the agency was not ‘out of control’ but very much under the control of its minister. The partisan use of security information arose from directives issued through the ‘democratic’ control exercised by a government. On the basis of this study, prevention of abuses by tighter governmental control is unlikely to work. A combination of government control, autonomy of the agency and independent scrutiny by an inspector-general is more likely to succeed.

Notes

The author gratefully acknowledges research funding for this project from the Australian Research Council and the goodwill of Dennis Richardson, former Director General of Security. The degree of access to the archival records of ASIO would not have been possible without Mr Richardson's commitment to openness.

Peter Gill, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State (London: Frank Cass 1994) p.217.

Ibid., p.240.

Laurence Lustgarten and Ian Leigh, In from the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994) p.414.

Ian Leigh, ‘More Closely Watching the Spies: Three Decades of Experience’ in Hans Born, Loch K. Johnson and Ian Leigh (eds.) Who's Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability (Washington: Potomac Books 2005) p.5.

Hans Born and Loch K. Johnson, ‘Balancing Operational Efficiency and Democratic Legitimacy’ in Born et al. (eds) Who's Watching the Spies?, p.228.

Ibid.

These files are found at the National Archives of Australia, Canberra and are titled: Records of Conversation and Correspondence between the DG ASIO and the Prime Minister, 1954–1976, Vols.5–8, A6122, Item 2133, 34, 35, 2273; Records of Conversation and Correspondence between the DG ASIO and the Attorney General, Vols.1–7, A6122, Items 2137, 38, 23, 24, 48, 64, 77; and Records of Conversation and Correspondence between DG ASIO and Ministers, Heads of Departments, Vols.1–8, A6122, Items 2163, 65, 66, 67, 78, 79, 2201, 2287. Hereafter they are respectively abbreviated as DG-PM, DG-AG and DG-Mins followed by a volume number and page number.

The Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security published its findings in four reports in 1977. The first report was devoted to the Commission's procedural matters; the second report dealt with security assessment and an appeal system; the third report dealt with the effectiveness of ASIO and was not made public; the fourth report was the most substantial and was published in two volumes.

Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (RCIS): Fourth Report (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service 1977) Vol.1, p.161.

Ibid., pp.167–70.

Ibid., p.239.

Ibid., p.256.

Sydney Morning Herald, 9 September 1981.

RCIS, Fourth Report, Vol.1, p.7.

Ibid., p.116. Hope adds: ‘It is not, of course, unlawful for the DG to do so, given the terms of section 5 (1) a) of the Act, if he is satisfied that it is “relevant to security” for him to do so. I can however, envisage few cases where a Director General should be so satisfied.’

Briefing Paper, 3 June 1968, DG-PM, Vol.6. p.79.

Letter from Spry to Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 13 February 1967, DG-PM, Vol.6, p.2.

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol.59, 4 June 1968, pp.1890–91. Privately, ASIO had attempted to convince Bowen that the allegation could be neither confirmed nor denied but Bowen insisted that the claim, which was embarrassing, touched on matters of parliamentary privilege and was an exception to the practice, DG-PM, Vol.6, pp.78–82.

‘History of ASIO by Bob Swan’, Vol.14, A6122, item 2080, pp.83–5.

Ibid., p.85.

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD), H of R, 44, 1 October 1964, p.1725.

Memo, 20 October 1964, DG-AG, Vol.1, p.23.

CPD (H of R) 14 May 1968, pp.1386–8.

CPD (H of R), 27 May 1969, pp.2242ff. See David McKnight, Australia's Spies and Their Secrets (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin 1994), p.216.

DG-PM, Vol.5, pp.116ff.

Letter to the Prime Minister, 20 September 1965, DG-PM, Vol.5, p.123.

The Michaelis case is outlined in McKnight, Australia's Spies and Their Secrets, p.212.

‘Defence of Security File Action’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 October 1966.

Sydney Morning Herald, 1 October 1966.

Record of telephone conversation, 3 October 1966, DG-PM, Vol.5. pp.166–7.

For example see Memo dated 24 October 1950 (A1209 item 57/4416) in which Prime Minister suggests that ASIO talk to Mr. W. Wentworth MP about his requests for information; see Memo dated 11 March 1953 in which Spry discusses Wentworth's misuse of ASIO information in A6119, item 500, p.3; see letter 16 December 1953 from Director General ASIO requesting a regional office make available material to Wentworth, in A6122 item 440, p.19; see also Spry's resistance to this practice in his letter to Attorney General, dated 17 October 1957 in A6119, item 500, p.6.

Correspondence with the Attorney General, 6 July 1967, DG-PM, Vol.6, pp.19, 23–4.

Spry to Prime Minister Gorton, 28 February 1968, in DG-PM, Vol.6, pp.72–5.

Record of conversation with the Attorney General, 20 July 1967. At the time of the request the two lawyers, Burt QC and Jeffreys, were already active at the inquiry which had been running for six weeks; DG-AG, Vol.1, p.29.

DG-AG, Vol.1, pp.86–7.

‘Note for Record: Ministerial Enquiries’, 16 May 1972, DG-Mins, Vol.3, pp.114–15.

Briefing paper headed ‘Vietnam Moratorium Campaign’ and associated correspondence, DG-AG, Vol.1, pp.91–8, and see also pp.106–9.

See McKnight, Australia's Spies and Their Secrets, pp.190–91.

See ibid., p.219.

Record of Conversation with Attorney General and Minister for Labor, 26 May 1971, DG-Mins, Vol.2, p.84.

Letter to Attorney General from J.C. Behm, 16 June 1970, DG-AG, Vol.1, p.115.

Minute Paper for Director General, 1 October 1970, DG-AG, Vol.2, p.15.

DG-AG, Vol.3, pp.3–4.

Ibid., p.4.

DG-AG, Vol.3, p.46. This document recording this exchange was leaked to writer Richard Hall and published in his book The Secret State (Sydney: Cassell Australia 1978), one of the rare instances when this has occurred.

Minute paper from J.C. Elliott, 23 December 1971, DG-AG, Vol.3, pp.65–6.

DG-AG, Vol.4, p.18.

Note for Record Purposes, Conversation with Prime Minister, 3 October 1966, DG-PM, Vol.5, pp.166–7.

Notes of a Discussion with A. Calwell, 5 May 1965, DG-Mins, Vol.1, pp.118ff. Earlier, Calwell asked directly whether any members of parliament were undercover members of the Communist Party and was informed that ASIO knew of none although several had previously been CPA members and kept this fact secret. DG Mins, Vol.1, pp.89ff.

DG-PM, Vol.6, p.58.

DG-PM, Vol.7, p.5.

Ibid., p.6 (emphasis added).

DG-AG, Vol.1, p.103.

Letter to Attorney General, 16 July 1971, DG-AG, Vol.2, pp.114–15.

DG-AG, Vol.1, pp.124–5.

Record of conversation, 25 June 1971, DG-AG, Vol.2, pp.111–12.

DG-AG, Vol.4, p.48.

Ibid., p.55.

Gill, Policing Politics, p.240.

Ibid., p.225.

David Marr, The Ivanov Trail (Melbourne: Thomas Nelson 1984) p.275; McKnight, Australia's Spies and Their Secrets, pp.295–9.

Jenny Hocking, Terror Laws: ASIO, Counter terrorism and the Threat to Democracy (Sydney: UNSW Press 2004) p.53; Frank Cain, ASIO: An Unofficial History (Richmond: Spectrum Publications 1994) pp.213–14.

In his second (1983–84) inquiry Hope acknowledged that it was ‘the misuse of the organization for political purposes’ that prompted this judgement. Royal Commission on Australia's Security and Intelligence Agencies: Report on the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service 1984) p.311.

Ibid., pp.314–15.

The government nevertheless established a parliamentary committee in 1979 after political pressure. It relies on ministerial approval for significant actions and has been widely seen as ineffectual.

Lustgarten and Leigh, In from the Cold, p.418.

Ibid., p.417.