The Joint Intelligence Bureau: (Not So) Secret Intelligence for the Post-War World

Abstract

In 1946 veteran British intelligence officer Kenneth Strong undertook the Directorship of a new intelligence organization, the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB). The JIB absorbed the responsibilities of several wartime intelligence organs, and was responsible for economic, topographic, and aspects of scientific intelligence on an inter-service basis. Its responsibilities grew over the following 18 years; most notably, it absorbed atomic intelligence in 1957. When the Defence Intelligence Staff was created in 1964, absorbing the JIB and the individual Service agencies, JIB was at its heart and Kenneth Strong its first Director. The organization conducted key work in the early Cold War, was at the centre of an international network of Joint Intelligence Bureaux, and was an important stepping stone in the movement to centralize military and military-relevant intelligence in Britain – but the historiography pays it surprisingly little attention. This paper introduces the JIB and various aspects of its work, and demonstrates that its low profile in the historiography is unjustified.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Michael Herman and Marcus Faulkner for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

Notes

*Email: [email protected]¹ National Intelligence Machinery (London: HMSO 2001) p.14.

²DIS website, ‘History’, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100503122851/http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/SecurityandIntelligence/DIS/History.htm> (accessed 8 November 2011).

³See inter alia, Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Secret Intelligence for a Post-War World: Reshaping the British Intelligence Community, 1944–1951’ in Richard J. Aldrich (ed.) British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945–51 (London: Routledge 1992) p.17; Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning Armageddon (Amsterdam: Harwood 2000) pp.24–7; Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong, Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer (London: Cassell 1968) pp.223–4.

⁴All quotations are from CAB 81/130, JIC(45) 265(0), ‘Post-War Organisation of Intelligence’, 7 September 1945.

⁵See Aldrich, ‘Secret Intelligence for a Post-War World’; Michael S. Goodman, ‘Learning to Walk: The Origins of the UK's Joint Intelligence Committee’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21/1 (2008).

⁶For instance, the future of the Inter-Service Topographical Department (ISTD) was discussed in January 1944. CAB 81/92, JIC(44) 4^th Meeting (0), 25 January 1944.

⁷Patrick Howarth, Intelligence Chief Extraordinary (London: Bodley Head 1986) p.199.

⁸Michael Herman, ‘The Postwar Organisation of Intelligence: The 1945 Joint Intelligence Committee Report on “The Intelligence Machine”’, unpublished.

⁹CAB 163/6, ‘Defence Organisation after the War’, Capel-Dunn, 29 April 1943.

¹⁰CAB 163/6, Capel-Dunn to Bentinck, 26 May 1943.

¹¹CAB 163/6, Cavendish-Bentinck to DNI, DMI, ACAS(I), Vickers, Menzies, Allen, 13 October 1943.

¹²CAB 163/6, ‘The Intelligence Machine’, 10 January 1945.

¹³CAB 163/6, Note by Cavendish-Bentinck, 26 February 1945.

¹⁴CAB 163/6, Summary of JIC meeting to discuss, ‘The Intelligence Machine’, 21 March 1945.

¹⁵CAB 81/93, JIC (45) 31^st Meeting (0), 8 May 1945.

¹⁶CAB 81/130, JIC (45) 265(0), ‘Post-War Organisation of Intelligence’, 7 September, 1945.

¹⁷CAB 81/130, JIC(45) 226 (Final), ‘Joint Intelligence Bureau’, 24 July 1945.

¹⁸CAB 81/129, JIC(45) 181(0) (Final), ‘Post-War Organisation of Intelligence’, 1 June 1945.

¹⁹Strong, Intelligence at the Top, p.223.

²⁰Philip J. Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying (London: Frank Cass 2004) p.197.

²¹CAB 81/130, JIC(45) 226 (Final), ‘Joint Intelligence Bureau’, 24 July 1945.

²²Strong, Intelligence at the Top, p.223.

²³Richard J. Aldrich, Espionage, Security, and Intelligence in Britain, 1945–1970 (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1998) p.87.

²⁴Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001) p.26.

²⁵National Archives of the United States (USNA), College Park, RG 139, Records of the Army Staff, Box 2143, ‘Origins and Functions of the Joint Intelligence Bureau’.

²⁶DEFE 11/349, Strong to Shinwell, 17 May 1950.

²⁷Strong, Intelligence at the Top, p.225.

²⁸AIR 75/92, ACAS(I) to John Slessor, 29 June 1945.

²⁹Strong, Intelligence at the Top, p.224; Michael Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age (London: Frank Cass 2002) p.191.

³⁰Richard J. Aldrich, Espionage, Security, and Intelligence in Britain, 1945–1970, p. 87.

³¹Strong, Intelligence at the Top, p.223.

³²See, for example, AIR 8/1953, S. O. Bufton to Permanent Secretary, CAS, 20 March 1961.

³³DEFE 5/6 COS(47) 231(0) ‘Review of Intelligence Organisations, 1947’, 8 November 1947.

³⁴Wesley K. Wark, The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence on Nazi Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986) p.163.

³⁵CAB 81/131, JIC(45) 181(0) (Final), ‘Post War Organisation of Intelligence’, 1 June 1945.

³⁶CAB 158/1, JIC(47)15(0), ‘The Collection of Scientific Intelligence’, 7 March 1947.

³⁷See Paul Maddrell, Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany 1945–1961 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006).

³⁸DEFE 60/145, ‘Soviet Airfields’, October 1950.

³⁹See for example, DEFE 10/319, SX/P (53)257, ‘Oil Bunkering’, 14 December 1953.

⁴⁰R.H. Mathams, Sub Rosa (London: Allan & Unwin 1982) p.60.

⁴¹See Abram Shulsky, Silent Warfare (New York: Brassey's 1991) p.33.

⁴²Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (New York: Doubleday & Company Ltd 1981) p.129.

⁴³See the DEFE 60 series, where files ranging from DEFE 60/8 ‘Yemen: Oil Storage and Distribution’ to DEFE 60/222 ‘Sweden: Airfields and Flying Boat Bases’ are stored.

⁴⁴Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age, p.84.

⁴⁵See, for example, Christopher Andrew, Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane 2009) pp.369–73.

⁴⁶An exception is Christopher Andrew, ‘The Growth of the Australian Intelligence Community and the Anglo-American Connection’, Intelligence and National Security 4/2 (1989) p.236.

⁴⁷CAB 81/131, JIC(45) 265, ‘Post-War Organisation of Intelligence’, 7 September 1945.

⁴⁸CAB 81/94, JIC(46) 2^nd Meeting (0), 9 January 1946.

⁴⁹CAB 81/93, JIC(45) 76^th Meeting (0), 14 November 1945.

⁵⁰CAB 81/132, JIC(46) 26, ‘Joint Intelligence Bureau – Australia’, 18 March 1946.

⁵¹Andrew, ‘The Growth of the Australian Intelligence Community and the Anglo-American Connection’ p.226.

⁵²CAB 81/93, JIC(45) 72^nd Meeting (0), 23 October 1945.

⁵³Wesley K. Wark, ‘The Evolution of Military Intelligence in Canada’, Armed Forces and Society 16/1 (1989) pp.87–8.

⁵⁴CAB 81/93, JIC(45) 82^nd Meeting (0), 12 December 1945.

⁵⁵Wark, ‘The Evolution of Military Intelligence in Canada’, p.90.

⁵⁶USNA, RG319, Box 2143, ‘Organization and Function of Joint Intelligence Bureau, London’, 30 August 1949.

⁵⁷Mathams, Sub Rosa, p.29.

⁵⁸USNA, RG 139, Records of the Army Staff, Box 2143, ‘Items of Economic and Topographical Intelligence from Canadian Sources – Joint Intelligence Bureau, Ottawa’, May and November 1950.

⁵⁹The National Archives of Australia's catalogue contains reference to JIB London Digests, reports, and summaries dating from 1954–58, among many others. See <http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/explore/security/index.aspx> (accessed 8 November 2011). See for example, DEFE 60/145, ‘Soviet Airfields’, October 1951.

⁶⁰Mathams, Sub Rosa, p.48.

⁶¹Ibid., p.49.

⁶²Ibid., pp.29–33.

⁶³Ibid., p.48.

⁶⁴Jeffery T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties that Bind (London: Allen & Unwin 1985) p.37.

⁶⁵Mathams, Sub Rosa, p.60.

⁶⁶AIR 40/2775, ‘Air Intelligence Review’, (1) 11, November 1961.

⁶⁷CAB 159/31, JIC (59) 35^th meeting, ‘Confidential Annex’, 21 May 1959.

⁶⁸AIR 40/2775, ‘Air Intelligence Review’, 1/11, November 1961.

⁶⁹CAB 182/12, JIC (MT) (63) 5^th Meeting, 31 July 1963. This is not the sole example of a British intelligence paper dealing with Chinese missiles being altered or delayed pending input from the Australians. A further example can be found regarding the JIC's appreciation of the Chinese threat early in 1964. See CAB 182/13, JIC (MT) (64) 1^st Meeting, 9 January 1964.

⁷⁰CAB 158/51, JIC (64) 2 (Final), ‘China and Associated Countries – War Potential, 1964–1968’, 3 June 1964.

⁷¹CAB 182/21 JIC (MT) (WP) (64) 4^th Meeting, 12 February 1964.

⁷²Research and development on another Chinese missile, the D-1, which was similar to the Soviet R-12 began in 1960. This missile was designed to deliver a payload of 1500 kg some 1080 miles. Whether or not, or when, this missile was deployed is unclear. Wilson and Di note that it was modified in 1964 to increase its range but that its development was beset by problems. See John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, ‘China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies Strategies, Goals’, International Security 17/2 (1992) pp.5–40, specifically p.14. See also Federation of American Scientists: <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/index.html>.

⁷³Thomas F. Troy, ‘The “Correct” Definition of Intelligence’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5/4 (1991) p.448.

⁷⁴Strong, Intelligence at The Top, p.224.

⁷⁵USNA RG 319-Box 2143, ‘Egypt: Ports and Coast’, 1 May 1949.

⁷⁶See US TNA, RG 319, Box 440, ‘The Russian Transport System and its Weaknesses’, 31 March 1947; ‘The Soviet Controlled Baltic Ports’, 11 July 1947; RG 319, Box 437, ‘Map of the Railways of China’, 1 August 1947.

⁷⁷US TNA, Box 440, RG 319, ‘Appraisal Maps of the USSR’, March, 1948; for ‘GX’ material see Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: John Murray 2001), p.220.

⁷⁸Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p.213.

⁷⁹AIR 40/2547, Fawssett to Bufton, Annex N, SI No.1, 14 February 1952.

⁸⁰CAB 159/7, JIC (50) 6^th Meeting, 13 January 1950.

⁸¹AIR 40/2547, TAB/9/5, 5^th Meeting of Committee for the Strategic Targets Programme, 16 April 1953.

⁸²See Donald Cameron Watt, ‘British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe’ in Ernest R. May (ed.) Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessments Before the Two World Wars (Guildford: Princeton University Press 1984) p.244; Wark, The Ultimate Enemy, p.159;

⁸³FO 371-77639, Letter from G.W. Harrison to Sir David Kelly, 21 November 1949.

⁸⁴See CAB 134-144, DTC (EW) (48) 6, ‘The Scope of Future Economic Warfare’, 10 August 1948.

⁸⁵CAB 134/146, DTC (EW)(WP) (51)13, ‘Chapter 8: Action by Government Departments During the Precautionary Stage – First Draft’, 15 November 1951.

⁸⁶For CoCom see Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1992).

⁸⁷BT 268/58, Letter from C.H. Baylis to Miss G. Rolleston, 14 November 1953; DEFE 10/319, SX/P (53)225, ‘Rubber Exports to Soviet Bloc Countries from UK Controlled Sources’, 14 October, 1953.

⁸⁸CAB 158/12, JIC (51)10 (Terms of Reference), ‘Vulnerability of China’, 24 January 1951.

⁸⁹CAB 158/12, Telegram from British Embassy Tokyo to London. 18 January 1951.

⁹⁰DEFE 5/31, COS (51)355, ‘Naval Blockade of China’, 8 June 1951.

⁹¹CAB 158/12, JIC (51)10, ‘Vulnerability of China’, 3 March 1951.

⁹²DEFE 5/31, COS (51) 355, ‘Naval Blockade of China’, 8 June 1951.

⁹³CAB 21/3271, COS (51)420, ‘Naval Blockade of China’, 18 July 1951.

⁹⁴CAB 21/3271, FE (0) (51) 31 (Revise), ‘Report of the Working Party on Additional Economic Measures Against China’, 11 December 1951.

⁹⁵It appears that the American defence/intelligence community were also at odds over the question of the potential utility of a blockade. It seems the CIA agreed with the JIB in this case; indeed, they discussed the issue in 1951 and concluded the US Navy was incorrect. AIR 75/58, Slessor to Strausz-Hupe (undated).

⁹⁶See for example US TNA, RG 319, Box 441, ‘The Soviet Coal Supply’, 3 May 1949; US TNA, RG 319, Box 441, ‘Tractor Industry in the USSR’, 1 January 1950; CAB 158-34, JIC (58) 110(Final), ‘The Impact of Khrushchev on the Soviet Economy’, 19 November 1958.

⁹⁷CAB 158-34, JIC (58) 100 (Final), ‘Egypt: The Economic Situation’, 9 October 1958.