Intelligence Accountability and the Role of Public Interest Groups in the United States

Abstract

This article explores the role of US public interest groups in the promotion of government transparency, as part of a broader agenda on civil liberties. Drawing on a set of declassified documents, and extensive oral testimony from protagonists, it is argued that such groups occupy a significant position as facilitators of intelligence accountability in the United States. Public interest groups represent a tradition of pluralism that lies at the heart of the American conception of democracy. A survey of the tactics deployed by interest groups to support liberal democratic principles demonstrates that these groups always rely on government institutions to carry out their oversight function. By virtue of this, public interest groups support intelligence accountability rather than hold to account the US government and its intelligence agencies.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Alastair Finlan, Claudia Hillebrand, Gerry Hughes and Sonja Kittelsen for providing useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also wish to express my appreciation to all the inspiring individuals who accepted to meet with me and share their knowledge about the practice and the theory of intelligence accountability during my field research in the United States. This field research was made possible thanks to funding from the Caroline Adams Travel Bursary.

Notes

¹ See, for example, Hans Born, Loch Johnson and Ian Leigh, Who's Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability (Washington, DC: Potomac 2005); Björn Müller-Wille, ‘Intelligence and Democratic Accountability: A Blessing, Not a Curse’, European Security 15/4 (2006) pp.491–506; Marina Caparini and Hans Born, Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants (Aldershot: Ashgate 2007); Loch K. Johnson (ed.), Strategic Intelligence Volume 5. Intelligence and Accountability: Safeguards Against the Abuse of Secret Power (Westport, CT; London: Praeger Security International 2007); Peter Gill, ‘Security Intelligence and Human Rights: “Illuminating the Heart of Darkness”?’, Intelligence and National Security 24/1 (2009) pp.78–102; Jennifer Kibbe, ‘Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Is the Solution Part of the Problem?’, Intelligence and National Security 25/1 (2010) pp.24–49.

² This approach arguably follows Neustadt's famous characterization of the American institutional system of ‘separated institutions, sharing powers’. See Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: Free Press 1990) p.29. For examples of institutional approaches to intelligence accountability, see Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation (Lexington, KS: The University Press of Kentucky 1985); Marshall Silverberg, ‘The Separation of Powers and Control of the CIA's Covert Operations’, Texas Law Review 68/3 (1990) pp.575–622; Frederick F. Manget, ‘Intelligence and the Rise of Judicial Intervention: Another System of Oversight’, Studies in Intelligence 39/5 (1996) pp.43–50; Frederick M. Kaiser, ‘GAO Versus the CIA: Uphill Battles Against an Overpowering Force’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 15/3 (2002) pp.330–89; Loch K. Johnson, ‘The Contemporary Presidency: Presidents, Lawmakers, and Spies: Intelligence Accountability in the United States’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 34/4 (2004) pp.828–37; Hans Born and Ian Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies (Oslo: Publishing House of the Parliament of Norway 2005).

³ For some recent articles on the congressional oversight of intelligence in the United States, see Marvin C. Ott, ‘Partisanship and the Decline of Intelligence Oversight’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 16/1 (2003) pp.69–94; Anthony Glees and Philip H.J. Davies, ‘Intelligence, Iraq and the Limits of Legislative Accountability during Political Crisis’, Intelligence and National Security 21/5 (2006) pp.848–83; Matthew B. Walker, ‘Reforming Congressional Oversight of U.S. Intelligence’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 19/4 (2006) pp.702–20; Frederick A.O. Schwarz Jr, ‘The Church Committee and a New Era of Intelligence Oversight’, Intelligence and National Security 22/2 (2007) pp.270–97; Loch K. Johnson, ‘The Church Committee Investigation of 1975 and the Evolution of Modern Intelligence Accountability’, Intelligence and National Security 23/2 (2008) pp.198–225; Heidi Kitrosser, ‘Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving Information Funnels’, Cardozo Law Review 29/3 (2008) pp.1049–90; Amy B. Zegart, ‘The Domestic Politics of Irrational Intelligence Oversight’, Political Science Quarterly 126/1 (2011) pp.1–25.

⁴ Russell A. Miller (ed.), US National Security, Intelligence and Democracy: From the Church Committee to the War on Terror (London; New York: Routledge 2008). Parliamentary bodies also provide a basis for intelligence accountability in most other liberal democracies. See, for example, Judith K. Boyd, ‘Improving U.S. Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Services: A Comparative Approach’, American Intelligence Journal 28/1 (2010) pp.29–39.

⁵ For the most recent evidence, see Amy Zegart and Julie Quinn, ‘Congressional Intelligence Oversight: The Electoral Disconnection’, Intelligence and National Security 25/6 (2010) pp.744–66.

⁶ For example, see Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, US Department of Justice, Memo 14, ‘Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C.§§2340-2340A’, prepared for Alberto R. Gonzales, 1 August 2002, in Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (eds.), The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005) p.207. See also: Loch K. Johnson, ‘Accountability and America's Secret Foreign Policy: Keeping a Legislative Eye on the Central Intelligence Agency’, Foreign Policy Analysis 1/1 (2005) pp.113–4; Frederick A.O. Schwarz and Aziz Z. Huq, Unchecked an Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of Terror (New York: The New Press 2008).

⁷ Louis Fisher, ‘Rethinking the State Secrets Privilege’ in Loch K. Johnson (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press 2010) pp.657, 670; Michael J. Greenlee, ‘National Security Letters and Intelligence Oversight’ in Russell A. Miller (ed.) US National Security, Intelligence and Democracy: From the Church Committee to the War on Terror (London; New York: Routledge 2008) p.196; Samuel Issacharoff, ‘Political Safeguards in Democracies at War’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29/2 (2009) p.213. For evidence to the contrary, see Manget, ‘Intelligence and the Rise of Judicial Intervention’, pp.43–50.

⁸ Marina Caparini, ‘Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Agencies in Democratic States’ in Marina Caparini and Hans Born (eds.) Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants (Aldershot: Ashgate 2007) p.24 (arguing that civil society and the media provide ‘informal’ oversight functions).

⁹ Richard Aldrich, ‘Regulation by Revelation? Intelligence, Transparency and the Media’ in Robert Dover and Michael Goodman (eds.) Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs the Media, Why the Media Needs Intelligence (New York: Columbia University Press 2009) pp.13–36; Loch K. Johnson, ‘A Shock Theory of Congressional Accountability for Intelligence’ in Loch K. Johnson (ed.) Handbook of Intelligence Studies (London and New York: Routledge 2009) pp.344–5.

¹⁰ Seymour Hersh, ‘Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years’, The New York Times, 22 December 1974, A1.

¹¹ See for example the work of Walter Pincus at The Washington Post and James Risen at The New York Times.

¹² For a similar point, see Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence. From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press 2006) p.216.

¹³ Some authors mention their role, see, for example, Caparini, ‘Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Agencies’, pp.12, 24–5; Zegart, ‘The Domestic Politics of Irrational Intelligence Oversight’, pp.7, 11–12 (referring to the weakness of interest groups in this area). Mentions can also be found in law journals, see, for example, Tara M. Sugiyama and Marisa Perry, ‘The NSA Domestic Surveillance Program: An Analysis of Congressional Oversight During an Era of One-Party-Rule’, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 40/1 (2006) pp.177–81; Kathleen Clark, ‘The Architecture of Accountability: A Case Study of the Warrantless Surveillance Program’, Brigham Young University Law Review 2 (2010) pp.357–8. For the political science literature on interest groups, see, for example, William C. Mitchell and Michael C. Munger, ‘Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey’, American Journal of Political Science 35/2 (1991) pp.512–46.

¹⁴ Morris S. Ogul, Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy: Studies in Legislative Supervision (Pittsburgh, PN: University of Pittsburgh Press 1976) p.7 (arguing that ‘how oversight is defined affects what oversight one finds’). For example, a focus on congressional oversight alone may shed light on the reactive nature of intelligence accountability (the so-called fire alarm model). While that finding is sound, considering other actors and activities may generate different findings. Johnson, ‘Accountability and America's Secret Foreign Policy’, pp.99–120. For the original distinction between the fire alarm and police patrols, see Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, ‘Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms’, American Journal of Political Science 28/1 (1984) pp.165–79.

¹⁵ Philip Zelikow et al. (eds.), The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton 2004) p.103; Zegart, ‘The Domestic Politics of Irrational Intelligence Oversight’, pp.5, 8.

¹⁶ Zegart, ‘The Domestic Politics of Irrational Intelligence Oversight’, p.5.

¹⁷ David Knoke, ‘Associations and Interest Groups’, Annual Review of Sociology 12 (1986) p.17.

¹⁸ For example the digital library proposed by the National Security Archives at George Washington University and the library of governmental resources provided by the project on government secrecy at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). Such resources are regularly found in the footnotes of academic journal articles. See, for example, Richard J. Aldrich, ‘A Profoundly Disruptive Force: The CIA, Historiography and the Perils of Globalization’, Intelligence and National Security 26/2–3 (2011) pp.150, 158; Gary Kern, ‘Torture and Intelligence in the Global War on Terror’, Intelligence and National Security 24/3 (2009) pp.445, 447–8; Stafford T. Thomas, ‘The CIA's Bureaucratic Dimensions’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 12/4 (1999) p.413.

¹⁹ The logic of selection for the sample of interest groups is discriminative. The article intends to provide a reasonably large coverage of those groups whose activities contribute significantly to intelligence accountability. The absence of a strictly representative set weakens the external validity of the argument but does not contradict the explorative nature of this article. A list of groups pursuing government transparency can be accessed on the following website: < http://www.openthegovernment.org> (accessed 28 August 2011).

²⁰ Bovens defines accountability as a social relation between an accountability holder and an accountability holdee. See Mark Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework’, European Law Journal 13/4 (2007) pp.450–2. For a similar approach see Thorsten Wetzling, ‘The Democratic Control of Intergovernmental Intelligence Cooperation’, DCAF working paper No.165, May 2006.

²¹ US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), ‘The Declaration of Independence: A Transcription’ < http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html> (accessed 28 August 2011).

²² For a good summary of this dilemma, see Jeffrey M. Berry and Clyde Wilcox, The Interest Group Society (New York: Pearson Longman 2007) pp.1–13.

²³ From the early days of the American Republic onwards, political thinkers regularly emphasized the abundance of organized interests characterizing the American political culture. For an early account, see Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Doubleday 1969) pp.192–3. The proponents of pluralism writing in the 1950s and 1960s are also of notable interest. See Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1961); David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf 1951). For a more recent defence of pluralism, see Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political theory (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1980).

²⁴ Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1966) pp.6–7.

²⁵ Élisabeth Zoller, Introduction au Droit Public (Paris: Dalloz 2006) p.128.

²⁶ In the words of James Madison: ‘If men were angels, no government would be necessary’. See James Madison, ‘The Federalist (51)’ in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008) p.257.

²⁷ Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability’, p.451.

²⁸ In this article, public interest groups refer to interest groups supporting individual liberty, political freedom and government transparency.

²⁹ During the Palmer raids and the climate of red scare in the 1920s, the ACLU was a vocal critique of the intrusive activities of the General Intelligence Division, a division of the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation led by the young Hoover. For more on this period see Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The FBI: A History (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press 2007) pp.68–80, 120–3. From the 1920s onwards, the ACLU's activism against the FBI's surveillance activities granted it specific attention from the FBI. On the history of the ACLU see Samuel Walker, In Defense of American Liberties: A History of the ACLU (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990).

³⁰ Knoke, ‘Associations and Interest Groups’, p.16.

³¹ For example, the victory of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured people in the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the 1965 Voting Rights Act are often considered as key achievements of the civil rights movement. See Dennis Chong, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 1991) p.193; James T. Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press 2001); Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, ‘The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past’, The Journal Of American History 91/4 (2005) p.1234. Interestingly, these three achievements constitute institutional recognitions of some of the values defended by the civil rights movements.

³² See the table by Frank. R. Baumgartner, ‘The Growth and Diversity of U.S. Association: 1956–2004. Analyzing Trends Using the Encyclopaedia of Associations’, Working Paper, 29 March 2005, in Jeffrey M. Berry and Clyde Wilcox, The Interest Group Society (New York: Pearson Longman 2007) p.17; Thomas L. Gais, Mark A. Peterson and Jack L. Walker, ‘Interest Groups, Iron Triangles and Representative Institutions in American National Government’, British Journal of Political Science 14/2 (1984) pp.166–8.

³³ The US Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (often called the Church committee) was chaired by Democratic Senator Frank Church of Idaho and released some 14 reports between 1975 and 1976. From 1975 to 1977, the House of Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence (often called by the name of its chair, Democratic Representative Otis Pike of New York) investigated illegal activities by the CIA and the FBI. The US President's Commission on CIA activities within the United States (often called by the name of its chair, Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller) issued its report in 1975.

³⁴ Project on National Security and Civil Liberties, First Principles 1/1 (1974); Center for National Security Studies, Intelligence Report 1/1 (1975); Covert Action Publications, Covert Action Information Bulletin 1/1 (1978) [which adopted an extremely adversarial approach by tracking and naming CIA officers under diplomatic cover]; Dr Loch K. Johnson, interview with author, Athens, GA, 11 July 2011. Dr Johnson was Special Assistant to the Chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Oversight from 1975 to 1976 and served as Staff Director of the House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight from 1977 to 1979.

³⁵ Walker, In Defense of American Liberties, p.296.

³⁶ Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, ‘Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence’, 1 March 1996, p.96. See also Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Perennial 1995) pp.540–1.

³⁷ Ott, ‘Partisanship and the Decline of Intelligence Oversight’, pp.69–94; Zegart and Quinn, ‘Congressional Intelligence Oversight’, pp.744–66; Loch K. Johnson, ‘Establishment of Modern Intelligence Accountability’ in Russell A. Miller (ed.) US National Security, Intelligence and Democracy: From the Church Committee to the War on Terror (London; New York: Routledge 2008), pp.47–51; Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, ‘Preparing for the 21st Century’, pp.139–45; Zelikow et. al., The 9/11 Commission Report, pp.419–21; Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, ‘Report to the President of the United States’, 31 March 2005, p.20.

³⁸ In most of these groups, only a small part of the staff works on matters involving national security intelligence. The financial sustainability of these groups is usually guaranteed by grants provided by foundations and donations. None of these groups accept government funding, which allows them to guarantee an independence from the government and credibility.

³⁹ United States House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform, Minority Staff Special Investigations Division, ‘Secrecy in the Bush Administration’, 14 September 2004 (concluding that ‘the Bush Administration has systematically sought to limit disclosure of government records while expanding its authority to operate in secret’). For President Obama's position, see Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, 29 December 2009 (permitting retroactive classification).

⁴⁰ On the difficulties encountered by Congress, see for example, Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism, Freedom and Security: Winning without War (London: The MIT Press 2003) pp.155–6 (pointing out that Congress faced recurring obstruction from the administration to provide documents or make witnesses available during the 9/11 Commission inquiry). On the difficulties encountered by the judiciary branch see Amanda Frost, ‘The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers’, Fordham Law Review 75/4 (2007) pp.1931–64 (arguing that the executive's use of the privilege in the Global War on Terrorism disrupts the traditional constitutional collaboration between the executive and judiciary branches); Meredith Fuchs, ‘Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy’, Administrative Law Review 58/1 (2006) pp.133–6 (detailing the rise of classification since 9/11, the creation of new categories of secret information, the use of state secrets privilege by the government).

⁴¹ The project, which started in 1991, aims to challenge excessive government secrecy and to promote public oversight. It is part of the FAS, an organization founded in 1945 which describes itself as ‘an independent, nonpartisan think tank and membership organization is dedicated to providing rigorous, objective, evidence-based analysis and practical policy recommendations on national and international security issues connected to applied science and technology’. FAS, ‘About FAS’ < http://www.fas.org/about/index.html> (accessed 19 July 2011). Currently, a single individual runs the project: Steven Aftergood.

⁴² POGO was founded in 1981, and describes itself as ‘a nonpartisan independent watchdog that champions good government reforms’. The project puts a particular emphasis on its investigations into corruption, misconduct, and conflicts of interest in order to ‘achieve a more effective, accountable, open, and ethical federal government’. POGO website, ‘Mission Statement’ < http://www.pogo.org/about/mission-statement.html> (accessed 19 July 2011). The project counts 13 board members and 21 staff members. Project on Government Oversight, ‘Board & Staff’ < http://www.pogo.org/about/board-staff.html> (accessed 19 July 2011).

⁴³ The ACLU was founded in 1918. Currently, at least two of its programmes directly target national security intelligence: the National Security Program, and the Technology and Liberty Program. ACLU, ‘Key Issues’ < http://www.aclu.org/key-issues> (accessed 28 August 2011).

⁴⁴ The Way Back Machine < http://wayback.archive.org/web/> (accessed 28 August 2011); Steven Aftergood (FAS), interview with author, Washington, DC, 20 June 2011.

⁴⁵ See, for example, the document vault on the following websites: James Madison Project, ‘Document Vault’ < http://www.jamesmadisonproject.org/documents.php> (accessed 20 August 2011); The National Security Archives < http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/> (accessed 20 August 2011).

⁴⁶ See for example the website of the project on government secrecy: ‘Congressional Services Reports’ < http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/index.html> (accessed 29 August 2011).

⁴⁷ The Project on Government Secrecy < http://www.fas.org/sgp/> (accessed 20 July 2011).

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ The Project on Government Secrecy < http://www.fas.org/sgp/foia/victory.html> (accessed 20 July 2011).

⁵⁰ See the partial transcript of an interview Patrick Keefe conducted with Steven Aftergood in Patrick Radden Keefe, Chatter: Uncovering the Echelon Surveillance Network and the Secret World of Global Eavesdropping (New York: Random House 2006) p.91. See also Steven Aftergood, ‘Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works’, Yale Law & Policy Review 27/2 (2009) p.404 (detailing what he considers as genuine national security secrecy).

⁵¹ Steven Aftergood (FAS), email correspondence with the author, 31 July 2011. Mr Aftergood estimates that approximately 20% of the subscribers to his secrecy newsletter are from government and military, 20% are media, 20% are non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the rest are miscellaneous or unidentified.

⁵² For an example of education on best practice for whistleblowers: POGO, Government Accountability Project and Public Employees Environmental Responsibility, The Art of Anonymous Activism: Serving the Public While Surviving Public Service (private publication, undated).

⁵³ However, in some cases whistleblowers may be biased, for example because of some forms of disgruntlement.

⁵⁴ Thomas Drake was indicted on counts of unlawful retention of classified information, obstruction to justice and making false statements. For more on this case, see Jane Mayer, ‘The Secret Sharer: Is Thomas Drake an Enemy of the State?’, The New Yorker, 23 May 2011, pp.46–57. The original indictment is available on the following website: FAS < http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2010/04/drake-indict.pdf> (accessed 30 August 2011).

⁵⁵ Danielle Brian, ‘Open Government Advocates Meet with POTUS: A Firsthand Account’, 31 March 2011 < http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2011/03/open-government-advocates-meet-with-potus-a-firsthand-account.html> (accessed 28 August 2011).

⁵⁶ Thomas Drake agreed to plead guilty to a misdemeanour charge of ‘exceeding authorized use of a computer’. Steven Aftergood, ‘Settlement Reached in Thomas Drake “Leak” Case’, Secrecy News, 10 June 2011 < http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2011/06/drake_settlement.html> (accessed 11 July 2011).

⁵⁷ For example, see the following website: Jesselyn Radack, ‘Why Thomas Drake is Not an Enemy of the State’, The Huffington Post, 19 May 2011 < http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jesselyn-radack/why-thomas-drake-is-not-a_b_864322.html> (accessed 10 June 2011). For more information on GAP's activities in this case see the following website: GAP < http://www.whistleblower.org> (accessed 20 August 2011).

⁵⁸ GAP, ‘Over 4,100 Citizens Stand Up for Tom Drake’, 7 June 2011, < http://www.whistleblower.org/blog/31-2010/1154-over-4100-citizens-stand-up-for-tom-drake> (accessed 2 September 2011).

⁵⁹ Judge Richard D. Bennett accepted an amicus curiae brief field by GAP on behalf of Mr Drake. The brief can be accessed on the website of FAS: < http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/drake/032911-amicus.pdf> (accessed 1 September 2011).

⁶⁰ Jesselyn Radack (GAP), email correspondence with author, 31 August 2011.

⁶¹ It remains for everyone to judge whether the information Mr Drake furnished to the press (most likely, The Baltimore Sun's journalist Siobhan Gorman) constituted a useful contribution to government transparency.

⁶² POGO, ‘Tell Your Members of Congress about POGO's Reform Agenda’ < https://secure3.convio.net/pogo/site/Advocacy?cmd = display&page = UserAction&id = 151> (accessed 29 August 2011).

⁶³ For example, Steven Aftergood and Danielle Brian's (Director of POGO) positions on the Drake case were mentioned in the following articles: Scott Shane, ‘Complaint Seeks Punishment for Classification of Documents’, The New York Times, 1 August 2011, A16; R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘Classified Pentagon Report Upholds Thomas Drake's Complaints about NSA’, The Washington Post, 23 June 2011, A7. For an example of op-ed written by the director of the National Security Archives, see Thomas Blanton, ‘Seeking Secrecy Where There Was Sunshine’, The Washington Post, 19 July 2000, A23.

⁶⁴ POGO, ‘Government Accountability Advocates Convene to Honor Tom Drake’, 9 August 2011 < http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2011/08/government-accountability-advocates-convene-to-honor-tom-drake.html> (accessed 30 August 2011).

⁶⁵ Jewel v. NSA, United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Case No.08-4373 VRW < https://www.eff.org/cases/jewel> (accessed 28 August 2011) [the case is currently in appeal]; Hepting v. AT&T, United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Case No.06-1791 VRW < https://www.eff.org/cases/hepting> (accessed 28 August 2011); Shubert et al. v. Bush et al, United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Case No.07-069 < https://www.eff.org/cases/shubert-v-bush> (accessed 28 August 2011) [the case is currently in appeal]. The cases were originally dismissed when the government invoked state secrets privilege.

⁶⁶ The Torture Report, ‘About The Torture Report’ < http://www.thetorturereport.org/node/8> (accessed 9 November 2011).

⁶⁷ Aftergood, interview with author; Scott Amey (POGO), interview with author, 26 July 2011, Washington, DC; Nick Schwellenbach (POGO), interview with author, 30 June 2011, Washington, DC; Patrick Eddington (staffer for Rep. Rush Dew Holt), interview with author, 8 August 2011, Washington, DC. Representative Rush Dew Holt (NJ, D.) was member of the House Permanent Select Committee on intelligence during the 108th, 109th and 110th Congress. During the 110th Congress, he was Vice Chair of the Subcommittee on Intelligence Community Management.

⁶⁸ Aftergood, interview with author; Amey, interview with author.

⁶⁹ Congressional staffer working on intelligence matters, interview with author, 10 June 2011, Washington, DC. In 2010, the Senate intelligence committee was composed of some 45 staff members. In the same year, these members were overseeing 16 agencies, a 100,000-employee workforce, and a National Intelligence Program budget of $53.1 billion. For the workforce figure, see the following website: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ‘Questions and Answers on the Intelligence Community Post 9/11’, p.4, < http://cdn.theatlantic.com/static/mt/assets/politics/question_and_answer_ic.pdf> (accessed 4 November 2011). For the budget figure, see Office of the director for National Intelligence, Public Affairs Office, ODNI News Release No.21-10, ‘DNI Releases Budget Figure for 2010 National Intelligence Program’, 28 October 2010. Congressional committees' composition and the salary of their staffers are available on the following website: ‘Displaying Salaries for Time Period: 04/01/10 – 09/30/10’ < http://www.legistorm.com/office/Senate_Select_Committee_on_Intelligence/687/72.html> (accessed 30 August 2011).

⁷⁰ Gais, Peterson and Walker, ‘Interest Groups, Iron Triangles and Representative Institutions’, p.173.

⁷¹ Aftergood, interview with author.

⁷² For an example of joint letter in support of whistleblowers' right, see the following website: POGO, ‘351 Organizations and Corporations Support Swift Action to Restore Strong, Comprehensive Whistleblower Rights’, Letter to President Obama and Members of Congress, 27 January 2010 < http://www.pogoarchives.org/m/wi/wpa-sign-on-ltr-20100127.pdf> (accessed 15 July 2011). The coalition openthegovernment.org also adopts similar tactics; see its website < http://www.openthegovernment.org/press_room/letters> (accessed 31 August 2011). Interestingly, the existence of a structure of cooperation (such as openthegovernment.org) shows how public interest groups can pull resources and tactics together to impact more heavily on the trade-off between security and liberal democratic values. Yet such cooperation should not eclipse the fact that public interest groups also compete for similar sources of funding.

⁷³ POGO, ‘Congressional Oversight Training Series’ < http://www.pogo.org/cots/> (accessed 1 August 2011).

⁷⁴ Eddington, interview with author.

⁷⁵ POGO, The Art of Congressional Oversight: A User's Guide to Doing it Right (Washington, DC: Project on Government Oversight 2009).

⁷⁶ Amey, interview with author; Jay Stanley (ACLU), interview with author, 21 June 2011, Washington, DC.

⁷⁷ See, for example, Thomas Blanton (National Security Archives), Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security Emerging Threats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, United States House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 2nd Session, 2 March 2005; Lisa Graves (ACLU), Testimony before the Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security Subcommittee, United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Congress, 2nd Session, 15 March 2005; Patrice McDermott (openthegovernment.org), Statement before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Finance, and Accountability, Committee on Government Reform, United States House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, 26 July 2006; Gary D. Bass (OMB Watch), Testimony before the Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and International Security Committee, United States Senate, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, 18 July, 2006; Nick Schwellenbach (POGO), Testimony before the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, US House of Representative, 110th Congress, 1st Session, 13 February 2007; Steven Aftergood (FAS), Statement before the Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence Community Management, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, ‘Oversight of National Security Classification Policy’, 110th Congress, 1st Session, 12 July 2007. All of these statements are available on the FAS Project on Government Secrecy website: < http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/> (accessed 12 July 2011).

⁷⁸ US Senate, Senate Report No.110-442, State Secrets Protection Act, 110th Congress, 2nd Session, 1 August 2008.

⁷⁹ Johnson, interview with author.

⁸⁰ See for example the quote of the late Rep. Steven Horn (CA, R.) available on the following website: POGO, ‘2001 Annual Report’, p.2 < http://www.pogoarchives.org/m/xp/xp-20anniv.pdf> (accessed 20 July 2011).

⁸¹ Aftergood, interview with author.

⁸² One may argue that some established groups have been institutionalized so much that it limits their repertoire of contention. Public interest groups' financial dependence on big foundations may have a similar effect. Public interest groups need to prove their impact, their value to their patrons, which may not always foster the most effective means to hold government to account.

⁸³ For example, former Rep. Randy ‘Duke’ Cunningham (CA, R.) accepted bribes from intelligence contractor (MZM Inc.) in order to earmark some contracts to the company. Randal C. Archibold, ‘Ex-Congressman Gets 8-Year Term in Bribery Case’, The New York Times, 4 March 2006, A1.

⁸⁴ Interestingly, the fire alarm/police patrol model does not take into account this role as a co-producer of oversight.

⁸⁵ Lee H. Hamilton, Statement before the Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Activities, US Senate, 110th Congress, 1st Session, 13 November 2007, p.11.

⁸⁶ Frederick M. Kaiser, ‘Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives’, Congressional Research Service, Report to Congress, 25 August 2010, p.2 (pointing out the existence of informal agreements between ‘Members and staff in Congress and officials and staff in the executive branch’); Loch K. Johnson, ‘Legislative Reform of Intelligence Policy’, Polity 17/3 (1985) p.562.

⁸⁷ One may argue that this is because intelligence studies does not pay attention to whistleblowers.

⁸⁸ For similar recommendations, see Richard Aldrich, ‘Beyond the Vigilant State: Globalisation and Intelligence’, Review of International Studies 35/4 (2009) pp.892, 894, 901–2 (referring to the role of a global and networked civil society, implementing a regulation by revelation); Hans Born, ‘International Intelligence Cooperation: The Need for Networking Accountability’, speaking notes, NATO Parliamentary Assembly Session at Reykjavik, 6 October 2007; Peter Gill, ‘Not Just Joining the Dots But Crossing the Borders and Bridging the Voids: Constructing Security Networks After 11 September 2001’, Policing and Society 16/1 (2006) pp.41–5; Glenn J. Voelz, Managing the Private Spies: The Use of Commercial Augmentation for Intelligence Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College 2007) p.63.