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Abstract
Counter-terrorism is a product of government, identifying as its target a kind of violence defined as terrorism. This article explores a particular moment in its development, as an intersection of international, national and bureaucratic responses to the Munich Olympics massacre of 1972. Australian understandings of the development of counter-terrorism have been dominated by a number of themes – principally by the Hilton Bombing of 1978 and the subsequent acceleration of security restructuring during the Fraser years, by the collapse of the Cold War focus of the security and intelligence agencies at the end of the 1980s and then by the ‘war on terror’ following 9/11 and the Bali bombing. Counter-terrorist planning was however an emerging business of government in the 1970s, in Australia as in its alliance partner the United States. While the Hope Royal Commission into intelligence agencies (1974–7) has dominated attention in later accounts of the development of counter-terrorism, a 1972 Interdepartmental Committee on Terrorism and Violence in Australia anticipated many of its concerns. In this developing concern with terrorism, the role and interest of the domestic intelligence agency (ASIO) at this time was limited. This paper contextualizes the Munich massacre as one of the factors shaping a rethinking of security and policing strategies in the early 1970s, a moment in the emergence of a modern government of terrorism.
Acknowledgements
Research for this article has been supported by the Australian Research Council (DP0771492) and the ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security. I am grateful to John Myrtle for his research assistance and to Kate O'Donnell and Roger Holditch for their comments.
Notes
1 Simon Reeve, One Day in September: The Full Story of the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and the Israeli Revenge Operation ‘Wrath of God’ (NY: Arcade Publishing 2011).
2 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (NY: Columbia University Press 2006) p.66; Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (NY: Random House 2006) pp.94–5.
3 Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law, Oxford Monographs in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006) pp.198–9; Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982) pp.105–8.
4 Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law, p.203 and generally; for conceptual and historical discussion of the term see Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, chap. 1. Hoffman defines terrorism as ‘the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change’ (p.40).
5 C. M. Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, Lane, Allen 2009), pp.612–4.
6 Eppie Briggs, The Munich Massacre: A New History, Honours thesis (University of Sydney, Department of History 2011) < http://hdl.handle.net/2123/7980>; Tim Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (NY: Basic Books 2006) pp.54–77.
7The Australian, 7 September 1972, p.8.
8 Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law, p.217.
9 Jenny Hocking, Beyond Terrorism: The Development of the Australian Security State (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin 1993); Jenny Hocking, Terror Laws: ASIO, Counter-terrorism and the Threat to Democracy (Sydney: UNSW Press 2004).
10 Andrew O'Neil, ‘Degrading and Managing Risk: Assessing Australia's Counter-terrorist Strategy’, Australian Journal of Political Science 42/3 (2007) pp.471–87.
11 Mark Aarons, War Criminals Welcome: Australia, a Sanctuary for Fugitive War Criminals Since 1945 (Melbourne: Black Inc. 2001); Frank Cain, The Origins of Political Surveillance in Australia (Sydney: Angus & Robertson 1983); Frank Cain, Terrorism & Intelligence in Australia: A History of ASIO & National Surveillance (North Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing 2008); David McKnight, Australia's Spies and their Secrets (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin 1994).
12 Phillip Deery, ‘“Dear Mr. Brown”: Migrants, Security and the Cold War’, History Australia 2/2 (2005) pp.1–12; Phillip Deery, ‘A Double Agent Down Under: Australian Security and the Infiltration of the Left’, Intelligence and National Security 22/3 (2007) pp.346–66.
13 Desmond Ball and D. M. Horner, Breaking the Codes: Australia's KGB Network 1944–1950 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin 1998); David McKnight, ‘Partisan Improprieties: Ministerial Control and Australia's Security Agencies, 1962–72’, Intelligence and National Security 23/5 (2008) p.707 doi:10.1080/02684520802449518; David McKnight, ‘Rethinking Cold War History’, Labour History 95 (2008) pp.185–96. The weakening of the bonds of Cold War historiography is likely to be accelerated by the production of the ‘official’ ASIO history (in progress under the direction of Professor David Horner, ANU), with the first volume planned for publication in 2014.
14 The Royal Commission on Intelligence and National Security (Commissioner Justice Robert Marsden Hope) was appointed by the Whitlam Labor government in August 1974 to report on the history, governance, practices and future of the intelligence and security agencies. Its reports (1974–7) were published only in part at the time, but were released in large part in 2008: for a detailed overview and guide to the reports and associated records see National Archives of Australia, ‘Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security – Fact Sheet 262’ (accessed 13 March 2012) < http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/fact-sheets/fs262.aspx>
15 Naftali, Blind Spot, pp.23–40 and passim.
16 Aarons, War Criminals Welcome, pp.423–34; McKnight, Australia's Spies and their Secrets, pp.171–81, 250–57. For the Labor opposition's criticism see Jenny Hocking, Lionel Murphy: A Political Biography (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press 1997) pp.145–6.
17 Bowen (Foreign Affairs) to Greenwood (Attorney-General), 20 September 1972, ‘Interdepartmental Committee on Terrorism, Violence in Australia’, National Archives of Australia (NAA), A432 (A432/21), 1972/7013.
18 Naftali, Blind Spot, p.55.
19 The other members included the Secretaries of Defence, Transportation, Treasury, the Attorney-General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the US Ambassador to the UN, the Director of the FBI and the Assistants to the President for National Security (Kissinger) and Domestic Affairs (Erlichman): see Nixon to Rogers, 25 September 1972, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. 1 (FRUS): Doc 110 < http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d110>
20 See Briggs, ‘The Munich Massacre’. For the extraordinary machinations of the White House working covertly against the State Department's promotion of a Middle East settlement see Salim Yaqub, ‘The Politics of Stalemate: The Nixon Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969–73’, in Nigel J. Ashton (ed.) The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers 1967–73 (London: Routledge, 2007) pp.35–58.
21 Savingram from the Australian Embassy, Washington to the Department of Foreign Affairs, 16 October 1972: United States: The Campaign against Terrorism, ‘Interdepartmental Committee on Terrorism, Violence in Australia’, NAA A432 (A432/21), 1972/7013.
22 Hoskinsson to Kissinger, 6 September 1972, FRUS, Doc 92 < http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d92>
23 Conversation of Nixon, Kissinger and Haldeman (White House Tapes), 6 September 1972, FRUS, Doc 95 < http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d95>
24 Savingram, NAA A432 (A432/21), 1972/7013 (n. 18 above).
25 Cablegram (Plimsoll) to Foreign Affairs, 6 September 1972, ‘Terrorist Attack on Israeli Athletes Competing at the Olympic Games, Munich 1972’, NAA A1209, 1972/6887.
26 See especially Bunting (Prime Minister & Cabinet), 9 September and Waller (Foreign Affairs) 11 September: ‘Terrorist Attack on Israeli Athletes Competing at the Olympic Games, Munich 1972’, NAA A1209, 1972/6887.
27 See The Australian, 19 September 1972, 20 September 1972, for cartoons ridiculing the Attorney-General and reports of divisions between ministers over response to political violence.
28 Aarons, War Criminals Welcome, p.428. McMahon's annotations (29 September) on a draft Cabinet submission from Attorney-General's Department show that he emphatically disagreed with the arguments against appointing a Royal Commission, but agreed that the submission itself be listed for Cabinet discussion: ‘Notes on Submission, Terrorism and Violence in Australia’ (p. 35) NAA, A5882, CO1528.
29 Bunting file note, 18 September 1972, ‘Terrorism and Violence in Australia’ (Cabinet file re decision 1406, 10 October 1972, including Submission 896) NAA A5882 (A5882/2), CO1528. Although there was a Commonwealth Police Force its jurisdiction was limited to federal territories and to matters affected by Commonwealth criminal and other laws.
30 The Convention was ratified by the Commonwealth Parliament in one of the last legislative acts of the McMahon government, the Crimes (Hijacking of Aircraft) Act 1972, which entered into force in Australia on 9 December, a week after the election of the Whitlam Labor government.
31 All material quoted in these two paragraphs: Bowen to Greenwood, 20 September 1972, ‘Interdepartmental Committee on Terrorism, Violence in Australia’, National Archives of Australia (NAA), A432 (A432/21), 1972/7013.
32 David Mackenzie, ICAO: A History of the International Civil Aviation Organization (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).
33 Cabinet submission (Greenwood), 10 October 1972, ‘Terrorism and Violence in Australia - Decision 1406’ NAA A5908 (A5908/1), 896. The Green Bans were instituted to stop destruction of urban heritage and housing in inner-city Sydney, an early and popular campaign supporting environmental amenity of the city.
34 The foreign intelligence was the reason for the classification of the submission as ‘Secret’, a decision taken by the head of Attorney-General's: see Harders to Bunting, 29 September 1971 (p.48) ‘Terrorism and Violence in Australia’, NAA A5882 (A5882/2), CO1528.
35 Cabinet submission (Greenwood), 10 October 1972, ‘Terrorism and Violence in Australia - Decision 1406’ NAA A5908 (A5908/1), 896.
36 Ibid.
37 McMahon notes on submission, 29 September 1972, ‘Terrorism and Violence in Australia’, NAA A5882 (A5882/2), CO1528.
38 ‘Notes on Cabinet Submission no 896’, PM & C, 10 October 1972, ‘Terrorism and Violence in Australia’, NAA A5882 (A5882/2), CO1528.
39 Minutes of 2nd Meeting, 30 October 1972, ‘Interdepartmental Committee on Terrorism, Violence in Australia’, NAA A432 (A432/21), 1972/7013.
40 Hilton bombing: on 13 February 1978 a bomb exploded in a rubbish bin outside the Hilton Hotel in Sydney, where the first Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting (CHOGRM) was about to begin. Two civilians and a police officer were killed; in subsequent controversial action the government declared a state of emergency and invoked the defence power to call out the army to patrol the region around Bowral, near Sydney, where delegates attending CHOGRM were to visit for two days: Hocking, Terror Laws, pp.82–100; Michael Head, ‘Thirty Years Since Sydney's Hilton Hotel Bombing: Unanswered Questions’, Legal History 12 (2008) p.241; H. P. Lee, Emergency Powers (Sydney: Law Book Co. 1984) pp.195–9.
41 All quotes from Report on First Meeting, 26 October 1972, ‘Interdepartmental Committee on Terrorism and Violence in Australia’ (pp.146–8), NAA A432 (A432/21), 1972/7013. Bailey attended only the first meeting of the committee.
42 Mackenzie, ICAO, pp.246–75; Naftali, Blind Spot, pp.19–25, 32–41, 60–8.
43 Third Draft report (p.163), ‘Terrorism and Violence in Australia’, NAA, A6980, S250688.
44 Third Draft report (p.156), ‘Terrorism and Violence in Australia’, NAA, A6980, S250688.
45 Draft Report, 7 November 1972, p.121, 'Terrorism and Political Violence in Australia', NAA, A6980, S250688. The collateral damage to commercial interests through unilateral government action was evident elsewhere, for example in the concern by United States national security officials in 1970 that boycotts of unsafe airports not result in disadvantage to American airlines: Naftali, Blind Spot, p.50.
46 Cain, Terrorism & Intelligence in Australia; Richard Hall, The Secret State: Australia's Spy Industry (Stanmore: Cassell Australia 1978); Hocking, Lionel Murphy.
47 Deery, ‘“Dear Mr. Brown”’; Mark Finnane, ‘Controlling the “Alien” in Mid-twentieth Century Australia: The Origins and Fate of a Policing Role’, Policing and Society 19/4 (2009) pp.442–67; Klaus Neumann, In the Interest of National Security: Civilian Internment in Australia During World War II (Canberra: National Archives of Australia 2006).
48 The controversy developed out of the Labor government's attempts to indict politically the previous government's evident inaction on Croatian violence. Attempts by Labor staffers to access the committee files were resisted by the permanent officers of the public service: see especially ‘[Sir John Bunting: Copies of Outward Correspondence] Secretary's Pinks, March 1973’, NAA, M319, 43 Part 2; and ‘[Sir John Bunting: Copies of Outward Correspondence] Secretary's Pinks, April 1973’, NAA, M319, 44.
49 Robert Manne, The Petrov Affair: Politics and Espionage (Sydney: Pergamon 1987).
50 See especially Murphy's speech to the Senate, Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, Senate Official Hansard, 27 March 1973.
51 Kathleen O'Donnell, ‘From Guns, Gates and Guards: The Development of Australia's Federal Critical Infrastructure Policy, 1978–2010’, Master of Criminology and Criminal Justice (Honours) (Griffith University 2011).
52 Naftali, Blind Spot.
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Mark Finnane
Mark Finnane is ARC Laureate Fellow and Professor of History at Griffith University, where he is a Chief Investigator in the ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS). He has published widely on the history of criminal justice, policing, punishment, and criminal law in both Australia and Ireland. His most recent book, with Heather Douglas, is Indigenous Crime and Settler Law: White Sovereignty after Empire (2012).