Missing revolution: the American intelligence failure in Iraq, 1958

Abstract

Why were American officials caught by surprise with the military coup and later revolution in Iraq on 14 July 1958? Drawing on American intelligence and diplomatic records as well as multilingual sources, this article argues that the US intelligence failure is the product of two factors: the collection of information from too few and too similar human sources of intelligence in Iraq’s ruling regime, and the unreceptivity of US officials to assessing new information and their unwillingness to update assessments of local Iraqi developments. It revisits America’s intelligence failure in Iraq and suggests important lessons for the study of intelligence.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Shai Feldman, Robert J. Art, Irene L. Gendzier, Sana Tannoury-Karam, David S. Patel, Daniel Kryder, and a number of colleagues at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association and the International Studies Association for thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. The author would also like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers of Intelligence and National Security for the constructive and careful suggestions. All remaining errors are the responsibility of the author.

Notes

1. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence; and Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails.

2. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 138.

3. Given that states follow different procedures to declassify diplomatic and intelligence records, it is important to explore other understudied and even studied cases of intelligence failure during the Cold War. The availability of newly declassified material invites scholars to revisit cases of intelligence failure, particularly ones that involve unexpected military coups. Some cases that deserve further scholarly attention include: the Carnation Revolution of 1974, which began as a military coup in Portugal and the Saur Revolution of 1978, which was first launched through a military coup in Afghanistan. Broadly speaking the article’s focus on intelligence failures fits well with existing studies. Some of the most known works on intelligence failures (tactical or strategic) include: Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor; Warning and Decision; Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails; Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep; Wirtz, The Tet Offensive; Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises; and Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack.

4. There are some parallels between the American surprise in Iraq (1958) and Iran (1979). Bearing in mind that both events happened during under different administrations, some of the main underlying causes that explain why American officials in Baghdad and Tehran were caught by surprise are similar. For instance, assessments by American officials of the regime’s ability, particularly its coercive apparatus, and that of key officials, Nuri in Iraq and Mohammad Reza Shah in Iran, to protect the regime from any local or foreign threats are very similar. Moreover, the focus of American officials on Communists and their supporters in Iraq and Iran before the revolutions in 1958 and 1978–1979 respectively is also very similar. The bottom line is that there are strong parallels between both cases, particularly stemming from similar problems of collection and analysis. See Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 15–122; and Jeffrey G. Karam, “U.S. Intelligence in the Middle East,” 63–128.

5. Some major works on the Iraqi Revolution: Bāsh Aʻyān, Inqilāb 14 Tammūz 1958; Romero, The Iraqi Revolution of 1958; Maqṣūd, Sīrat thāʼir; and Fernea and Louis, The Iraqi Revolution of 1958.

6. This assertion should not lead to the conclusion that American officials in Washington and Baghdad were the only ones caught by surprise with the coup and later revolution. In fact, British archival documents provide strong evidence the coup also came as a surprise to British officials. See the Prime Minister’s Office Records (PREM) 11/2368 and the Joint Intelligence Committee Records (JIC) 58–102 for further information on why British officials were caught by surprise with the coup and later revolution.

7. Heuer and Pherson, eds., Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis; Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis; Betts and Mahnken, eds., Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence; and Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor.

8. Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy; Rovner, Fixing the Facts; and Zegart, Spying Blind.

9. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 2.

10. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack.

11. Rovner, Fixing the Facts; and Zegart, Spying Blind the CIA.

12. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack; and Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises.

13. Len Scott, “Human Intelligence,” 96–104.

14. Hitz, “Human Source Intelligence,” 257–74; Russell, Sharpening Strategic Intelligence; Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 128–9; Johnson, Strategic Intelligence, 124–5; and Hitz, The Great Game.

15. Brian Jenkins, “Prepared Statement for the 9/11 Commission”; Betts, Enemies of Intelligence; and Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails.

16. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence; and Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails.

17. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack; and Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises.

18. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 140.

19. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 119.

20. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 140–1; and Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 115–21.

21. Eiran, “The Three Tensions of Investigating Intelligence Failures,” 1–21; and Jensen, “Intelligence Failures,” 261–82.

22. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics; and Jervis, The Logic of Images.

23. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.

24. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics; Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis; and Betts, Enemies of Intelligence.

25. Rovner, Fixing the Facts, 3; Heidenrich, “The Intelligence Community’s Neglect of Strategic Intelligence”; and Johnson, Strategic Intelligence.

26. Bāsh Aʻyān, Inqilāb 14 Tammūz 1958, 226–8.

27. Bashkin, The Other Iraq, 87–121.

28. Ismael, The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Iraq, 71.

29. Ḥusayn, Thawrat 14 Tammūz 1958, 42–4.

30. Pearson, In the Name of Oil, 161–2.

31. The Hashemites in the Modern Arab World, 154.

32. Bāsh Aʻyān, Inqilāb 14 Tammūz 1958, 197.

33. Tripp, A History of Iraq, 141–2.

34. “Radio Baghdad announced the Army has liberated the Iraqi people from domination by a corrupt group put in power by imperialism,” http://goo.gl/qV1vd9.

35. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, 801.

36. Fernea and Louis, The Iraqi Revolution of 1958, 1–28.

37. This research is based on archival research at the US National Archives II in College Park, MD. Some of the records consulted for this manuscript include: CIA reports and National Security Council (NSC) briefings from the CIA CREST (CIA Records Search Tool) Archive, diplomatic cables and intelligence reports in the published volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), and consular dispatches and Embassy reports from the Confidential State Department Central Files on Iraq, 1955–1959. See Karam, “U.S. Intelligence in the Middle East,” 55–9.

38. Document 96, Memorandum pp.289–91 in Edward C. Keefer, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958–1960, Volume XI, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula; Foreign Service Dispatch No. 1327, February 12, 1958, 787.02/2-1258; Document 14, Telegram, pp.48–54; Document 99, Telegram, pp.293–4; Document 101, Telegram, pp.296–7 and Document 108, Memorandum pp.304–6 in FRUS Vol. XI, Iraq.

39. Some of these resources include firm government action over public political activity, and different kinds of propaganda campaigns to counter the widespread appeal of Nasserism in Iraq. Foreign Service Dispatch, No. 1678, April 11, 1958, 787.00/4-1158, Document 108 in Keefer, FRUS, Vol. XI, 1958–1960, Near East Region: Iraq, and Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), 13 May 1958.

40. Foreign Service Dispatch, No. 1678 and Document 108 in Ibid.

41. Documents 99 and 108 in Ibid.

42. NSC Briefing, February 12, 1958, CIA-RDP79R00890A000900060025-5 and Document 99 in Ibid.

43. Documents 101 and 108 in Ibid. Foreign Service Dispatch from the U.S. Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, No. 1825, May 6, 1958, 787.00/5-658.

44. Ibid.

45. Documents 101 and 108 in Keefer, FRUS, Vol. XI, 1958–1960, Near East Region: Iraq.

46. Foreign Service Dispatch, No. 909, March 18, 1958, 787.00/3-1858 and Foreign Service Dispatch No. 7, February 1, 1958, 787.00/2-158.

47. Foreign Service Dispatch, No. 7.

48. NSC Briefing, February 12, 1958 and Ibid.

49. Foreign Service Dispatch, No. 909 and No. 920, March 19, 1958, 787.00/3-1958.

50. Foreign Service Dispatches, No. 909 and No. 920.

51. Although this report dates back to late 1955, diplomats and intelligence officers referenced it in 1957 and early 1958 when they assessed the issue of the military’s continued loyalty to the monarchy. Document 427, Operations Coordinating Board Report, Washington, December 4, 1955 pp.979–86 in Keefer, FRUS, Vol. XI, 1958–1960, Near East Region: Iraq; Operations Coordinating Board, Operational Guidance Paper for Iraq, Internal Security, 22 May 1957, DDRS, U.S. National Archives; and Document 108 in Ibid.

52. This National Intelligence Estimate was one of the references used in preparing ‘Staff Notes’ for President Eisenhower and for CIA in 1958. Document 458, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 36.2-57, pp.1048–58; Document 3, Memo pp.4–5 and Document 4, Memo of Disucssion pp.6–16 in Keefer, FRUS, Vol. XI, 1958–1960, Near East Region: Iraq.

53. Document 458 in Glennon, FRUS, Vol. XII, 1955–1957, Near East Region: Iraq; Incoming Secret Message from the Staff Message Division, the Department of the U.S. Air Force in Baghdad to the Department of the Air Force, No. C-10, January 26, 1958, 787.00 (W)/1-2558; Incoming Secret Message from the Staff Message Division, the Department of the U.S. Air Force in Baghdad to the Department of the Air Force, No. C-11, February 4, 1958, 787.00 (W)/2-458; and Document 101 in Ibid.

54. Incoming Secret Message, No. C-11 and Document 101 in Keefer, FRUS, Vol. XI, 1958–1960, Near East Region: Iraq.

55. Document 108 in Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Document 458 in Glennon, FRUS, Vol. XII, 1955–1957, Near East Region: Iraq and Document 108 in Ibid.

58. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 561.

59. Ibid., X:531.

60. Bāsh Aʻyān, Inqilāb 14 Tammūz 1958, 33–4.

61. The Iraq Development Board was created by the government in 1950 to oversee that 70 percent of the oil revenue would be set aside for infrastructure development. It was abolished immediately after the July Coup. Jalal, The Role of Government in the Industrialization of Iraq, 1950–1965, 14–19.

62. Daniel, “Contemporary Perceptions of the Revolution in Iraq,” and Thatcher, “Reflections on U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Iraq,” 1–28 and 62–75.

63. Daniel, “Contemporary Perceptions of the Revolution in Iraq,” 47–56; Ibid., 47–56; Interviews with A. David Fritzlan, Robert C.F. Gordon, and Morris Draper. Interviews by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Frontline Diplomacy.

64. Dann, Iraq under Qassem, 8–10.

65. Romero, The Iraqi Revolution of 1958, 3–4.

66. Bashkin, The Other Iraq, 100–4; and Ismael, The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Iraq, 74–6.

67. Bāsh Aʻyān, Inqilāb 14 Tammūz 1958, 147.

68. Ḥusayn, Thawrat 14 Tammūz 1958, 113–15.

69. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq since 1958, 38–45.

70. Ṣubhī ʻAbd al-Hamid, Asrār Thawrat 14 Tammūz 1958, 31–41; and Tahir, Irak : Aux Origines d’un Régime Militaire.

71. Ḥusayn, Thawrat 14 Tammūz 1958, 15–16.

72. Bāsh Aʻyān, Inqilāb 14 Tammūz 1958, 194–7.

73. Maqṣūd, Sīrat thāʼir, 22–32.

74. Rafīʻī, Anā wa-al-zaʻīm, 34–5.

75. Bāsh Aʻyān, Inqilāb 14 Tammūz 1958, 196–7.

76. Ibid., 197.

77. Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri, 91–2.

78. Suwaydī, My Memoirs, 484–7.

79. Bāsh Aʻyān, Inqilāb 14 Tammūz 1958, 234–5.

80. Though American officials had a few sources in different circles (particularly regime and military), almost all declassified records point to their overreliance on human sources in the regime. We also have no evidence that American intelligence officers and diplomats sought to cultivate strong and useful relationships with sources in the opposition and other circles, especially in the military in lower grades, which were critical of the regime.

81. See above section on the gist of US Intelligence Assessments.

82. See for example Foreign Service Dispatch No. 34, April 1, 1958, 787.00/4-158.

83. Ibid.

84. Fritzlan, Interview with A. David Fritzlan.

85. Ibid., 39.

86. Ibid.

87. Incoming Secret Messages, No. C-10 and No. C-11.

88. Draper, Interview with Morris Draper; Fritzlan, Interview with A. David Fritzlan; Gordon, Interview with Robert C.F. Gordon.

89. Gordon, Interview with Robert C.F. Gordon.

90. Document 120 in Keefer, FRUS, Vol. XI, 1958–1960, Near East Region: Iraq.

91. Ibid., 322.

92. Ibid., 322–3.

93. Ibid., 323.

94. Foreign Service Dispatch, No. 920.

95. Document 108 in Keefer, FRUS, Vol. XI, 1958–1960, Near East Region: Iraq.

96. Ibid.

97. See above section on US Intelligence Assessments.

98. Telegram, pp.988–92 in Keefer, FRUS, Vol. XI, 1958–1960, Near East Region: Iraq; Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri, 219–30.

99. Document 108, in Keefer, FRUS, Vol. XI, 1958–1960, Near East Region: Iraq.

100. Romero, The Iraqi Revolution of 1958, 68–9.

101. Foreign Service Dispatch, No. 1327 and Document 99 in Keefer, FRUS, Vol. XI, 1958–1960, Near East Region: Iraq and NSC Briefing, 21 May 1958.

102. Document 462 in Keefer, FRUS, Vol. XII, 1955–1957, Near East Region: Iraq.

103. Foreign Service Dispatch from the U.S. Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, No. 361, December 7, 1956.

104. Document 108 in Keefer, FRUS, Vol. XI, 1958–1960, Near East Region: Iraq.

105. Document 120 in Ibid.

106. Document 433 in Ibid.

107. Documents 101 and 108 in Keefer, FRUS, Vol. XI, 1958–1960, Near East Region: Iraq.

108. Document 108 in Ibid.

109. Document 101 in Ibid.

110. Document 108 in Ibid.

111. A meticulous search of American archival documents, including intelligence reports, embassy reports, consular dispatches, and records by service attachés, does not provide any evidence that American officials made any reference to previous coups in Iraq’s history to provide the historical context or make comparisons to other Assessments of the military’s loyalty to the monarchy.

112. Document 99 in Keefer, FRUS, Vol. XI, 1958–1960, Near East Region: Iraq.

113. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails.