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Abstract
Why does strategic intelligence analysis have limited influence on American foreign policy? Intelligence analysis is frequently disregarded, this paper contends, because it is a duplicated step in the decision-making process and supplements but does not supplant policy assessment. Many intelligence analyses will confirm policy assessments and be redundant or – if the assessments are different – policy-makers will choose their own interpretations over those of intelligence analysts. The findings of this paper provide scholars with important insights into the limits of intelligence analysis in the foreign policy process as well as recommendations for increasing its positive impact on policy.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Richard Betts, Brent Durbin, Matthew Hughes, Robert Jervis, Jennifer Kibbe, Genevieve Lester, Mark Neocleous and Mark Stout for their help with this paper. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2013 ISA and 2014 APSA conferences.
Notes
1. Immerman, “Intelligence and Strategy,” 7.
2. Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 96–120.
3. Hilsman, “Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs,” 23–24.
4. Wasserman, “The Failure of Intelligence Prediction,” 164.
5. Kent, Estimates and Influence, 11–21.
6. Hughes, The Fate of Facts; Handel, The Politics of Intelligence; Harkabi, “The Intelligence-Policymaker Tangle,” 125–31; Gates, “The CIA and American Foreign Policy,” 215–30.
7. See note 3 above.
8. See note 7 above.
9. Adams, War of Numbers; Goodman, Failure of Intelligence; Pillar “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq”.
10. Cline, “Policy Without Intelligence,” 121–35.
11. Kerr, “The Track Record,” 35–54.
12. Immerman, “Intelligence and Strategy,” 2–3; Jervis, “Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash”; Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 185–204; Rovner, Fixing the Facts. Also see Poteat, “The Intelligence Gap,” as cited in Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision,” 81.
13. Ford, “The U.S. Government’s Experience,” 50.
14. US Central Intelligence Agency, National Estimates, 35–36.
15. Examples include the lack of influence of intelligence assessment on: German military decision-making in World War I; American, Soviet, and German military decision-making in World War II; Soviet and East German decision-making during the Cold War; American decision-making during the Vietnam War; Israeli decision-making before the Yom Kippur War; American decision-making before 9/11; and American decision-making before and during the Iraq War. For the lack of influence in other domains, see: Ratcliffe, “Intelligence-led Policing,” 263–82; Bernhardt, “Consumer versus Producer,” 19–26; Bernhardt, “Intelligence versus Policy,” 24–28.
16. Marrin, “Intelligence Analysis and Decision-making,” 133.
17. Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq,” 15–27.
18. Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty; Omand, Securing the State, 23–24; Marrin, “Intelligence Analysis Theory,” 821–46.
19. Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, 206.
20. Rovner, Fixing the Facts, 26–29.
21. May, “Strange Victory,” 458–9. May attributes the general decision-making framework to Vickers, Art of Judgment. Also see May and Zelikow, “Seven Tenets,” 4.
22. Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, 202.
23. Davis, “Intelligence Analysts and Policymakers,” 1014.
24. Petersen, “The Challenge for the Political Analyst,” 51.
25. Gates, “An Opportunity Unfulfilled,” 37–38.
26. Petersen, “The Challenge for the Political Analyst,” 51–52.
27. Jervis, “Strategic Intelligence and Effective Policy,” 172.
28. Forbush, Chase, and Goldberg, “CIA Intelligence Support for Foreign and National Security Policy Making,” 3.
29. Russell, Sharpening Strategic Intelligence, 92.
30. Ford, “The U.S. Government’s Experience,” 50–51.
31. Gates, “The CIA and American Foreign Policy,” 221.
32. Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, 199.
33. Knorr, Foreign Intelligence and the Social Sciences, 23.
34. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 62.
35. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 60.
36. Armstrong, “Ways to Make Analysis,” 37–43.
37. Kendall, “The Function of Intelligence,” 550.
38. Betts, “American Strategic Intelligence,” 257.
39. Jervis, “Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash,” 204.
40. “The Problem of Objectivity and Integrity” in Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, 195–201.
41. Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, 182.
42. Hilsman, “Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs,” 12–13.
43. Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, 203–5.
44. Gates, “The CIA and American Foreign Policy,” 227.
45. Dahl, “Why Won’t They Listen?” 70. Referencing Lowenthal, “Grant vs. Sherman,” 198.
46. Wasserman, “The Failure of Intelligence Prediction,” 165.
47. Dahl, “Why Won’t They Listen?” 68–90.
48. Frantz and Waas, “CIA Failed to See Iraq’s Attack Plans”.
49. Foer and Ackerman, “The Radical”.
50. Russell, “CIA’s Strategic Intelligence in Iraq,” 194.
51. See note 49 above.
52. Wolfowitz, Comments, 78.
53. See note 52 above.
54. Wolfowitz, Comments, 78–79.
55. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 15–90: Yugoslavia Transformed.
56. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence, 177.
57. Shreeve, “The Intelligence Community Case Method Program,” 327–40.
58. Shreeve, “The Intelligence Community Case Method Program,” 327.
59. See note 56 above.
60. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence, 178.
61. Shreeve, “The Intelligence Community Case Method Program,” 338.
62. Shreeve, “The Intelligence Community Case Method Program,” 336–9.
63. See note 61 above
64. See note 62 above.
65. See note 61 above.
66. The 9/11 Commission Report, 341 (henceforth 9/11 Commission Report).
67. Pillar, “A Scapegoat is Not a Solution”.
68. Marrin, “The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks,” 197.
69. Marrin, “The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks,” 185, 197. 9/11 Commission Report, 101.
70. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Staff Statement No. 7. This comment was not duplicated in the 9/11 Commission Report.
71. 9/11 Commission Report, 348; Clarke, Against All Enemies, 238.
72. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 141.
73. Rovner, Long, and Zegart, “Correspondence,” 203.
74. US National Intelligence Council, NIE: Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction; US National Intelligence Council, Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq; US National Intelligence Council, Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq.
75. Lowenthal, “The Real Intelligence Failure?” B01.
76. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 122.
77. Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq”.
78. Bush, Decision Points, 248–9.
79. Immerman, “Intelligence and Strategy,” 23.
80. Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 317–30.
81. Petersen, “The Challenge for the Political Analyst,” 51–56; Kerbel and Olcott, “The Intelligence-Policy Nexus,” 1–13; Petersen, “What I Learned in 40 Years of Doing Intelligence Analysis,” 13–20; Wilder, “An Educated Consumer is Our Best Customer,” 23–31.
82. Davis, “The Challenge of Managing Uncertainty,” 35–42.
83. The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, In From the Cold, 11; Andrew, “An Agenda for Future Research,” 225; Brown et al., “Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence,” Commission the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community.
84. Steinberg, “The Policymaker’s Perspective,” 88–89.
85. Marrin and Davies, “National Assessment by the National Security Council Staff 1968–80,” 644–73.
86. Hulnick and Brammer, The Impact of Intelligence, 9.
87. Ford, “The U.S. Government’s Experience,” 52.
88. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision,” 83–84.
89. Marrin, “Intelligence Analysis Theory”.
90. Betts, “Policy-Makers and Intelligence Analysts,” 185–6.