‘It takes a Russian to beat a Russian’: the National Union of Labor Solidarists, nationalism, and human intelligence operations in the Cold War

Abstract

This article reconstructs the CIA’s exploitation of the Natsional’no Trudovoi Soyuz, a right-wing Russian nationalist organization, as a part of ‘rollback’ and ‘stay-behind’ covert operations against the Soviet Union during the 1950s. Operations such as these relied on the notion that far-right nationalism presented a potent counter to international communism. The article explores postwar ties between American intelligence and the NTS in a shared effort to ‘roll back’ the borders of communism. It likewise discusses the ability of Soviet counterintelligence to intercept, penetrate, and sabotage nationalist networks and their operations backed by Western governments.

Acknowledgments

I would especially like to thank Jeffrey Burds, for I am particularly indebted to him for his incisive thoughts and thorough feedback. I will always appreciate our exciting and illuminating conversations. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to Matthew Williamson, Charles Wiseman, and Jeffrey Williams for providing their insights and thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. Any errors in the text are solely mine.

Notes

1. Carroll, “It takes a Russian to beat a Russian,” Life, 19 December 1949, 80.

2. Memorandum, Harry Rositzke to Distribution List, Intelligence Requirements on Russian Zone/Germany, 21 August 1945, NARA, RG-226, Entry 210, Box 501, Folder 3; Memorandum, Rositzke to Penrose, Current Status of the Procurement of Intelligence on the USSR by SSU and Major Foreign Secret Intelligence Services, 11 July 1946, NARA, RG-226, Entry 210, Box 329, File: Historical Documents; Memorandum, Rositzke to Penrose, Recommendations, 23 August 1946, NARA, RG-226, Entry 210, Box 368, Folder 1. Ruffner, “Cold War Allies,” 32–3. Harry Rositzke held a doctorate from Harvard University in Germanic philology and taught college English several years before the World War II. During the war he entered the Office of Strategic Services and rose to lead the steering division in Wiesbaden. After the war, he became the acting chief of the Special Projects Division-Soviet (SPD-S). Though eager to establish ties with significant sources of opposition to Moscow, Rositzke urged caution in allying with émigré groups without significant vetting. Of course, not all intelligence planners shared his reluctance.

3. Simpson, Blowback; Loftus, The Belarus Secret; Grose, Operation Rollback; Breitman et al., U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis; Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow; Burds, Early Cold War in Ukraine; and Corke, US Covert Operations.

4. Top Secret Memorandum, Harry A. Rositzke to S.B.L. Penrose and Col. William W. Quinn, “Preliminary Analysis and Evaluation of the Methods of Procurement of Secret Intelligence on the USSR Proper,” 23 August 1946. NARA, RG226, Entry 210, Box 368, #WN 13,597, p.10.

5. Ibid.

6. Report no. R-G16-50, Undated, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, 6–7. Although the report is missing the first several pages, including its date, it likely originates no later than the autumn of 1950.

7. Khokhlov, Name of Conscience, 202.

8. Ibid., 153.

9. Krasnov, Soviet Defectors, 28–9, 57–8; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield; Khokhlov, “I Would Not Murder for the Soviets,” The Saturday Evening Post, 20 November 1954, 27–9, 121–4.

10. Laqueur, Black Hundred.

11. Za Rodinu, No. 88, 1 April 1939, quoted in Dvinov, Politics of the Russian Emigration, 124.

12. Za Rodinu, No. 95, 15 December 1939, quoted in Dvinov, Politics of the Russian Emigration, 126.

13. Ibid., 306–7; Ruffner, Forging an Intelligence Partnership.

14. Report No. R-G16-50, Undated, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, pp.6–7.

15. Ibid. Some leaders found the American zone of occupation ‘unfavorable’, however, and relocated to British-occupied Hamburg after 1948.

16. Ibid.; Littlejohn, The Patriotic Traitors, 296.

17. FDS/E1 to Chief, FDS, “Discussions with Mr. Angleton and [Redacted] Regarding NTS,” 24 September 1950, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

18. Memorandum, Subject: Proposed plan submitted by AEROSOL (1), NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1. Memorandum is undated. Its placement in the record and details within suggest it originated between 9 April and 30 June 1951.

19. “Subject: REDBIRD/Summary of Projects for [Redacted],” 30 June 1951, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

20. Memorandum to Chief, ZACACTUS, Washington, D.C., “SUBJECT: REDSOX/AEROSOL,” 11 October 1951, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

21. “Narrative Summary of AIS Relationship with NTS,” Undated, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol.1, file 302A.1.

22. Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, to Chief, Foreign Division M, & Chief, Foreign Division S, 10 January 1952, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

23. Ibid.

24. Chief of Station , Karlsruhe, to Chief, Foreign Division M, & Chief, Foreign Division S, Attachment to MGMA 07725, 10 November 1951, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

25. Chief of Station , Karlsruhe, to Chief, Foreign Division M, & Chief, Foreign Division S, Attachment to MGMA 07725, 10 November 1951, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24; Chief of Station, Frankfurt to Chief, SR and Chief, SE, SUBJECT: “REDSOX/AESAURUS/CACCOLA 1: Transmittal of final Report on First Cycle of Caccola 1,” 4 June 1952, Attachment, page 11, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

26. Chief of Station , Karlsruhe, to Chief, Foreign Division M, & Chief, Foreign Division S, 10 January 1952, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

27. See Table 1 for more names and details on the CACCOLA operatives deployed in cycles A and B.

28. Ibid; “CARCASS Operation,” 12 March 1952, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

29. Dispatch from Chief of Station, Frankfurt, to Chief, SR Division & Chief, EE Division, “Subject: REDSOX/AEROSOL/CARCASS: Transmittal of Revised Operation Plan,” 28 February 1952, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

30. Chief of Mission, Frankfurt, to Chief, EE, “SUBJECT: REDSOX/CACCOLA 1, Transmittal of Progress Report, 25 July to 26 August 1952,”4 September 1952, Attachment to EGMA-00009, Appendix B, “SUBJECT: REDSOX/CACCOLA/Review of Radio Traffic,” 5 May–25 Aug. 1952, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

31. Chief of Base, Munich, to Chief, EE, “SUBJECT: REDSOX/AESARUS, Transmittal of [Redacted] Report on Meeting with CAPABLE 7, CAPABLE 14, [Redacted], and [Redacted],” 25 September 1952, Attachment to EGMA-612, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

32. Chief of Mission, Frankfurt, to Chief, EE, “SUBJECT: REDSOX/CACCOLA 1, Transmittal of Progress Report, 25 July to 26 August 1952,”4 September 1952, Attachment to EGMA-00009, Appendix B, “SUBJECT: REDSOX/CACCOLA/Review of Radio Traffic,” 5 May–25 Aug. 1952, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

33. Ibid.

34. Chief of Station, Frankfurt, to Chief, SR, Chief, EE, Attachment to MGMA-09836, “SUBJECT: REDSOX/AESAURUS/Final Report on First Cycle of CACCOLA 1,” 4 June 1952, NARA RG263, ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

35. Chief of Mission, Frankfurt, to Chief, EE, “SUBJECT: REDSOX/CACCOLA 1, Transmittal of Progress Report, 25 July to 26 August 1952,” Attachment to EGMA-00009, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

36. Also see Dorill, MI6, 416–7. CACCOLA-24, whose real name was Nikolai Ivanovich Yakuta, was no wide-eyed neophyte in anti-Soviet operations. During the World War II he fell into the hands of the Germans and defected to their ranks. After the war, he migrated from a Munich DP camp to Casablanca, where other NTS members aggregated in labor brigades organized by Constantine Boldyrev, one of the co-founders of the NTS. These labor brigades provided a recruitment pool for Western intelligence agencies.

37. Chief of Base, Munich, to Chief EE (Attn: Chief SR), “SUBJECT: REDSOX/CACOLA, Transmittal of Operational Plans,” 7 January 1953, Attachment A to EGMA-2877, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

38. Chief of Base, Munich to Chief EE (Attn: Chief SR), “SUBJECT: REDSOX/CACOLA, Transmittal of Operational Plans,” 7 January 1953, Attachment A to EGMA-2877, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24; Attachment B to EGMA-2877, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

39. Chief of Mission, Frankfurt, to Chief SR (Attn: [Redacted]), Attachment e-8, CACCOLA 28, 9 June 1953, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 2.

40. Chief of Base, Munich to Chief EE (Attn: Chief SR), “SUBJECT: REDSOX/CACOLA, Transmittal of Operational Plans,” 7 January 1953, Attachment F to EGMA-2877, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

41. “CSOB Prog. Report for Dec 52,” 8 January, 1953, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

42. Chief of Base, Munich to Chief EE (Attn: Chief SR), “SUBJECT: REDSOX/CACOLA, Transmittal of Operational Plans,” 7 January 1953, Attachment A to EGMA-2877, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 2.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Chief of Base, Munich to Chief EE (Attn: Chief SR), “Subject: REDSOX/CACCOLA, Transmittal of Plans for 1953–54, CACCOLA Training and Operations,” Attachment to EGMA-4571, 25 March 1953, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 2.

46. “Soobshchenie: Ministerstva vnutrennix del, Soyuza SSR,” 28 April 1953, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 2.

47. “Soobshchenie: Ministerstva vnutrennix del, Soyuza SSR,” 28 April 1953, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 2.

48. The names included: Major Ronald Otto Bollenbach, an assistant Air and Naval Attaché in Moscow between 1946 and 1947 and head of the Kaufbeuren school; a Captain Holleday, who accompanied the four agents to the Athens airfield from where they began their infiltration flight; and Major Harold Irving Fielder, a former State Department courier to the USSR and who currently worked at the Athens airfield. “Soobshchenie: Ministerstva vnutrennix del, Soyuza SSR,” 28 April 1953, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 2.

49. “Soobshchenie: Ministerstva vnutrennix del, Soyuza SSR,” 28 April 1953, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 2.

50. “USSR Executes Four Spies of U.S.” TASS, 27 May 1953, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 2; “Reds Execute 4 Chutists as ‘Spies’ for U.S.,” Chicago Tribune, 27 May 1953; “Four Men Shot as U.S. ‘Spies’,” The Times, 27 May 1953; “Russ Report Shooting 4 As U.S.-Trained Spies,” Reuters, 27 May 1953; and Baidalakov, Da vozvelichit’sia Rossiia, 69. At the time, stunned NTS leaders Baidalakov and Okolovich could only make wild speculations as the source of leaks contributing to these failures, but they most likely came from British intelligence moles Kim Philby and George Blake.

51. Chief of Mission, Frankfurt, to Chief SR, “REDSOX/CACCOLAB: Investigation of the Capture of CACCOLAS 10, 20, 21, and 28,” 7 July 1953, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 2.

52. Chief of Mission, Frankfurt, to Chief, EE (ATTN: Chief, SR), “SUBJECT: REDSOX/CACCOLA B/Operational, Exploitation of CACCOLA 27 Channel,” 2 November 1953, NARA RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 2.

53. Chief of Mission, Frankfurt, to Chief, EE (ATTN: Chief, SR), “SUBJECT: REDSOX/CACCOLA B/Operational, Exploitation of CACCOLA 27 Channel,” 2 November 1953, NARA RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 2.

54. Memorandum from Moscow to Secretary of State, No: 191, FEBRUARY 8, 7 PM, 8 February 1957, NARA, RG263, EntryZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 3.

55. SR/3 WI, to Chief, DOB, “SUBJECT: Housing Requirements for the CACCOLA SCHOOL,” 30 September 1953, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 2.

56. Chief of Base, Munich, to Chief EE (Attn: Chief, SR), “Subject: REDSOX/Operational, Proposals for Resumption of CACCOLA C Training and Recruitment,” NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 2, pp.1–3.

57. Chief of Base, Munich, to Chief EE (Attn: Chief, SR), “Subject: REDSOX/Operational, Proposals for Resumption of CACCOLA C Training and Recruitment,” NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 2, pp.2–3.

58. Riley, Philby: The Hidden Years, 60–4; Hermiston, The Greatest Traitor, 252–3; and Kalugin, Spymaster, 158. Kim Philby had worked in Washington as the SIS representative to the Americans. By 1951, he was under suspicion of being a Soviet mole and officially retired from the SIS. He continued, however, to supply information to Moscow on émigré operations, aiding fellow spy George Blake in SIS. Blake was not uncovered until 1961, well after he had managed to largely scuttle émigré operations in Eastern Europe.

59. “Izvestia Woos ‘U.S. Spies,’ Reports Surrender of Two,” Reuters in The Christian Science Monitor, June 15, 1954, NARA RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 3.

60. “Oni iavilis’ s povinnoi …,” Izvestiiya, 15 June 1954.

61. Mikonnen, “Not by Force Alone,” 189. The offer of leniency was further formalized in a 17 September 1955 decree that promised those who had collaborated with the Germans could repatriate with their families, regardless of their family members’ nationalities. Naturally, many in the émigré community remained dubious of the decree’s sincerity.

62. “Izvestia Woos ‘U.S. Spies,’ Reports Surrender of Two,” Reuters in The Christian Science Monitor, June 15, 1954, NARA RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 3; Curiously, the Reuters translation used the adjective ‘Russian’ consistently in place of ‘Soviet’ when discussing the men’s loneliness and national pride.

63. Charles Bohlen to John Foster Dulles, State Department Telegram, 15 June 1954, NARA RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 3.

64. “Izvestia Woos ‘U.S. Spies,’ Reports Surrender of Two,” Reuters in The Christian Science Monitor, June 15, 1954, NARA RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 3.

65. David E. Murphy, Chief, SR/3, to Chief, SR/DOB, “SUBJECT: AENOBLE C,” 7 July 1954, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 3.

66. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions; Debo, “Lockhart Plot or Dzerzhinskii Plot?” 413–39; Long, “Searching for Sidney Reilly,” 1225–41; Foglesong, America’s Secret War against Bolshevism; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 32–3. Soviet counterintelligence used ‘Trust’ deceptions to ensnare not only the plots of nationalist émigrés, but also those of British and American efforts to throttle the center of world communism in its infancy, thereby undermining leftist movements at home.

67. Memorandum, “Effort to Analyze Soviet Provocation and Inspiration in Recent Years in Western Europe and Role in such Provocation Activity of Émigré Political Organisation,” 30 June 1954, NARA , RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 25, AEVIRGIL, Vol. 1.

68. Keane and Warner, “NSC 5412/2,” https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel.

69. Chief, SR Division, to Chief of Operations, DD/P, “SUBJECT: NTS Penetration Operations into the USSR,” 8 December 1954, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 3.

70. Heuser, “Covert Action within British and American,” 65–84. As Beatrice Heuser has shown, the British had their own policy of Containment that ran parallel to those of the United States. In some regions, like in Ukraine and the Caucasus, the US and UK worked more closely. However, the British significantly scaled back their liberationist operations by the time President Dwight Eisenhower took office. His administration expanded liberationist efforts until the disappointment of the failed Hungarian Revolution of 1956.

71. Ibid.

72. Kalugin, Spymaster, 275; and CIA Memorandum, “Soviet Use of Assassination,” https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol19no3/html/v19i3a01p_0001.htm. Nikolai Khokhlov himself became marked for death by the very same man who ordered him to kill Okolovich, Alexander Sakharovsky, Sakharovsky, as chief of KGB Directorate One, ordered the assassination of other nationalist leaders, including Lev Rebet and Stepan Bandera. Soviet assassins poisoned all three men. Khokhlov survived poisoning of Soviet thallium and continued to work as a professor and CIA informer in the United States.

73. Chief, SR Division, to Chief of Operations, DD/P, “SUBJECT: NTS Penetration Operations into the USSR,” 8 December 1954, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 3.

74. Message from Soviet Ambassador to British Government, 28 May 1954, TNA FO 371/111795.

75. Headquarters Case Officer (Redacted), Project Outline, AESAURUS/AENOBLE, 1 July 1956, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 3.

76. Charles Bohlen, US Embassy in Moscow, to Secretary of State, 7 February 1957, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 3.

77. Memorandum for the Director, Central Intelligence, Subject: Soviet Statement on American Subversive and Espionage Activity, 6 February 1957, 7 February 1957, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 3.

78. US Embassy, Moscow to Secretary of State, 7 February 1957, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 3; O.J. Cutler, “4 ‘U.S. Spies’ Tell All on Moscow TV Show,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 7 February 1957.

79. Memorandum from Charles Bohlen, US Embassy in Moscow, to Secretary of State, 7 February 1957, NARA, RG263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 3.

80. “FYI: Infiltrated in May 1952” February–March 1961, NARA, RG263, ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1.

81. “SEVERE PENALTY SEEN IN U-2 CASE,” New York Times, Aug 4, 1960.

82. “FYI: Infiltrated in May 1952” February-March 1961, NARA, RG263, ZZ-19, Box 24, Vol. 1. Such announcements, whether about the men apprehend in 1957 or those in 1960, failed to mention that the men had been operating covertly for several years before their capture. See Mordvinkin, Belogvardeitsy, 181. Note that the author’s English edition omits several chapters included in the Russian, specifically those that deal more directly with his relationship to Nazi-linked White Russian networks, including the NTS.

83. Special to the New York Times, “MOSCOW REPORTS ARREST OF U.S. SPY,” New York Times, Nov 2, 1960.

84. Liberationism was dubious by 1953, but the failed Hungarian Revolution of 1956 marked the end of American Rollback operations in earnest. The Red Army crushed the Hungarian rebellion, which had been instigated in part by Voice of America broadcasts promising American intervention for Hungarian independence. The American help never came, and the contradictions of Eisenhower’s attempts to negotiate with the Soviet Union while sowing instability were laid bare. See Long, CIA and the Soviet Bloc; Corke, “Bridging the Gap,” 45–65; Borhi, “Rollback or Inaction?” 67–110; Memorandum from William Griffith to Richard Condon, European director of Radio Free Europe, SUBJECT: Policy Review of Voice for Free Hungary Programming, 23 October – 23 November 1956. Document 10, published in The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, eds. Békés, Byrne, and Rainer.

85. The cautiously small scale of these operations had its roots in their organization by the OPC, for an assessment of these earlier operations. See Long, “Strategic Disorder,” 459–87.

86. “National Alliance of Russian Solidarists. Folder 53. The Chekist Anthology,” June, 2007, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Contributed to CWIHP by Vasili Mitrokhin, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112272. This stands in contrast with the other, more widely used strategy to discredit the NTS as an inauthentic Russian movement due to its ties to Germany, the United States and other foreign powers. The account of Konstantin Cherezov, a NTS defector, provides a typical example. While similar in concept to the dramatic 1957 televised confessions, Cherezov’s account provides a more accurate account: Cherezov, Maska NTS.

87. N. P. Bayne to M. R. H. Jenkins, 6 February 1968, TNA FCO 28/502.

88. Central Intelligence Agency Clandestine Service, Illegal Border-crossing Program, 142–16, cited in Ahern, The Way We Do Things, 2.