The perils of multinational intelligence coalitions: Britain, America and the origins of Pakistan’s ISI

Abstract

This article examines how Great Britain helped create Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) with two goals: (1) establishing a Pakistani branch of a Commonwealth intelligence network; (2) ensuring information security within that network. Ultimately, this endeavor failed because of perceived deficiencies in Pakistan’s security institutions and Britain’s inability to address Pakistan’s security needs. By the mid-1950s ISI forged close ties with the United States which offered more and with fewer political strings attached. This article offers new insights on intelligence alliance formation during the cold war. It also provides a useful case study in the weaknesses of multilateral intelligence coalitions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Owen L. Sirrs is an adjunct professor of international security studies at the University of Montana’s Maureen and Mike Mansfield Center. His publications include Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (2016). His academic areas of research include Middle East and South Asian intelligence services during the Cold War era.

Notes

1. The British Viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten, staggered the two independence dates so that he could be present at both ceremonies. Therefore, Pakistan received her independence on 14 August 1947 and India followed a day later.

2. See, for example, Murphy, “Creating a Commonwealth Intelligence Culture,” 131–162; Yitzhak, “Jordanian Intelligence under the Rule of King Abdullah I (1921–1951),” 647–662; Eickelman and Dennison, “Arabizing the Omani Intelligence Services: Clash of Cultures?” 1–28; Heather, “Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in Kenya 1952–56,” 57–83; Ashton, “A ‘Special Relationship Sometimes in Spite of Ourselves’: Britain and Jordan, 1957–73,” 238–240; and Dehez, “Security Sector Reform and Intelligence Services in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 41–43.

3. There is a growing literature on foreign intelligence liaison. See, for example, Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details,” 195–217; Clough, “Quid Pro Quo: The Challenges of International Strategic Intelligence Cooperation,” 601–613; Richelson, “The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation,” 307–323; and Herman, “Diplomacy and Intelligence,” 1–22.

4. Gerolymatos, Castles Made of Sand.

5. For discussions on researching foreign intelligence liaison relationships see Svendsen, “Connecting Intelligence and Theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations,” 700–729; Johnson, “Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence,” 17; and Clough, “Quid Pro Quo,” 601–613.

6. Hamid, Autobiography of a General; Hamid, Disastrous Twilight: A Personal Record of the Partition of India; and Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan.

7. Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions; Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military; Jalal, The State of Martial Rule; Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan; Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within; Gerolymatos, Castles Made Of Sand; Dylan, “The Joint Intelligence Bureau”; and Aldrich, The Hidden Hand.

8. Khan, The Great Partition, 155, 156.

9. The National Archives at Kew (hereafter TNA): WO 208/4960, Department of the Army (US), Intelligence Division, Strategic Intelligence Digest, 24.

10. Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 27; Hamid, Early Years, 69; TNA: DEFE 11/31, Memorandum from Cawthorn, 28 September 1948; and Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, 115.

11. TNA: WO 208/4959, Correspondence from Reed, 25 July 1948; Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, 20; TNA: CAB 158/3, Joint Intelligence Committee (hereafter JIC) report, 13 April 1948.

12. When the British Indian Army was divided officers and NCOs had to select their country of service regardless of where they were serving at that moment. Therefore, Muslim soldiers and officers who had opted for Pakistan had to find transport for settlement in their new country. That process took months to accomplish. See Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan, 67. The Pakistani Army’s Military Intelligence Review began monitoring discipline, morale and welfare in its ranks shortly after the transfer of power. See, for example: TNA: WO 208/4962, General Headquarters Pakistan, Monthly Intelligence Review, 10 January 1948.

13. Stripp, Codebreaker in the Far East, 49–51; Hussain, “The Beginnings – Early Days of Intelligence in Pakistan”; and Riza, The Pakistan Army: 1947–1949, 154–156, 227–228.

14. For example, MI was attached to the Operations Directorate of the Pakistani Army until March 1948, when it was reconstituted as an independent Directorate in its own right under the aegis of the General Staff. ISI could be seen as the natural consequence of an evolving Pakistani military intelligence infrastructure which adapted to the escalating needs of Pakistan’s expanding military establishment: Riza, The Pakistan Army: 1947–1949, 55; Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan, 67; James, Pakistan Chronicle, 25; Gerolymatos, Castles Made of Sand, 194; TNA: CAB 159/6 Part 2, JIC report, 16 December1949; Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 137–138; and Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, 98.

15. Gerolymatos, Castles Made of Sand, 194; TNA: WO 208/4962, Correspondence by GHQ Pakistan, G.S. Branch, M.I. Dte., Rawalpindi, 14 July 1948; TNA: WO 208/4961, Correspondence by J.F. Walker, British High Commission, Karachi, 9 October 1948; TNA: WO 208/4959, Correspondence by A.H. Reed, British High Commission office, Rawalpindi, 25 July 1948.

16. Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan, 67–69; Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 30; James, Pakistan Chronicle, 25; and Cohen, The Pakistan Army, 17.

17. Hohnen, “Cawthorn, Sir Walter Joseph (1896–1970),” 392–393; Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan, 67; and Gerolymatos, Castles Made of Sand, 194.

18. Ahmed Rashid, “Obituary: Maj-Gen Syed Shahid Hamid,” The Independent, 15 March1993; Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan, 60, 67, 70–72, 76; and TNA: WO 208/4961, Correspondence by J.F. Walker, British High Commission, Karachi, 9 October 1948.

19. Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan, 67, 68.

20. Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan, 67, 69, 72, 73; TNA: DEFE 11/31, Note prepared by W.J. Cawthorn, 28 September1948; TNA: CAB 159/5, Part 1, JIC report for 7 April 1949; TNA: CAB 159/6 Part 2, JIC report for 16 December 1949; TNA: WO 208/4961, Correspondence by J.F. Walker, UK High Commission, Karachi, 6 November1948; and TNA: WO 208/4961, Correspondence by Brig. J.F. Walker, British High Commission, Karachi, 9 October 1948.

21. TNA: CAB 159/6 Part 2, JIC report, 16 December 1949; TNA: WO 208/4961, Correspondence by A.H. Reed, British High Commission office, Rawalpindi, 23 November1948; TNA: WO 208/4961, Correspondence by J.F. Walker, British High Commission, Karachi, 9 October1948; and Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan, 67.

22. Dylan, “The Joint Intelligence Bureau,” 28–31.

23. Ibid., 28.

24. Ibid., 35–37.

25. TNA: CAB 158/3, JIC, “Disclosure of Information to India and Pakistan,” 5 February1948.

26. TNA: CAB 158/3, JIC report for 13 April 1948.

27. Ibid.

28. TNA: CAB 158/3, JIC report for 5 February 1948.

29. TNA: CAB 158/3, JIC report for 13 April 1948.

30. TNA: DEFE 11/31, Memorandum from Chiefs of Staff Committee, 29 September1948; TNA: CAB 158/3, JIC, “Disclosure of Information to India and Pakistan,” 5 February1948; and TNA: CAB 158/3, JIC report for 13 April 1948. Embarrassing details of inadequate Commonwealth counter-intelligence were provided inter alia by the defecting GRU cypher clerk, Igor Gouzenko, and the Venona revelations of Soviet intelligence activity in Britain, USA, Australia, and Canada. See Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, 102–115.

31. TNA: CAB 158/3, JIC report for 13 April 1948.

32. Ibid. The JIC recognized that UK nationals on temporary duty with the Pakistani and Indian armed forces and civilian security organs would soon detect the fact that their employers were being discriminated against by the UK security authorities.

33. TNA: DEFE 11/31, Note prepared by W.J. Cawthorn, 28 September1948; TNA: CAB 159/5 Part 1, JIC report for 24 February1949; and TNA: CAB 159/5 Part 1, JIC report for 22 April1949.

34. TNA: DEFE 11/31, Note prepared by W.J. Cawthorn, 28 September1948.

35. TNA: DEFE 11/31 Note by W.J. Cawthorn, n.d. [September 1948 timeframe].

36. Pakistan scholar Ayesha Jalal describes how ISI officers began to hype the internal Communist threat following the 1949 Kashmir ceasefire as a way of currying favor with London and Washington: Jalal, State of Martial Rule, 111–113; 124n214; and TNA: CAB 159/8 Part 1, JIC report for 20 September 1950.

37. TNA: CAB 159/8 Part 1, JIC report for 20 September 1950.

38. Ibid.

39. TNA: CAB 159/5 Part 1, JIC report for 6 January 1949.

40. Andrew, Defend the Realm, 442–445; and Walton, Empire of Secrets, 67.

41. TNA: CAB 159/5 Part 1, JIC report for 7 April 1949.

42. See note 41 above.

43. TNA: CAB 159/6 Part 2, JIC report for 22 July 1949.

44. TNA: CAB 159/6 Part 2, JIC report for 17 November 1949; and TNA: CAB 159/6 Part 2, JIC report for 16 December 1949.

45. TNA: CAB 159/6 Part 1, JIC report for 16 December 1949.

46. Kux, United States and Pakistan, 95, 96.

47. Following his Melbourne JIB assignment, Cawthorn returned to Pakistan as Australia’s well-connected High Commissioner. Later in his career, he was director of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service.

48. TNA: CAB 159/14 Part 1, JIC report for 23 December 1953.

49. TNA: CAB 159/19, JIC report for 12 May 1955.

50. Kux, United States and Pakistan, 17–51.

51. Jalal, State of Martial Rule, 76.

52. Kux, United States and Pakistan, 15.

53. Hence Pakistan’s founding father, Mohamed Ali Jinnah, to a Life magazine reporter in 1947: ‘America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America … Pakistan is the pivot of the world, as we are placed … [on] the frontier on which the position of the world revolves’, quoted in Haqqani, Between Mosque and Military, 30.

54. Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, 115.

55. Jalal, State of Martial Rule, 112, 113, 115; Arif, Khaki Shadows, 388, 389; and TNA: FO 371/86764, Minutes to File by H. McEarlean, UK Foreign Office, 19 September 1950.

56. TNA: FO 371/112306, Correspondence from UK High Commission in Pakistan, 28 February 1954.

57. TNA: CAB 159/5 Part 1, JIC report for 16 December 1949.

58. TNA: CAB 158/3, JIC report for 13 April 1948.

59. TNA: CAB 159/8 Part 1, JIC report for 20 September 1950.

60. Jalal, State of Martial Rule, 112, 113, 115.

61. Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions, 69; Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 98; and Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 95, 96, 104, 203.

62. Mitha, Unlikely Beginnings, outlines the creation of the Special Services Group from the perspective of its first commander. Also see Qureshi, The Indo-Pak War of 1971, 248 for details on the planning behind the SSG.

63. Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 76, 88.

64. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 112, 115, 116, 188; Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 185, 186; National Security Archive at George Washington University: Letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to Secretary of State (Rusk), 9 August 1961.

65. Ali, Cold War in the High Himalayas, 186–186.

66. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 116, 188.

67. See, for example, Amnesty International, “A Bullet Has Been Chosen for You”.