A theoretical reframing of the intelligence–policy relation

Abstract

The intertwined relation between policy and intelligence has long been considered a vital issue for intelligence studies. However, this article argues that the role of the intelligence services as producers of knowledge within policy processes has not yet been thoroughly discussed within academia. One possible overall theoretical framework for studying intelligence in its role as knowledge producer is that of policy analysis, especially if the variance of intelligence’s impact on policy is under scrutiny. More specifically, this article argues that the theoretical approaches within critical policy analysis and policy network analysis constitute productive frameworks for research into the intelligence–policy nexus.

Notes

1. Ostrom, “Background on the Institutional Analysis,” 7–27.

2. See for instance Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.

3. See for instance Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor.

4. See for instance Nolan, “Information Sharing and Collaboration”.

5. See for instance Bean, “Organizational Culture and US Intelligence Affairs.” See also Gill and Phythian, “What Is Intelligence Studies?” for a scholarly argument on how intelligence studies have evolved and how this field of research might productively be conceptualised.

6. See for instance Wirtz, “The Intelligence-policy Nexus”.

7. Eriksson, Military Intelligence. Although, the field have been the focus of scholarly debate for decades. See for instance Hart, “The Cognitive Dynamics of Swedish Security Elites.” See also Gill, Intelligence Governance and Democratisation.

8. For further reading on critical policy analysis, see for instance Fischer and Forester, The Argumentative Turn in Policy or Fischer, Reframing Public Policy.

9. Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science, 18–19, 29ff. See also March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, 20ff.

10. Fischer, Reframing Public Policy, 13.

11. Mazey also refers to related research with the founding notion of the importance of norms, values, ideas and shared belief systems with quite recent concepts being developed such as ‘policy paradgim’, ‘policy frames’. Mazey, “Introduction: Integrating Gender,” 336.

12. Bacchi, Analysing Policy, xiv.

13. Ibid., 30–5.

14. Fischer, Reframing Public Policy, 14.

15. Schön and Rein defines frames as ‘policy positions as resting on belief, perception and appreciation, which we call frames.’ Schön and Rein, “Frame-Critical Policy Analysis,” 23–6.

16. Fischer, Reframing Public Policy, viii.

17. Edelman cited in Fischer, Reframing Public Policy, 61.

18. Eriksson, Military Intelligence.

19. Ibid.

20. In the theoretical meta-model used in this study is founded within the policy analytical field of research and developed by Svara. The original model is founded on the idea that the decision-maker is exemplified by elected officials, while the other category is exemplified as civil servants. In this particular study these categories are further defined as ‘decision-maker in the political establishment’ and ‘decision-maker within the Armed Forces’, and the category of civil servants is defined as ‘intelligence personnel’ (both civilian and military). Svara, “Introduction”.

21. Within the field of policy analysis the complex interaction between civil servants and policy-makers/making has had great scholarly attention. For example the concepts of network and network analysis have been fruitful in comprehending the relationship between policy-makers and civil servants. As mentioned above, critical policy analysis argues the importance of norms and ideas embodied in civil servants and experts within policy processes for different policy outcomes.

22. On a more general policy analytical level the general idea that the policy-makers (in the political arena often elected official).

23. However, this dichotomist view on the difference between policy makers and civil servants has been challenged.

24. Svara, “Introduction,” 953–76.

25. Ibid., 955.

26. The most common way to conceptualise the roles of civil servants and policy makers is that of separated roles, where ‘politician brings values and the administrator brings facts into’ into the political process. This view holds that the civil servant should remain neutral to the political will of the policy-maker, though provide advice and expertise, yet upholding professional integrity. Svara, “Introduction,” 957.

27. The autonomous administrator may occur ‘If there is a separation of politicians and administrators but political accountability is absent or limited.’ Svara, “Introduction,” 959. That is, if the policy-makers lacks the ability of steering of the civil servant (for instance from lack of specialised knowledge or expertise in certain areas). The civil servant may become self-steering through asymmetry in information or access to certain processes.

28. The responsive administrator is still subordinated to the policy-maker, though embraces the political view of the policy-maker. Therefore, the neutrality of the civil servants (mere bringing facts and expertise) may be questioned. Instead, the norms of the policy-maker overrides the strive for professional integrity.

29. Overlapping roles holds that the policy makers and civil servants share influence. The relationship is characterised by extensive interaction, shared functions, roles and norms. ‘This administrator sees politicians not as antagonists but rather as participants in a common endeavour who have different skills and priorities but whose ultimate goal are similar to those of the administrator. (…) Administrators are also concerned with values.’ Svara, “Introduction,” 963.

30. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.

31. Sabatier, “An Advocacy Coalition Framework”.