The US stay-behind operation in Iran, 1948-1953

ABSTRACT

This article explains a US initiative to prepare resistance forces for use in the event of a Soviet invasion or communist attempt to seize power in Iran during the early Cold War era. It begins by discussing similar ‘stay-behind’ operations in Europe in this era and the conditions that led US officials to develop one in Iran. It then explains what this stay-behind operation consisted of and why US officials eventually abandoned it. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the stay-behind operation in Iran differed from those in Europe and the important role it played in the decision-making that led to the 1953 coup in Iran.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. CIA, “Project Outline”; NSC, First Progress Report.

2. This volume is available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran. The main previous account of the stay-behind operation is a brief description in Gasiorowski, “CIA’s TPBEDAMN Operation.”

3. Atkin, Fighting Nazi Occupation; Mawdsley, “Anti-German Insurgency”; and Biddiscombe, The Last Nazis.

4. Nuti and Riste, “Introduction”; Riste, “Stay Behind.”

5. Riste, “Stay Behind.”

6. Ibid.; Long, CIA and the Soviet Bloc; NSC, NSC 10/2; and Memo from Wisner to Hillenkoetter.

7. Long, CIA and the Soviet Bloc, 201–202; “12. Editorial Note”; OPC, “CIA/OPC Strategic War Plan”; NSC, NSC 10/5; CIA, “Status of Planning.” The CIA also carried out stay-behind operations in China in 1948. See Singlaub, Hazardous Duty, 148.

8. Nuti, “Italian ‘Stay-Behind’ Network”; Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies; Williams, Operation Gladio; and Kwitney, “The CIA’s Secret Armies.” A stay-behind network was even established in Alaska in the 1950s. See Harper, “Alaskans Trained.”

9. O’Sullivan, Nazi Secret Warfare. Germany undertook similar operations in Iran during World War I. See Hopkirk, Like Hidden Fire, chs. 7, 11.

10. Tehran Legation Dispatches 616, 337, 647, 700, and 8.

11. Tehran Embassy Dispatches 217 and 141. On Soviet and Tudeh activities during this period, see Gasiorowski, “US Perceptions.”

12. Tehran Embassy Dispatch 25; Basra Consulate Dispatch 36; Tehran Embassy Telegrams 1011, 1266, and 1258; Louis, “Britain and the Overthrow,” 163; and London Embassy Dispatch 2432. On earlier British ties with the Bakhtiari and other southern tribes, see Cronin, Tribal Politics in Iran.

13. Tehran Embassy Dispatches 277 and 339; Tehran Embassy Telegram 145.

14. JCS, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff”; State Department Telegram 434 to the Tehran Embassy.

15. State Department Telegram 5; Tehran Embassy Telegram 22; JCS, Preparations for Demolition; Everly, “Top-Secret Cold War Plan”; and US Department of the Army, “Action of US Missions.”

16. Tehran Embassy Telegrams A-173, A-21, A-46, and 452; Tehran Embassy Dispatches A-182 and A-196; and CIA, “Soviet Activities in Iran.”

17. Tehran Embassy Telegrams A-167, A-190, A-196, 452; Tehran Embassy Dispatch 300.

18. Attachment to memo from Souers.

19. Attachment to Memo from Dooher. It is not clear whether the initiative behind Dooher’s proposal came from the Tehran embassy, from Washington, or from the shah.

20. Letter from Wiley to Jernegan, August 19, 1948; Memo from Merriam to Kennan; Memo from Satterthwaite to Kennan; and Letter from Satterthwaite to Wiley.

21. Tehran Embassy unnumbered dispatch; letter from Wilson to Jernegan, November 22, 1948. The reports by Dooher and Sexton are attached to the unnumbered dispatch, along with a report by John Waller on Qashqai-German collaboration during World War II.

22. Letter from Wiley to Jernegan, October 14, 1948; State Department Telegram 423; and Memo from Silver to Rountree.

23. Memo from Jernegan to Wilson; Letter from Jernegan to Wilson; letter from Wilson to Jernegan, January 21, 1949. In the second of these documents, Jernegan stated that an organization whose name he did not yet know – presumably OPC – now had primary responsibility for stay-behind planning. The last of these documents stated that CIA personnel in Iran were sending Washington recommendations on what type of communications equipment should be provided to Iranian stay-behind forces. In a cover letter attached to this document, Jernegan referred to stay-behind planning as “Operation JIBI,” which may have been its OPC codename.

24. NSC, NSC 54.

25. Memo of Conversation with His Imperial Majesty; Tehran Embassy Dispatch 107; Memo of Conversation, “The Shah’s Strategic Plan”; and Memo from McGhee to Matthews. The CIA sent Donald Wilber, who had served in Iran as an OSS officer during World War II, to inspect Iran’s stay-behind plans in 1949. See Wilber, Adventures, 156.

26. Memo from McGhee to Matthews; Tehran Embassy Dispatch 212; and Tehran Embassy Telegram 1352. US Supreme Court Justice William Douglas vacationed in the Qashqai and Bakhtiari regions in August 1950 and met with tribal leaders. He apparently discussed arming the Bakhtiari and told them he would speak to President Truman about them. Douglas’ visit was reported in the Iranian press, producing accusations that the United States was arming the tribes, and leading the government to restrict travel in the tribal areas by US citizens. See Unattributed report RIT-423; and Tehran Embassy Dispatch 200.

27. Memo from McGhee to Matthews; JIC, JIC 522/2 and JIC 522/20.

28. Department of State, Foreign Service List; interviews with one of the paramilitary officers and another CIA officer stationed in Iran during this period, who requested anonymity.

29. NSC, NSC 107 and NSC 107/2.

30. Memo From Dulles to Smith; Memo to Roosevelt; Memo From Wisner to Dulles; Gasiorowski, “CIA’s TPBEDAMN Operation”; “Project Outline,” July 26, 1951; “Project Outline,” undated; and Memo for the Record, June 29, 1951.

31. Memo for the Record, October 9, 1951; interview with the paramilitary officer mentioned in endnote 28; Woodhouse, Something Ventured, 106.

32. Memo from Roosevelt; “Minutes,” July 29, 1952. These delays may have reflected a growing belief in the US intelligence community that global war, including a Soviet invasion of Iran, had become less likely because the Soviets now believed they might not survive a protracted war and they could better achieve their objectives through subversion in regions such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East. See CIA, NIE-48.

33. Gasiorowski, “US Perceptions”; Memo of Telephone Conversation; and Tehran Embassy Telegram 481.

34. Memo for the Record, July 31, 1952. In a July 30 meeting, Allen Dulles speculated that it might be necessary for tribal forces to overthrow the current dynasty to forestall a communist coup. See Minutes, July 30, 1952.

35. Memo From Wisner to Joyce; interview with an SIS officer who knew about Woodhouse’s activities and requested anonymity; Woodhouse, Something Ventured, 116; and Wilber, Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq, 1.

36. Memo From Wisner to Smith; CIA, “Study of CIA Capabilities”; and Memo From Jernegan to Matthews. In November 1952, Iranian authorities arrested an American named Arthur Dubois in the Lur tribal region. See Tehran Embassy Telegram 1836. Dubois had worked in Iran for many years before World War II and then worked for US army intelligence during the war, traveling extensively in southern Iran and writing a series of reports on local tribes. See Tehran Legation Dispatch 466. The second CIA officer mentioned in endnote 28, above, told me Dubois was working on paramilitary operations for the CIA in 1952, presumably on the stay-behind operation. He later helped plan the 1953 coup. See Wilber, Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq, D–2.

37. CIA, SE-33, NIE-75, and NIE 75/1.

38. US Department of the Army, “Estimate of the Capabilities.”

39. NSC, NSC 136/1.

40. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup D’État”; Tehran Embassy Dispatches 414 and 549; and Tehran Embassy Telegram 2593.

41. Tehran Embassy Telegram 3627; Memo of Discussion, March 4, 1953; Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. Stay-behind plans were discussed at the second of these meetings. See Memorandum of Discussion, March 11, 1953. Bakhtiari tribesmen and the idea of establishing a “Free Iran” state in the south played minor roles in the August 1953 coup. See Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup D’État,” 255, 338.

42. NSC, First Progress Report; Letter From Lovett to Acheson.

43. NSC, First Progress Report; CIA, “Iran, February 1953”; CIA, “Capabilities of CIA Clandestine Services”; “158. Editorial Note.”

44. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup D’État,” 232; Byrne, "Road to Intervention"; Tehran Embassy Dispatch 251. On April 22, 1953, the NSC directed that all copies of the progress report be returned to it, perhaps indicating that the Eisenhower administration was abandoning the contingency plan. See NSC, "Record of Actions."

45. Tehran Embassy Telegrams 4324, 4356, and 42; Memo of Conversation, June 6, 1953; Wilber, Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq, 13, 27, A-6; Roosevelt, Countercoup, 160; interview with Roosevelt; and Memo From Waller to Wisner. Beck, The Qashqa’i, 153, reports that US officials offered the Qashqai $5 million at some point to break with Mosaddeq, which they refused.

46. Record of Meeting; Tehran Embassy Dispatch 608; Beck, The Qashqa’i, 155–159; and Memo From Rountree to Under Secretary of State.

47. Tehran Embassy Telegram 1102; NSC, NSC 5402.

48. NSC, NSC 5504.

49. Byrne and Gasiorowski, “1953 Iran Coup.”

50. See, e.g. Marsh, “The United States, Iran and Operation Ajax.”

51. Truman authorized extensive covert intervention in Eastern Europe and elsewhere as well. See Long, CIA and the Soviet Bloc.

52. See Gasiorowski, “US Perceptions.”

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Mark Gasiorowski

Mark Gasiorowski is a Professor of Political Science at Tulane University in New Orleans, LA, USA. Much of his research has focused on US policy toward Iran, with articles appearing in the International Journal of Middle East Studies, Middle Eastern Studies, the Middle East Journal, and other journals.