The CIA’s mole in the Viet Cong: learning from a rare success

ABSTRACT

What does it take to cultivate spies inside an adversary’s forces? I assess efforts by the United States and South Vietnam to penetrate the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War. I offer the first extended account of the United States’ most successful intelligence penetration of the conflict. After initial recruitment by South Vietnam, a mid-level Viet Cong cadre spied for the CIA from 1969 until the end of the war. U.S. experience in this episode and others in Vietnam points up a challenge. Local allies offer expertise in identifying potential informants. But prospective spies view U.S. intelligence as more trustworthy and legitimate than local agencies with dubious operational security.

Acknowledgements

For their feedback, assistance, and encouragement, I am grateful to Roger Petersen, Fotini Christia, Philip Martin, Andrew Miller, Nina McMurry, Marika Landau-Wells, Ben Chang, Lena Andrews, Reid Pauly, Noel Anderson, Merle Pribbenow, Mike Fowler, Mark Stout, participants at the 2018 International Studies Association conference in San Francisco, the anonymous reviewers, and the editors of Intelligence and National Security.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. DeForest and Chanoff, Slow Burn, 27.

2. Hitz, “Human Source Intelligence,” 261.

3. Fischer, “Vilification and Vindication.”

4. Jervis, “Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Perception,” 77–78.

5. U.S. review and oversight bodies have noted the unique value of intelligence penetrations for decades. See, e.g., Intelligence Capabilities of the United States.

6. Bar-Joseph, The Angel.

7. Among his other works, see Byman, “The Intelligence War,” 837–63.

8. Byman, “The Intelligence War,” 851.

9. See Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence. See also Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency,” 75–90.

10. Berman, Felter, and Shapiro, Small Wars, Big Data.

11. Bar-Joseph compares the accuracy of U.S. and Israeli assessments of Iran in the lead-up to the Islamic revolution, for example, and finds that Israeli estimate proved more accurate. Bar-Joseph, “Forecasting a Hurricane,” 718–42. Dahl also explains a positive outcome, the prevention of terrorist attacks, in Intelligence and Surprise Attack. Bar-Josph and McDermott usefully investigate U.S. intelligence success at the Battle of Midway in World War II. McDermott and Uri Bar-Joseph, “Pearl Harbor and Midway,” 949–62.

12. For one such study in the context of Vietnam, see Wirtz, The Tet Offensive.

13. On the difficulty of studying success, see Byman, “Intelligence and Its Critics,” 260–80.

14. Teague, “Double Blind.”

15. Quoted in Karnow, Vietnam, 603.

16. Sims, “A Theory of Intelligence,” 68.

17. National Intelligence Estimate (hereafter NIE) 63–59, “Prospects for North and South Vietnam,” 26 May 1959, CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001166782.pdf (Accessed 20 May 2014).

18. NIE 63.1-60, “Short Term Trends in South Vietnam,” 23 August 1960, CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001166419.pdf (Accessed 20 May 2014).

19. NIE 53-63, “Prospects in South Vietnam,” 17 April 1963, CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001166413.pdf (Accessed 20 May 2014).

20. Document 4 (8 February 1958) in Keefer and Mabon, FRUS, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I; Document 132 (8 April 1960) in Keefer and Mabon, FRUS, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I.

21. See note 17 above.

22. CIA, “Memo for the Special Group (CI): Intelligence Collection and Evaluation in South Vietnam,” 25 June 1962, CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000399812.pdf (Accessed 20 May 2014).

23. Ibid.

24. Advanced detection often comes from human sources inside an insurgency. Captured documents seldom reveal the time and place of future attacks, and defectors or prisoners usually lack this knowledge after a few months out of the fight.

25. Ahern, CIA and Rural Pacification, 128.

26. Ibid., 280.

27. Moyar, Phoenix. See also Sullivan, Of Spies and Lies.

28. Moyar, Phoenix, 73.

29. See Sullivan, Of Spies and Lies.

30. DeForest and Chanoff, Slow Burn, 59.

31. Quoted Valentine, The Phoenix Program, 109.

32. Ibid.

33. Finlayson, “Tay Ninh Provincial Reconnaissance.”

34. See, e.g., Stein, Murder in Wartime, 72.

35. Quoted in Moyar, Phoenix, 68.

36. Valentine, Phoenix Program, 165.

37. Ibid., 334.

38. Ibid.

39. See David Corn, Blond Ghost.

40. DeForest’s memoir of his time in Vietnam serves as one of only a handful of open-source records of these unilateral penetrations. DeForest’s claims fit with allusions and references in other memoirs, secondary source volumes on intelligence in Vietnam, and declassified documents.

41. DeForest, Slow Burn, 231.

42. Ibid., 173.

43. Valentine, Phoenix Program, 109.

44. DeForest, 115.

45. Ibid., 173.

46. Merle Pribbenow, a Vietnamese linguist and former CIA officer, has pioneered English-language documentation on the case of Vo Van Ba. I thank Pribbenow for calling my attention to key documents. Pribbenow presented his research on Ba at “Intelligence in the Vietnam War,” a conference sponsored by Texas Tech University and the Center for the Study of Intelligence in 2006. The video of his presentation, “The Most Famous Unknown Spies of the Vietnam War,” is available here: https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/events/2006_Intel_Conference/2006sessions_fall.php (Accessed in June 2019).

47. In some accounts, Ba is referred to by his alleged codename, “Hackle.” Other accounts call him the “Tay Ninh Source,” owing to the area where he operated. DeForest uses the nickname “The Reaper” to reference an agent that is almost certainly Ba. This is based on DeForest’s detailed description of the location and timing of Ba’s initial work for the CIA, his contributions over a period of years, and his reporting at the very end of the war.

48. Pribbenow, “Most Famous Unknown Spies.”

49. Article from Quan Doi Nhan Dan online (People’s Army Newspaper), with English translation by Merle Pribbenow - 45th Anniversary of the Formation of the Military Security Deparment: ‘The Fate of an Internal Spy’, 22 July 1995, Box 01, Folder 08, Merle Pribbenow Collection, Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=16900108001, Accessed 22 Jul 2019.

50. Quoted in Corn, Blond Ghost, 202.

51. Moyar, Phoenix, 67.

52. Mai Huong Tra, “Looking Back on the Vo Van Ba ‘Internal Mole’ Case 20 Years Later,” People’s Public Security Magazine, Issue 4, 1995 (translated by Merle Pribbenow and provided by Pribbenow to the author on 18 August 2014).

53. See note 52 above.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. See note 48 above.

58. See note 53 above.

59. See note 49 above.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. DeForest, Slow Burn, 51.

63. Ibid., 52.

64. Ibid., 255.

65. Kalyvas and Kocher, “Ethnic Cleavages,” 183–223.

66. “Speech Given by the Minister at the Third Conference on Investigation of Political Targets [held in September 1977],” Ministry of Interior, 1 October 1979 (translated by Merle Pribbenow and provided by Pribbenow to the author on 18 August 2014).

67. See note 49 above.

68. See note 52 above.

69. See note 49 above.

70. Finlayson, Rice Paddy Recon, 233–4.

71. Ibid.

72. DeForest suggests that Ba provided warning of the Easter Offensive.

73. Document 194 (28 June 1972) in Carland, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume VIII, Vietnam, January–October 1972.

74. Document 242 (8 September 1972) in Carland, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume VIII, Vietnam, January–October 1972.

75. CIA, “COSVN Offensive Instruction,” 8 September 1972, CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/loc-hak-26-6-3-3 (accessed June 2019).

76. Might these documents have come from other agents or even other methods? When the CIA gained knowledge of COSVN documents or directives from sources other than an agent, such as captured documents or defectors, they said so explicitly in declassified versions of the documents. None of the reports I cite as originating from Ba bear such hallmarks. In January 1974, for example, a CIA report said a “rallier” (i.e. defector) had provided an account of a new COSVN resolution. In October 1974 we see another example of a case where the document was captured by ground forces. The document states this clearly. CIA, “National Intelligence Bulletin,” 30 October 1974, CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00975A027100010020-7.pdf (accessed June 2019).

77. CIA, “Weekly Summary,” 6 July 1973, CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00927A010400010001-7.pdf (accessed June 2019).

78. CIA, “The President’s Daily Brief,” 3 July 1973, CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/0005993865 (accessed June 2019).

79. Document 212 (9 April 1975) in Coleman, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975.

80. Finlayson, Rice Paddy Recon, p. 238.

81. “Speech Given By the Minister,” Ministry of Interior.

82. Colby and McCargar, Lost Victory, 183–84.

83. See note 81 above.

84. Helms and Hood, Look Over My Shoulder, 316.

85. Hoffman, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.”

86. Urban, Task Force Black, 52.

87. Burns and Semple, “Iraq Insurgency Has Funds.” It did not help that the insurgents operated in small and compartmentalized cells. See Chehab, Iraq Ablaze.

88. Boyne and Blanche, “Iraqi Intelligence Agencies Face Uphill Struggle.’

89. O’Hern, Intelligence Wars, 193.

90. Oppel, Mazetti, and Mekhennet, “Attacker in Afghanistan.” See also Warrick, The Triple Agent.

91. Document 48 (2 October 1968) in Sieg, FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969.

92. Lyall, “Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents?”

93. See note 52 above.

94. See note 80 above.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Cullen G. Nutt

Cullen G. Nutt is a U.S. Foreign Policy and International Security Fellow at the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College.