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ABSTRACT
Analytic objectivity as a standard for the US Intelligence Community appears to have been drawn from idealized conceptualizations of the scientific method as a kind of value-neutral epistemological framework used to develop knowledge “objectively.” But this embrace of objectivity provides a poor foundation for contemporary conceptualizations of the applied epistemology of intelligence analysis, as well as performance standards. Instead, intelligence analysts should embrace a more realistic goal of aspiring to but never actually achieving analytic objectivity through the reduction of subjectivity while embracing the values of honesty, neutrality, and integrity encapsulated in the phrase “calling it as you see it”.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Richard Immerman, James Marchio, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments and resulting improvements to earlier versions of this draft.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. For debates about and challenges to objectivity within scientific inquiry, see: entry on scientific objectivity in Stanford University’s Encyclopedia on Philosophy.
2. US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Report on the Progress of the Director of National Intelligence in Implementing the ‘Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,” 12.
3. US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Analytic Transformation,” 18.
4. US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Intelligence Community Directive 203,” 2015.
5. Webster’s Dictionary.
6. US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Intelligence Community Directive 203,” 2007.
7. See note 4 above.
8. See note 6 above.
9. See note 4 above.
10. Marchio, “Personal Correspondence with the author.” August 13, 2018. Citing: US Director of Central Intelligence, Review of National Intelligence, 1.
11. Boatner, “The Evaluation of Intelligence,” 67. As cited in: Marchio, “Analytic Tradecraft,” 159–183.
12. Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, 45.
13. Ibid., 156.
14. Ibid., 72–73.
15. Platt, Strategic Intelligence Production, 140.
16. Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, 182.
17. Hilsman, “Intelligence,” 12–13.
18. Gates, “Guarding Against Politicization,” 5.
19. For more on the standard model, see Marrin, “Intelligence Analysis”; and Marrin, “Rethinking Analytic Politicization”.
20. Fingar, “Intelligence and Grand Strategy,” 123–128.
21. Katz, Foreign Intelligence, 18–19.
22. Ibid., 41–42.
23. Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, 46.
24. Hughes, “The Fate of Facts in a World of Men”.
25. Megill, “Introduction,” 1–20.
26. Davis, “Intelligence Analysts,” 1007.
27. US Central Intelligence Agency, “Report of a Seminar on Bias in Intelligence Analysis,” 7–8.
28. Ibid., 1–2.
29. Ransom, “The Intelligence Establishment,” 227.
30. Gates, “The CIA,” 221.
31. Ford, “Estimative Intelligence,” 184–185.
32. Adams, “War of Numbers”.
33. Wirtz, “Intelligence to Please?,” 239–263.
34. Marrin, “Rethinking Analytic Politicization,” 32–54.
35. Fingar, “Intelligence and Grand Strategy,” 128.
36. Gates, “The CIA,” 227.
37. Horowitz, “Framework for Understanding Intelligence,” 395.
38. The strategic surprise and intelligence failure literature tends to emphasize what happens rather than what does not happen. In terms of warning outcomes, there are four: hit (warning, event happens), miss (no warning, event happens), false alarm (warning, no event), and correct rejection (not warning, no event). From the policy response side, if warning is provided, the implication is that action should be taken. Except that intelligence analysts have an incentive to over warn. In the same way that the strategic surprise and intelligence failure literatures do not emphasize what does not happen (correct rejections) the policymaking and implementation literatures do the same when no action is taken in response to warning, and nothing happens.
39. Marengo et al, “National Estimates,” 44.
40. US Central Intelligence Agency, “Report of a Seminar on Bias in Intelligence Analysis,” 6.
41. See note 35 above.
42. MacEachin, “The Tradecraft of Analysis,” 75.
43. Gates, “The CIA,” 230.
44. US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Principles of Professional Ethics,” 3.
45. Lowenthal, Intelligence, 319.
46. Wippl and D’Andrea, “The Qualities That Make a Great,” 811.
47. Sims in Treverton, Jones, Boraz and Lipscy, Conference Proceedings: Toward a Theory of Intelligence Workshop Report, 24.
48. Sims, A Theory of Intelligence, 58–92.
49. Davis, Intelligence Analysts, 1001.
50. Davis, “Improving CIA Analytic Performance,” 7.
51. Scowcroft, “The Value of Intelligence Analysis”.
52. Knorr, “Foreign Intelligence,” 17; Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis; Platt, Strategic Intelligence Production.
53. See chapter 3 on Improving the Science of Intelligence Analysis in: Marrin, “Improving Intelligence Analysis”.
54. Marrin, “Intelligence Analysis,” 131–150.
55. Novick, That Noble Dream.
56. See chapter 2, “A Theory of the Politicization of Expertise” in Bimber, “The Politics of Expertise in Congress,” 12–13.
57. Hastedt, “The New Context of Intelligence Estimating,” 54.
58. Vogel, “Expert Knowledge in Intelligence Assessments,” 59.
59. Pielke, “When Scientists Politicize Science,” 30.
60. Coates, “What is A Public Policy Issue?” 57.
61. Hoppe, “Rethinking,” 199–215.
62. Kent, “Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy,” 180.
63. Moore, “Social Science and Policy Analysis,” 271–291.
64. Weiss, “Communicating Uncertainty in Intelligence,” 58.
65. Henig, “Politicization of Evidence,” 137.
66. Ibid., 140.
67. Bimber, “The Politics of Expertise in Congress,” 12–14.
68. Betts, “American Strategic Intelligence,” 257.
69. Henig, “Politicization of Evidence,” 36–37.
70. Moore, “Social Science and Policy Analysis,” 272.
71. Ibid., 288–289.
72. For more on the proximity hypothesis, see: Marrin, “At Arm’s Length or At the Elbow?”; and Marrin and Davies, “National Assessment by the National Security Council Staff 1968–80,” 645–646.
73. MacEachin, “The Tradecraft of Analysis,” 75.
74. Ibid.
75. Heuer, Limits of Intelligence Analysis, 86.
76. US Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and The MITRE Corporation, Analytic Objectivity Symposium Registration Website. September 2016. Accessed May 2018. https://register.mitre.org/analytic-objectivity-symposium/.
77. See chapter 4 on Improving the Art of Intelligence Analysis in: Marrin, “Improving Intelligence Analysis”.
78. Chang et al., Restructuring Structured Analytic Techniques in Intelligence.
79. Hilsman, “Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs,” 1–45; Hughes, The Fate of Facts in a World of Men; and Kendall, “The Function of Intelligence,” 542–552.
80. Marrin and Davies, ‘National Assessment by the National Security Council Staff 1968–80,” 644–673.
81. Ibid.
82. Kerbel and Olcott “The Intelligence-Policy Nexus,” 1–13.
83. Gill and Phythian, “Issues in the Theorisation of Intelligence” citing Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, 127–28.
84. Woodard, “Tasting the Forbidden Fruit,” 91–108.
85. Holmes, “Pathos, Where Art Thou?”
86. Herman, “Threat Assessments,” 177.
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Stephen Marrin
Stephen Marrin is an associate professor at James Madison University where he is director of the Intelligence Analysis program in the School of Integrated Sciences. Previously, he worked as an analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). He earned his PhD from the University of Virginia, and began his academic career in the Intelligence Studies Department at Mercyhurst University before moving to London, UK to teach in Brunel University’s Department of Politics and History. He was Chair of the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association for five years, and a Visiting Fellow with the Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies at Brunel University.