Sharing empire: Great Britain, Fascist Italy, and (anti-) colonial intelligence networks in the Palestine Mandate, 1933-1940

ABSTRACT

This article contributes to the growing body of literature on colonial intelligence by examining the Palestine Mandate. Throughout the 1930s, Fascist Italy developed a network of local agents, informants, and intermediaries that reported on both local conditions and the British imperial administration. Yet the region was not a site of unrestrained imperial competition. Instead, I argue that the British and Italians transformed Palestine into a shared imperial space. Through colonial intelligence networks, Fascist Italy built an essential imperial infrastructure in the Palestine Mandate that overlapped with the British administration and diverted a certain degree of authority to Rome.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Francine McKenzie for her countless comments and suggestions on the broader project from which this article emerged. I am also very grateful to Timothy Andrews Sayle, G. Bruce Strang, and Nicolas G. Virtue for taking the time to read earlier drafts. I appreciate the thoughtful feedback of the two anonymous reviewers in helping me to move my work forward.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Appunto Per il Gabinetto, 2 September 1936, Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri [hereafter ASMAE], Gabinetto [hereafter Gab.], 743, b[usta] 3.

2. Appunto Per il Gabinetto, 2 September 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

3. De Angelis Report, 3 September 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

4. De Angelis Report, 3 September 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

5. De Angelis Report, 3 September 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

6. Appunto per S.E. il Ministro, 21 November 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

7. There are a number of well-known texts that recognize studies of intelligence as a missing dimension of international history. See Andrew and Dilks, The Missing Dimension; Jackson and Scott (eds.), Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century; Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy; and Ferris, “The Road to Bletchley Park”. More recently, scholars have argued that while studies of intelligence have become increasingly commonplace in international history, intelligence remains a “missed dimension” in histories of empire. See Thomas, Empires of Intelligence, 13; Wagner, Statecraft by Stealth, 5.

8. Bayly, Empire and Information.

9. See Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign; Sheffy, “The Spy Who Never Was”; Sheffy, “British Intelligence and the Middle East 1900–1918 how much do we know?”; Williams, “Mussolini”s Secret War in the Mediterranean and the Middle East”; Satia Spies in Arabia; Mohs, Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt; Owen, “British and French Military Intelligence in Syria and Palestine”, 1–6; Hevia, The Imperial Security State; Thomas, 2; Wagner, 9.

10. Mainwaring and Aldrich, “The Secret Empire of Signals Intelligence”.

11. See Sinha, “Projecting Power”, 263.

12. See Renzo de Felice, “Arabi e Medio Oriente nella strategia politica di guerra di Mussolini (1940–1943).” Storia Contemporanea 17, no. 6 (1986), 1255–1359; Renzo de Felice, Il Fascismo e l”Oriente: Arabi, Ebrei, e Indiani nella Politica di Mussolini. (Bologna: il Mulino, 1988).

13. Arielli, Fascist Italy and the Middle East; Arielli, “Italian Involvement in the Arab Revolt in Palestine”.

14. See Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 87–110.

15. Williams, Mussolini”s Propaganda Abroad, 52.

16. This view of intelligence parallels John Ferris”s explanation of intelligence between states and Steven B. Wagner”s definition of intelligence in empire: Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy, 99; Wagner, 3.

17. See Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 189.

18. See Balfour to de Martino, 19 July 1922, F[oriegn] O[ffice Records] 371/7778, E 7213/78/65, The National Archives [hereafter TNA]; Mussolini to Bordonaro, 10 July 1928, Documenti Diplomtici Italiani [hereafter DDI] S[eries]. 7, Vol 6; Mussolini to Bordonaro, 22 December 1928, DDI, S. 7, Vol. 7. R.J.B. Bosworth has covered widely the continuities between Liberal and Fascist imperial ambitions. See Bosworth, “Italy and the End of the Ottoman Empire”. Mussolini”s interest in expanding the Italian empire to the Eastern Mediterranean was also deeply ideological. See Knox, Common Destiny, 53–110; Kallis, Fascist Ideology, 27–60; Strang, On the Fiery March, 26–32.

19. Wagner, 183.

20. In considering backing the Zionist cause, De Angelis warned that a strong Jewish presence could pose a grave threat to Mussolini’s expansionist objectives if it were not under firm Italian influence. See Relazione Per S. I. Il Ministro, n.d., ASMAE, Affari Politici, 1919–1931 [hereafter AP (I)], Palestina, b. 1456, fasc. 6347.

21. Relazione Per S. I. Il Ministro, n.d., ASMAE, AP (I), Palestina, b. 1456, fasc. 6347.

22. See Fiore, “Anglo-Italian Armament Trade Competition in Iraq”.

23. See Williams, Mussolini”s Propaganda Abroad,124–142; Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 25–86; Gershoni and Jankowski, Confronting Fascism in Egypt; Mazza, “A Coherent Inconsistency”.

24. Thomas, 5–6.

25. Thomas, 5; 25–26; Bayly, 6–9.

26. Bayly, 365.

27. See Thomas, 21–25.

28. Mainwaring and Aldrich, 56.

29. See Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy, 99.

30. De Angelis to Jaconomi, 37 May 1935, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3; De Angelis to Jaconomi, 20 May 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3; De Angelis to Jacomoni, 3 June 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

31. Sulla Missione Compiuta in Palestina (Berionni), 9–29 December 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3; Appunto Per S.E. Il Ministro, 1 January 1937, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

32. For example, see R. Legazione d”Italia in Egitto (signature illegible) to Ministro degli Affari Ester, ASMAE, Affari Politici, 1931–1945 [hereafter AP (II)], b. 13, fasc. 1. By the 1930s, Italian colonial officials had few connections to the Zionist movement in Palestine. They did, however, occasionally receive information from the large Italian-Jewish immigration community in Egypt about both the Zionist movement and Muslim public opinion in Egypt.

33. Wagner, 4; Thomas, 76–78; Satia, 5.

34. See Williams, “Mussolini”s Secret War,” 881–904; Williams, Mussolini’s Propaganda, 147–181. The documentation makes several mentions of a Professor Enderle. He was a SIM agent who gave lectures and built connections with the Arab intelligentsia in Palestine. See Djabri to Gabinetto, 8 May 1934, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3; Appunto, 8 October 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3; Enderle to Ciano, 18 July 1937, DDI, S. 8, vol. 7; Enderle to Ciano, 23 July 1937, DDI, S. 8, vol. 7. The documents also mentions a “Dr. Hoff” which was a pseudonym for an Italian SIM agent Lo Lario who worked in Palestinian hospitals and coordinated arms deliveries. See Appunto per S.E. il Ministro, 21 November 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3; Relazione relative alla missione compiuta ad Atene il 20 Gennaio (Berionni), 22 January 1937, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3. Also see O’Halloran, “India, the Arabs, and Britain”s Problem in Palestine, 1937–1939.”

35. Wagner, 9–10.

36. See Boyd to Mason, 6 July 1936, FO 371/20,021, E 4195/94/31, TNA.

37. See Boyd to Mason, 6 July 1935, FO 371/20,021. E 4185/94/31, TNA; Hall to Assistant Chief Secretary, 20 September 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 6260/293/31, TNA.

38. See Hall to Assistant Chief Secretary, 20 September 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 6260/293/31, TNA; Boyd to Mason, 6 July 1936, FO 371/20,021, E 4195/94/31, TNA.

39. See UK Delegation to FO, 15 April 1935, FO 371/18,836, C 3289/55/18, TNA.

40. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 18 September 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 5538/293/31, TNA.

41. See Rochat, Guerre italiane in Libia e in Etiopia: Studi militari 1921–1939; Labanca, Oltremare: storia dell’espansione colonial italiana; Gooch, “Re-Conquest and Suppression”; Bassi, Labanca, and Sturani. Libia. Una guerra colonial italiana; Labanca, La guerra italiana per la Libia: 1911–1931; Ryan, “Violence and the Politics of Prestige”.

42. Rice to Foreign Office, 8 May 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 3519/293/31, TNA.

43. A. G. Wauchope Memorandum, 10 August 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 5538/293/31, TNA.

44. See A. G. Wauchope Memorandum, 10 August 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 5538/293/31, TNA. Several historians have written about Italian propaganda in the Arab World operating out of the wireless radio station in Bari. See MacDonald, “Radio Bari”; Williams, Mussolini’s Propaganda, 52–23; Arielli, Fascist Italy in the Middle East, 48–52 and 69; Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 35–69.

45. Ward Minute, 13 July 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 4117/293/31, TNA; Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 14 September 1935, FO 371/18,925, E 5595/5595/65, TNA; Also see Williams, Mussolini’s Propaganda, 172.

46. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 14 September 1935, FO 371/18,925, E 5595/5595/65, TNA.

47. Appunto Per S. E. Il Ministro (De Angelis), 22 July 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

48. Sulla Missione Compiuta in Palestina, 9–29 December 1936, n.d., ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

49. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 14 September 1935, FO 371/18,925, E5595/5595/65, TNA.

50. Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 56.

51. See note above 43.

52. See note above 42.

53. Appunto Per Il Capo del Governo (De Angelis), 4 September 1934, ASMAE, GAB. 743, b. 3.

54. Suvich to Mussolini, 4 September 1934, DDI, S. 7, Vol. 15.

55. De Angelis to Gabinetto, 17 October 1935, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

56. Italo-Abyssinian Dispute: Italian Intelligence Service, 6 September 1935, HW 12/195/061732, TNA.

57. See D. S. P Northern to District Police Headquarters (Haifa), 19 September 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 6260/293/31, TNA; Moody to Williams, 28 September 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 6260/293/31, TNA.

58. Moody to Williams, 28 September 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 6260/293/31, TNA.

59. Williams to Rendel, 27 April 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 2690/293/31, TNA.

60. Hall to Williams, 8 May 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 3519/293/31, TNA. Filastin, however, was generally favourable to the Italians during the Arab Revolt and Al Jami-a Al Islamiya also published a number of anti-British articles during the revolt. See also Arielli, Fascist Italy and the Middle East, 130; Wagner, 128–9.

61. FO Memorandum (Eastern Department), 23 September 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 5741/293/31, TNA; also see Williams, Mussolini’s Propaganda, 110; Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 36; Arielli, Fascist Italy and the Middle East, 52.

62. See Downie to Rendel, 3 July 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 4117/293/31, TNA.

63. See Downie to Rendel, 3 July 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 4117/293/31, TNA; Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 26 October 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 6373/293/31, TNA; Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 31 October 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 6483/293/31, TNA.

64. Ward Minute, 13 July 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 4117/293/31, TNA; Rendel Minute, 28 October 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 6373/293/31, TNA; Malcolm Minute, 28 October 1935, FO 371/18,958, E 6373/293/31, TNA.

65. See Record of a discussion of the possibility of a retaliation in kind against Italian anti-British propaganda in the Middle East,” 22 November 1937, R 7779/1/22, Documents on British Foreign Policy [hereafter DBFP] S. 2, Vol. 19; Nichols Minute, 2 July 1937, FO 371/21,159, R 4557/1/22.

66. For a more comprehensive appraisal of British strategic considerations in the Mediterranean after the Abyssinia Crisis, see Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez; Salerno, Vital Crossroads.

67. Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 87; Williams, Mussolini’s Propaganda, 56; Goglia, “Il Mufti e Mussolini: alcuni documenti diplomatici Italiani sui rapporti tra nazionalismo palestinese e fascismo negli anni trenta.”

68. See Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 91–105; Arielli, Fascist Italy in the Middle East, 110–123; Arielli, “Italian Involvement in the Arab Revolt,” 187–204.

69. See Wagner, Statecraft by Stealth,157–62; Sanagan, “Teacher, Preacher, Soldier, Martyr”.

70. Wagner, 159–60.

71. Gabinetto – Segreto Appunto, 3 September 1935, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

72. Gabinetto – Segreto Appunto, 3 September 1935, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

73. Appunto Per S.E. Il Ministro (De Angelis), 21 July 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3; Also see, Arielli, Fascist Italy in the Middle East, 72; Arielli, “Italian Involvement in the Arab Revolt,” 189–93.

74. Appunto per S.E. il Ministro, 4 September 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3; Moody to Williams, 19 October 1935, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3; District Officers Report, 15 October 1935, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3; Daily Intelligence Summary No. 193/35, 18 October 1935, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3. Fiore points out that British intel on Italian activities was not entirely correct. Whitehall was aware that the Italians were funding the Revolt, but believed they were doing so through bank transfers between the Banco di Roma in Beirut and its branch in Jerusalem. This funding, however, was passed directly through the network of agents and intermediaries. See Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 95.

75. Gabinetto – Segreto Appunto, 3 September 1935, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

76. Per Sua Eccellenza il Capo Del Governo, 14 December 1935, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

77. De Angelis report, 3 September 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

78. Appunto per S.E. il Ministro, 4 September 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

79. Appunto Baistrocchi, 10 September 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3; and also see Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 97.

80. Appunto Per S.E. il Ministro, 21 November 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

81. See Appunto Per S.E. il Ministro, 21 November 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3; Relazione relative alla missione compiuta ad Atene il 20 Gennaio (Berionni), 22 Janaury 1937, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3

82. Norton to FO, 25 June 1937, FO 371/21,159, E 3563/22/31, TNA.

83. Ibid.

84. See Lo Lario to Ministro degli Affari Esteri, 17 May 1937, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3; Cerutti to Gabinetto, 22 May 1937, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3; Gabrielli to Capo di Gabinetto, 8 August 1937, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

85. Appunto (Baistrocchi), 10 September 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

86. Appunto (Baistrocchi), 10 September 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3; Appunto per il Duce, 26 September 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3; Baistrocchi to Ministro degli Affari Esteri, 26 December 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

87. Arielli, “Italian Involvement in the Arab Revolt,” 196.

88. See note above 85.

89. Appunto per il Duce, 26 September 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3; Appunto, 28 September 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

90. Appunto (Baistrocchi), 5 October 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

91. Appunto, 14 April 1937, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

92. Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 110.

93. See Eden Memorandum, 20 June 1936, FO 371/20,021, E 3642/94/31, TNA.

94. See Sulla Missione Compiuta in Palestina (Berionni), 9–26 December 1936, ASMAE, Gab. 743, b. 3.

95. Foreign Office Minute (Eastern Department), 22 August 1936, FO 371/20,023, E 5390/94/31, TNA.

96. See Eden Minute (Italian Ambassador Conversation), 14 June 1937, FO 271/21,159, R 4147/1/22, TNA; Nichols Minute, 2 July 1937, FO 371/21,159, R 4557/1/22, TNA; Grandi to Ciano, 7 July 1937, DDI, S. 8, vol. 8.

97. See 12 August 1937, CAB 53/32/8, TNA; 8 September 1937, CAB 23/89/5, TNA; Chamberlain to Eden, 7 January 1938, A[von] P[apers, Cadbury Research Library] 13/1/49 U.

98. See Gilchrist, ““Clouds of Mutual Suspicion”“; Strang, “A Mésentente Cordiale”.

99. Cabinet Conclusions, n.d., FO 371/22,404, F 1714/23/22, TNA.

100. Perth to FO, 16 May 1938, FO 371/ 22,412, R 5205/23/22, TNA.

101. Perth to FO, 16 April 1938, FO 371/22,410, R 3940/23/22, TNA.

102. Anglo-Italian negotiations, Perth to FO, 30 May 1938, FO 371/22,412, R 5205/23/22, TNA; Conversation with the British Ambassador, 3 June 1938, Ciano”s Diplomatic Papers, 211.

103. Appunto Per S.E. Il Ministro, 4 July 1938, ASMAE, Gab. 744, b. 4, fasc. 1; Arielli, “Italian Involvement in the Arab Revolt,” 200–201.

104. Appunto per S. E. Il Ministro, 29 March 1938, ASMAE, Gab. 744, b. 4, fasc. 1.

105. Ibid. 1.

106. See Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law; Pedersen, The Guardians; Wempe, Revenants of the German Empire.

107. Cabinet Conclusions (extract), 8 July 1937, FO 371/21,159, R 4736/1/22, TNA.

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Jessi A. J. Gilchrist

Jessi A. J. Gilchrist is currently a graduate student at the University of Toronto. Her research focuses on Anglo-Italian relations over empire with a particular interest in imperial borderlands, surveillance, and cooperation. Her work has most recently appeared in The International History Review and International Journal.