From the politics of lying to the farce at Suez: What the US knew

Abstract

This article seeks to establish, in a definitive manner, what the US knew about the Suez invasion plan of 1956.

With the benefit of the CIA's U‐2 reconnaissance plane, the US was able to pinpoint, as of mid‐October, the existence of nearly three times the number of Mystère fighters in Israel than had previously been notified to Washington by the French government. That plus an information blackout on the part of the British and the French, and the breakdown of negotiations with the Egyptians at the UN, roused Washington's apprehensions that a military option was being considered. However, though there was suspicion on the part of the US that an Israeli‐French operation might be in the offing, Washington never seriously focused on the possibility of a tripartite operation involving the British, the French, and the Israelis. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles relied on the Anglo‐American special relationship and on British good sense not to get involved. In particular, Washington completely missed the fact of the British‐French‐Israeli meeting at Sèvres, at which time (24 October), the decision was taken to launch the operation five days later. The transparent nature of the British‐French announced decision, after the Israeli attack, to ‘separate’ the Egyptian and Israeli forces doomed the operation from the start before the court of world opinion. In this manner, Operation ‘Separation of Forces’ was transformed into a force.