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Abstract
This article uses recent changes within the Austrian university system to illustrate some general features and dilemmas of organizational design and reform. We focus upon two recent layers of the sediments left by previous and current system reforms: that left by the events of 1968 on continental university systems, and Austria’s late conversion to the path taken by the Anglo‐American university system since the late 1970s/early 1980s; namely, towards what Marginson and Considine (Citation2000) have called the “enterprise university”. These two reform waves are, we argue, neatly reflected in two university laws—UOG 1975 and UG 2002—which capture with great clarity the spirit of these two policy moments. The Austrian case is thus of interest for two types of reason: first, because of the co‐existence of deeply engrained traditions with more recent experiments in organizational democracy (co‐determination); secondly, because of the rapidity with which current reforms seek to catch up with what are taken to be international developments in university management. Drawing on arguments advanced by Christopher Hood, Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, and by Albert Hirschman, we seek to draw general conclusions concerning the implications of organizational reform for the management of organizations generally, and of universities in particular.
Notes
[1] In addition to the published versions of the university laws (Bast Citation1998 for UOG 1993 and Sebök Citation2002 for UG 2002), both UG 2002 and its predecessor, UOG 1993, can be found on the internet (UG 2002 at http://www.unigesetz.at/html/frameset.html; UOG 1993 at http://www.kfunigraz.ac.at/zvwww/gesetze/uog93.html). Here we focus largely on UOG 1975 (Ermacora Citation1994) and UG 2002 because these represent two clearly different paradigms of university governance. UOG 1993 was an attempt at a compromise between these two poles. Our conclusion will in fact suggest that a more consistent attempt to work out and pragmatically reform the compromise position represented by UOG 93 may have proven a more rational approach to university reform and governance.
[2] Historically, the German system distinguished between the Ordinarius (full professor) on the one hand, and the Auβerordinarius and Dozent (those who have completed the Habilitation, but have not been externally berufen—called to a full chair) on the other.
[3] The four models are given by Douglas’s characterization of grid and group as either high or low. “Grid” refers to the extent to which human communities are governed—or not governed—by fixed rules/conventions. “Group” refers to the degree of cooperation/solidarity existing within the community (roughly corresponding to Durkheim’s notion of “moral density”). This gives us four distinct community/organizational types: see Table .
[4] This has a long historical tradition particularly in the German/Prussian university system (see Stichweh Citation1994: 157).
[5] The Bologna Declaration was signed by EU education ministers in June 1999. The Declaration itself must be viewed as part of the internationalization process in that it brings continental HE systems into line with the Anglo‐American model—Bachelors, Masters, and PhD.
[6] These external Leistungsvereinbarungen (performance contracts)—but not the internal Zielvereinbarungen (contracts concerning agreed aims)—were deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. It is unclear what impact this judgement will have, or what form the state–university relation will take. An arbitration commission (Schlichtungskommission) presided over by a judge and with expert advisors, has been instituted by the government order to advise on these matters.
[7] The Austrian university councils are representative of a much narrower range of interests than are the US boards, and are much more interventionist than their UK equivalents.
[8] Of the seven members, three were to be chosen by the university, three by the Ministry, and the remaining member by the six selected. If they fail to agree on the seventh council member, the senate must accept one candidate from a list drawn up by the Austrian Academy of Science.
[9] New faculty, both lectures (Wissenschaftliche MitarbeiterInnen—WMAs) and professors, can be appointed either to temporary posts (of not more that six years) with the option of being made permanent at the end of the contract period, or to permanent (but not tenured in the US sense) positions. These matters lie within universities’ discretion, and the trend is towards temporary appointments.
[10] One might interpret this as confirmation of Max Weber’s old argument that a Ständestaatdemokratie (democracy based upon the principles of the polity of estates, as opposed to those of modern representative democracy) is incompatible with, indeed hinders, political, economic, and cultural modernization (Weber 1918/Citation1994). For a detailed discussion, see Scott (Citation2000).
[11] In particular, the more piecemeal changes introduced by UOG 1993 (which was not in fact implemented until 1999 in the larger universities) were not given sufficient time to prove themselves. The implementation of reforms on the basis of UOG 1993 was in part hindered by university academics who may have thus have missed the last opportunity to influence the direction of the reform process.
[12] While the formation of the Russell Group of 19 top English universities in 1994 marked, at least symbolically, the end of the formal equality between universities in England, and while both the French state system and the American university system have long—even formally—been unequal, only now with UG 2002 has the starter gun been fired for the jostling for position between Austrian universities in what is bound to become an increasingly hierarchical system. As Halsey (Citation1992) notes, in the UK this equality was always largely formal with general acknowledgement that the “golden triangle” of Oxford, Cambridge, and London stood at the top of the hierarchy in terms of reputation, job destinations, public vs. state school recruitment, resources, and so on. Nevertheless, the external examiners system sought to assure reasonable constancy of assessment standards across the entire system. This enabled at least a façade of equality to be maintained, and assisted some universities outside the golden triangle (e.g., the larger red bricks, some of the 1960s new universities) in catching up, not least by imitating and recruiting from Oxbridge. After the conversion of the old polytechnics into new universities in the 1980s, even the pretence of equality has been abandoned. The formation of the Russell Group is one manifestation of this, the proliferation of league tables another.
[13] There is no properly institutionalized system of internal promotion to personal chairs. A number of ad hoc measures have been deployed to address this problem—such as automatically giving those with the Habilitation the title of “Extra‐Ordinary Professor” (Auβerordentlicher Professor), or promoting some individuals by the back door—but such measures were largely sops (see Daxner Citation1999).
