Possibilities of Democratisation in Organisations

Abstract

In the reflection on organisations there is a tradition that focuses on the dimensions of power within organisations. Generally in that tradition, organisations are interpreted as complex unities of individuals and coalitions who try to influence the functioning of organisations with a view to their values and interests. This tradition presents itself in opposition to mainstream thinking about organisations in which they are interpreted as technical systems for making profits through efficient ways of production. This dichotomy of tradition reflects more or less Habermas’s dichotomy of communicative and instrumental reason. In this article I develop a perspective that goes beyond this dichotomy. I try to show by means of a critical analysis of organisations from a “technological” perspective that organisations are necessarily open to democratic actions. This can be considered as an unforeseen application or example of the Habermasian communicative reason.

Keywords:

• Democratisation
• Technology
• Feenberg
• Underdetermination
• Organisation
• Politics
• Action
• Design
• Choices
• Critical theory
• Ontology

Notes

[1] See online (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_management_studies).

[2] There are other concepts or theories developed by Feenberg, such as those of “primary and secondary instrumentalization” and “operational autonomy”. They are related to the concept of underdetermination, but in this article I pay no attention to these relations.

[3] In the philosophy of science, underdetermination is well known in the form of the Duhem–Quine thesis (Ariew 1984). This thesis asserts that any empirical evaluation of a theory is in fact a composite test of several interconnected hypotheses. Recalcitrant evidence signals falsity within the conjunction of hypotheses, but logic alone cannot pinpoint the individual element(s) inside the theoretical cluster responsible for a false prediction. The thesis refers to the inevitable lack of logically compelling reasons for preferring one competing scientific theory to another (Feenberg 1995).

[4] I use the term “non‐design elements” because these elements escape most of the categories of a (concrete) design, as I will argue.

[5] See Peters (1988), Clegg, Kornberger, and Pitsis (2006), Cloke and Goldsmith (2003), Senge (1990), Eccles, Nohria, and Berkley (1992), Handy (1994), Beer and Nohria (2000), Schein (1999), Hatch (1997), Naisbitt (1994), Vaill (1989) and Waterman (1990).

[6] For instance, to make available a computer infrastructure, authorisation to define one’s own goals for learning, authorisation to appoint project contributors, disposition of a budget, and so on.

[7] It is clear that such a match between personal aims and organisational goals is not guaranteed. My point is that, in principle, the possibilities of democratic actions by employees are greater when the organisation is knowledge intensive.