Contrastivism and Closure

Abstract

This paper argues for a solution to a problem that contrastivism faces. The problem is that contrastivism cannot preserve closure, in spite of claims to the contrary by its defenders. The problem is explained and a response developed.

Keywords:

• Contrastivism
• Contextualism
• Closure
• Salience

Notes

[1] I argue this point in Kvanvig (2007).

[2] See Jonathan Schaffer (2004).

[3] See, for example, Keith DeRose (1992) and Stewart Cohen (1998).

[4] Timothy Williamson (2000) proposes the general approach in terms of competent deduction, and the qualifications beyond competent deduction can be found in John Hawthorne (2004).

[5] Schaffer’s most developed approach is contained in “Closure, Contrast, and Answer” (Schaffer 2007), defending a closure principle along the lines of C1. His most recent account favours turning the consequent of the closure principle into the claim that a certain individual is in a position to know rather than actually knowing. Since I am not sure what being in a position to know is supposed to involve, I prefer to develop a closure principle not containing this notion, as I attempt here.

[6] See Fred Dretske (1970) and Alvin Goldman (1978).

[7] See Gail Stine (1976).

[8] See Stephen Cade Hetherington (2001).