The Nature of Epistemic Trust

Abstract

This paper offers an analysis of the nature of epistemic trust (ET). With increased philosophical attention to social epistemology in general and testimony in particular, the role for an epistemic or intellectual version of trust has loomed large in recent debates. But, too often, epistemologists talk about trust without really providing a sustained examination of the concept. After some introductory comments, I begin by addressing various components key to trust simpliciter. In particular, I examine what we might think of when we consider what it means to place trust in someone. Once we have examined trust in general, we can modify this discussion to derive an epistemic version of trust—placing trust in someone for an epistemic reason. I argue that ET includes four components: belief, communication, reliance, and confidence. The first two sets (belief and communication) are distinctively epistemic and the second set of conditions (reliance and confidence) form the core of any kind of trust. Put together, both strands of concepts yield a distinctively epistemic version of trust. Together, these four conditions account for when H places ET in S that/for p. I end by addressing alternative accounts of ET and argue that they are all lacking.

Keywords:

• Trust
• Testimony
• Reliance
• Confidence

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Richard Combes and J. Aaron Simmons as well as two anonymous journal referees for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. They have all greatly improved my thoughts and arguments.