Diving Deeper into the Concept of ‘Cultural Heritage’ and Its Relationship with Epistemic Diversity

ABSTRACT

First, the article illustrates the concept of ‘cultural heritage’ as traditionally meant, namely relying on a historically consolidated narrative. Next, it undertakes a broader conceptual analysis and deals with three distinct issues: (i) the fact that the conceptualizations and uses of heritage largely depend on long lasting dichotomies (e.g., tangible/intangible, natural/cultural); (ii) the way in which cultural backgrounds shape the dynamics of valuing and approaching heritage; (iii) the temporal framing of heritage, which today, in the Anthropocene, also points towards how to deal with a future of uncertainty. Lastly, it introduces the notion of epistemic heritage, (i.e., the existence of multiple cultural ways of knowing), investigating its implications for both how cultural heritage is conceived and the future approached.

KEYWORDS:

• Cultural heritage
• cultural construction of heritage
• heritage in the Anthropocene
• epistemic heritage

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. The term ‘folklore’, as today intangible heritage, is used to refer to diverse forms of traditional and popular culture, which have been transmitted orally or by gesture, and maintained through processes of social recreation.

2. In 2008 oral and graphic expressions of the Wajapi have been included in the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.

3. The ICHC only applies to intangible heritage that is still existing, supporting endangered but still living traditions. Manifestations and expressions that are no longer in use are seen as part of cultural history, but not as heritage in terms of the Convention.

4. Taking this to the extreme, it could be said that even speaking about preserving the system might be misplaced, as it implies an active intervention, which may interfere on how cultural groups relate to their own cultural history (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2004). At least in certain situations, rather than intervening, it would be more appropriate to enable the natural cycle of a tradition.

5. On the contrary, ‘bottom-up’ approaches are more capable to catch common people’s attitude towards heritage, which is less inclined to grand structures (e.g., Macdonald 2013), while seeking to preserve the ‘sense of place’ (e.g., Harrison and Rose 2010); they also help to acknowledge the existence of ‘unofficial’ forms of heritage, often disregarded by the official account, which mostly have a regional basis or correspond to the heritage of minorities (e.g., migrant groups) (Harrison 2013).

6. This also contributes to create conditions under which it becomes easier to bypass key cultural norms or to trivialize and misrepresent cultural expressions, e.g., through the diffusion of stereotypes and caricatural portrayals (e.g., Matthes 2018).

7. Matthes (2015) distinguishes two subcategories of universal reason, which partially mitigate the divide between these two views: (i) monistic universal reason, (i.e., everyone has the same single reason to value the same thing), and (ii) pluralistic universal reason, (i.e., everyone is warranted to value the same thing), and yet this is not due to a single shared reason; rather, the reasons to value the same thing differ, for example owing to the fact that diverse forms of positional valuing overlap.

8. The human/nonhuman divide is today a highly debated topic in Western contemporaneity too (e.g., Haraway 1991).

9. In the most extreme cases, the death of the tree could even elicit the death of people who used to live in strict entanglement with it, as told by many Aboriginal stories (e.g., Harrison and Rose 2010).

10. Issues like these intersect the discussion about cultural property, and whether specific rights and restrictions should be admitted, in response to the claims of particular groups. The question, on which internationalists and nationalists clash (e.g., Merryman 1986), cannot be properly understood unless geopolitical matters and power distribution among cultural groups are considered too.

11. First it was recognized that the Kennewick Man had the most genetic similarity with modern Native Americans, including the tribes living in the region where the skeletons were found; subsequently, the possibility to establish a reliable link between the Kennewick Man and any of the Native American tribes came to be denied; finally, the existence of such a link was scientifically proven, and the skeletons returned to the tribes for reburial in line with their traditions, as ruled by the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).

12. Colonization might take the form of cultural appropriation, (i.e., exploiting cultural resources that belong to other cultural groups). This could also involve the abolition of key cultural practices (Coleman, Coombe, and MacArailt 2012) and the silencing of traditional performers, whose cultural expertise is denied or not given chances for expression (Coombe 1993; Hladki 1994). The overall result is cultural assimilation and erosion (Rogers 2006). This issue intersects with the more general question of epistemic justice, as discussed in various philosophical works (e.g., Dotson 2011; Fricker 2007).

13. Several ongoing initiatives actually reflect the spirit of the ark. For instance, the Arch Mission (www.archmission.org), which has the purpose to create data storage archives (i.e., the Arch Libraries) for preserving knowledge; such archives are designed, by means of advances technologies, to last for many millennia and survive on Earth as well as across the solar system. Another is the Memory of Mankind (www.memory-of-mankind.com), which has instead the purpose to collect stories about human life in its multiple expressions and ordinariness, and to record them in enduring ceramic tablets; the latter are then stored deep underground in the Hallstatt’s salt mine, the oldest in the world.

14. My stance here should not be mistaken with relativism. Whereas I admit, in principle, multiple legitimate sets of epistemic norms, I am still committed to avoiding a number of relativist implications: (i) considering all epistemic systems as equally good, aprioristically and irrespective of their content, and (ii) thinking that reality imposes no restrictions upon the array of epistemic activities one can successfully undertake (Mazzocchi 2018; for a critical discussion on the thesis of epistemic pluralism, see instead; Boghossian 2006).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Fulvio Mazzocchi

Fulvio Mazzocchi, biologist and philosopher, is a researcher at the Institute of Heritage Science of the CNR (Italy). His research activity is focused on philosophical issues of scientific research, epistemic pluralism, philosophy of cultural heritage, and knowledge organization.