Strengthening the Epistemic Case against Epistocracy and for Democracy

ABSTRACT

Is epistocracy epistemically superior to democracy? In this paper, I scrutinize some of the arguments for and against the epistemic superiority of epistocracy. Using empirical results from the literature on the epistemic benefits of diversity as well as the epistemic contributions of citizen science, I strengthen the case against epistocracy and for democracy. Disenfranchising, or otherwise discouraging anyone to participate in political life, on the basis of them not possessing a certain body of (social scientific) knowledge, is untenable also from an epistemic point of view. Rather than focussing on individual competence, we should pay attention to the social constellation through which we produce knowledge to make sure we decrease epistemic loss (by ensuring diversity and inclusion) and increase epistemic productivity (by fostering a multiplicity of perspectives interacting fruitfully). Achieving those epistemic benefits requires a more democratic approach that differs significantly from epistocracy.

KEYWORDS:

• Epistocracy
• epistemic inclusion
• citizen science
• scientific pluralism

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Epistocracy is characterised by Reiss as follows: “(…) all forms have in common that voting power is roughly proportional to the voter’s knowledge of social science facts and principles. An epistocracy suppresses the voices of incompetent individuals by banning them from voting altogether, by giving fewer votes to them than to more competent individuals, or by blocking incompetent decisions through a body of experts with veto power.” (Reiss 2019, 184). In general, one could think of systems in which political influence is distributed in accordance with citizens’ knowledge levels. This could be done, (e.g. via a plural voting scheme), the disenfranchisement of citizens unable to pass a competency test, or, outsourcing important political decisions to experts.

2. Obviously there are different understandings of what democracy is, a quick glance at the democratic theory literature will tell you that. In this paper, I will understand democracy in general terms as more inclusive (including the entire demos) in contrast to the more exclusive epistocracy, without going into different versions of democracy. My arguments will present the benefits of having more democracy – epistemically speaking – rather than more epistocracy (it might also imply that we need more democratic epistemic processes than we currently have).

3. One mystery to me in the epistocrats enthusiastically going after the less well-informed and less rational population and discussing ordinary people’s bad choices at length, is how they go about feedback from those people on whose behalf they decide? And how would epistocrats possibly improve or make better choices without feedback, without pooling information from the non-epistocrats?

4. When specifying questions, we do not simply ask ‘Why f?’, but rather ‘Why f rather than c?’ We choose a contrast class. This insight is often illustrated by an anecdote regarding the bank robber Willie Sutton. When asked why he robbed banks, Sutton replied: “Because that’s where the money is.” While the questioner might have had the following question in mind: “Why do you rob banks, rather than leading an honest life?” Sutton answered a question with a different contrast class: “Why do you rob banks, rather than grocery stores?”

5. This example was elaborated by Fricker (2007). The introduction of the term “sexual harassment” in the 1970s implied alleviating a form of hermeneutical injustice – an injustice that refers to lacking a shared terminology to aptly convey one’s experiences. It is not easy to adequately convey thoughts or feelings without having an accurate shared language to express them, thus the introduction of an apt term enables turning those thoughts and feelings into a public concern.

6. Epistemic productivity is being understood here in terms of our capacity to answer our questions effectively, (i.e. answering important questions in the best way possible) (cf. Van Bouwel 2022).

7. In such a way that we could say that epistocracy limits epistemic productivity by excluding. For the importance of representation of different groups in science and the connection to epistemic productivity, see Van Bouwel (2022).

8. This might serve as a good example of a way to address testimonial injustice (cf. Fricker 2007) – an injustice that questions the capacity of a person to be a producer of knowledge and that is often based on prejudices assigning a lower level of credibility to a speaker’s testimony. The discussion of their experiences in a group setting might also be a way to overcome hermeneutical injustice by finding words, an apt terminology, to put to their experiences.

9. This might circle back to how one understands science (and the need to democratize it or not): some understand it as solving a puzzle where scientists know themselves which pieces of the puzzle are still missing and should be looked for, so scientists know what the research agenda should be. Some, i.a. defenders of scientific pluralism, understand science more like mapmaking, where it is less obvious that scientists would decide all by themselves what kind of maps (i.e. what concerns, whose epistemic interests) should be prioritized.

10. This plea for including more perspectives has a methodological pendant in that the current methodological conventions about standards of evidence and causal inference risk silencing local and contextual knowledge that arises from lived experience. Methods like historical and ethnographic research as well as case studies are needed to avoid ignorance about questions and topics that are not well suited to quantitative social science.

11. Defending this position obviously does not imply that every perspective should be considered just as epistemically successful or productive in addressing specific questions; often there will be both strengths and weaknesses. Important is the openness of perspectives for being corrected or fine-tuned via mutual criticism.

12. I use Phillips’ work as an argument for the epistemic benefits of diversity. Anderson’s quote clarifies how including more individuals might maximize these benefits. This results in a case for inclusion and democracy, and against epistocracy and the exclusion it implies. It does not say anything about the ideal size of a diverse, inclusive epistemic democracy though. Biological research suggests that there might be a maximum size of a group in which collective intelligence flourishes: “Work from the collective intelligence literature suggests intermediate optimal group sizes in complex environments and highlights the difficulty of wise decision making in large groups. Evolutionary mechanisms that encourage cooperation or coordination may be scale dependent, requiring institutions such as religion and governance to maintain these properties as group size increases. (…) changes in scale alone have the potential to alter a group’s ability to make accurate decisions, reach a clear majority, and cooperate” (Bak-Coleman et al. 2021).

13. Chick (2022) writes the following about the epistemic benefits of testimony: “First, it introduces new information about how events are experienced, or how they are felt. Second, it helps hearers connect their individual experiences to experiences that speakers convey. Third, it can serve as an invitation to conceive of entirely new experiences. (…) These three epistemic benefits of testimony can work together to produce two additional advantages. They can prompt hearers to recognize that their own experiences are not universal or generalizable, promoting ‘awareness of their own positionality.’ And they can deepen a hearer’s capacities to apply what they learn through testimony to related new cases, promoting understanding.”

14. For a good intro into citizen science, see Cavalier and Kennedy (2016).

15. This can be both critical and constructive. However, the inclusion of citizens in science and governance bodies is no panacea. It opens up for abuse as many corporations have understood, (see, e.g. Fernandez Pinto (2018)).

16. Brennan also adds: “perhaps while statistically controlling for the influence of race, income, sex, and/or other demographic factors” (Brennan 2016, 15). While sophisticated, it also raises a lot of questions about the choice, definition and relative weight of the different demographic factors.

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Notes on contributors

Jeroen Van Bouwel

Jeroen Van Bouwel is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science and a Visiting Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Moral Science at Ghent University. His research areas include philosophy of the social sciences, social epistemology, and the relations between science and democracy. His work has appeared in, inter alia, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Economics & Philosophy, Social Epistemology, Perspectives on Science, History and Theory, Journal for General Philosophy of Science as well as in numerous collected volumes, handbooks, and encyclopedias. His books include The Social Sciences and Democracy (2009, editor), Scientific Explanation (2013, co-authored with Erik Weber and Leen De Vreese), and The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Political Science (2022, co-edited with Harold Kincaid).