Normative Naturalism and Epistemic Relativism

Abstract

In previous work, I defended Larry Laudan against the criticism that the axiological component of his normative naturalism lacks a naturalistic justification. I argued that this criticism depends on an equivocation over the term ‘naturalism’ and that it begs the question against what we are entitled to include in our concept of nature. In this paper, I generalize that argument and explore its implications for Laudan and other proponents of epistemic naturalism. Here, I argue that a commitment to naturalism in the methods and aims of science inevitably entails a kind of epistemic relativism. However, I argue that this should not be interpreted as a reductio of naturalism, since the admission of contextually based standards and aims of science does not result in quietism when it comes to important questions concerning scientific rationality.

Acknowledgements

I first started working on the ideas in this paper when I was writing my Ph.D. thesis at the University of Toronto under the supervision of Jim Brown, and I want to thank him for his insight and guidance on these issues. I would also like to thank the anonymous referees of ISPS whose detailed comments on an earlier draft of this paper were instrumental in helping me to improve it.

Notes

[1] See, for instance, Giere (1985, 1989), Stump (1991, 1992), and Kitcher (1992, 1993).

[2] In Freedman (1999), I discuss a number of problems facing the methodological component of Laudan’s naturalism.

[3] A number of Laudan’s critics reject this historical picture (and the issue is further confused by semantics, as what some call a method others call an aim); see Leplin (1990, 24) and Rosenberg (1990, 36). Knowles (2002, 176–78) also disagrees with this historical story, and argues further that it renders untenable Laudan’s account of progress in science.

[4] See Laudan (1984, 63) for a helpful diagram of the reticulated model.

[5] Laudan (1984) also identifies a second criterion for the rational evaluation of aims, which is the harmonization of implicit and explicit aims, but this criterion is virtually absent from his later writings; it is the realizability criterion that Laudan continues to rely on (Laudan 1987a, 1987b, 1990a, 1990b, 1996).

[6] See Laudan (1984, 51–53) for examples of three utopian strategies: demonstrable utopianism, semantic utopianism, and epistemic utopianism.

[7] Some of these responses were helpfully pointed out to me by the reviewers at ISPS.

[8] One example of this can be found in the work of Mallett (2000, 2003), a distinguished physicist at the University of Connecticut whose current research looks at weak and strong gravitational fields as a basis for time travel.

[9] Of course, while it seemed to everyone (except perhaps Kuhn himself) that he was committed to this kind of epistemic relativism in Structure (1962/1970), Kuhn (1970) later argued that the rationality of science could be partially preserved in light of the fact that the history of science presents us with a more or less constant set of (five) objective values.

[10] See in particular Longino (1995, 2002).

[11] Knowles (2002, 179) disagrees. He argues that this form of relativism is pernicious, but for reasons different from those examined here.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Karyn L. Freedman

Karyn L. Freedman is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph, Canada.