Interpreting Causality in the Health Sciences

Abstract

We argue that the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of evidence both of physical mechanisms, and of probabilistic dependencies. Consequently, an analysis of causality solely in terms of physical mechanisms or solely in terms of probabilistic relationships, does not do justice to the causal claims of these sciences. Yet there seems to be a single relation of cause in these sciences—pluralism about causality will not do either. Instead, we maintain, the health sciences require a theory of causality that unifies its mechanistic and probabilistic aspects. We argue that the epistemic theory of causality provides the required unification.

Acknowledgements

This research forms a part of the project Causality and Probability in the Social and Health Sciences. We are grateful to the British Academy and to the Fonds Spécial de Recherche (Université catholique de Louvain) for funding this project.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Federica Russo

Federica Russo and Jon Williamson are at the Department of Philosophy, University of Kent.