Abstract
The influence that philosophy of science has had on scientific practice is as controversial as it is undeniable, especially in the case of biology. The dynamic between philosophy and biology as disciplines has developed along two different lines that can be characterized as ‘paternal’, on the one hand, and more ‘fraternal’, on the other. The role Popperian principles of demarcation and falsifiability have played in both the systematics community as well as the ongoing evolution–creation debates illustrate these contrasting forms of interdisciplinary engagement, underscoring the influence philosophy of science in shaping our contemporary understanding of biology in the North American context. However, a strict disciplinary distinction between philosophy and science may itself be a false dichotomy that risks hampering future development of the biological sciences. By actively engaging with philosophical considerations as an integral part of their scientific practice, nineteenth‐century biologists offer an interesting counterpoint to current trends of overspecialization and provide a model of scientists who avoided extremes of antagonism with, or subservience to, philosophy.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Daniel McShea, Yuichiro Suzuki, and the editorial guidance of ISPS and two anonymous reviewers for constructive and insightful comments on earlier drafts on this paper. This paper emerged from a talk originally presented at the 2007 Sci‐Phi Symposium sponsored by SUNY Stony Brook, and I thank its organizers Massimo Pigliucci and Robert Crease for providing the initial opportunity to develop this topic more fully.
Notes
[1] Aware of the generally gender‐specific nature of the term ‘fraternal’, I intend to use it here in a gender‐neutral sense of ‘sibling relationship’, much like ‘fraternal twins’ who can be of any sex. ‘Fraternal’ was specifically chosen because of its additional connotations of amity and cooperation, which are not implicit in alternative terms.