Nominal Definition in the Writings of Ibn Taymiyya

Abstract

I endeavour in this article to present Ibn Taymiyya's theory of nominal definition as an alternative to logical definition. Ibn Taymiyya argues that nominal definition is based on concrete principles that are subject to experiment. Furthermore, the function of definition is akin to the ‘name’ because it aims at distinguishing any one object from others but not at reaching the entity of things. Nominal definition aims to define the name or the named, and this aim can be achieved by translation or by interpretation. Translation is the movement from one name to another or from one named object to another. Interpretation is movement from a name to a named object or from a named object to a name.

Acknowledgements

I thank the anonymous referee of this journal for helpful comments on a previous draft.

Notes

[1] Socrates is considered the first philosopher to discuss the notion of definition through his dialogues in an attempt to establish a definition for the quiddity of virtue. He tried to find a stable and absolute image of the terms in order to establish the notion of knowledge based on stable definitions in order to reach the universal. Therefore definition constitutes the beginning of the philosophical debate that aims at acquisition of knowledge. After him, Aristotle discussed the notion of definition and laid down the bases of logic. He believed that the definition of form is by genus and differentia (Metaphysics, 7, 12, 1038a, 25–30) and aims at revealing the quiddity of objects and their truth (Analytica Posteriora, 2, 91a, 1–5).

[2] The Muslim philosophers believed that knowledge is divided into two parts: concept and judgement. Concept precedes judgement, which is the acquisition of the image of the object in the mind. It is the knowledge that is devoid of judgement and is acquired by definition. Judgement, on the other hand, is the knowledge that is accompanied by judgement and is acquired by analogy or syllogism. However, ʿUthmān Amīn (1945, 231) believes that this difference (differentia) is found among the Stoics who spoke about two parallel terms: phantasia and synkatathesis. This implies that Stoic philosophy reached the Muslims in a certain way despite the absence of direct evidence. Unlike Amīn, I believe that there is some difference in the meanings of these terms: the meaning of phantasia in Stoic philosophy is the impression or presentation that is considered certainty of the existence of things. The correctness of presentation is connected to another epistemological process known as Synkatathesis, which you may give or withhold at will. Since mature human beings are rational, and this means that their impressions are called ‘rational impressions’, meaning that their content can be expressed in language. Strictly speaking it is the proposition associated with it that we are taking to be true when we assent to an impression (Sedley 1998, 150). Thus, concept for the Stoics is connected to materialistic things, while concept in Islamic philosophy deals with metaphysical issues.